The Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism

Towards an Individuated Approach to Cultural Diversity

A. Vitikainen

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137404626
• Topic: Philosophie
• Subtopic: Philosophie politique

The Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism provides a timely analysis of some of the weaknesses, as well as the successes, of the liberal multicultural project. It also takes a step forward by developing a pluralist, individual-centred approach to allocating minority rights in practice.

1

Introduction

Since the 1990s, multiculturalism has become a household term. The term has been used to champion the recognition and respect of cultural diversity and difference, but it has also been used to indicate everything that is wrong with this difference. Multiculturalism, in common public discourse, refers to the idea of accepting cultural diversity and the multiplicity of cultural and religious groups within society. It also refers to the aim of accommodating, even catering for, this diversity and for people’s distinctive cultural or religious identities. At the level of state policies, multiculturalism has been used to refer to particular types of policy approaches that aim to accommodate people’s cultural differences, including a variety of minority rights, such as exemptions, assistance rights, special representation, symbolic recognition, and so on.

At the turn of the millennium – after a tremendous upsurge of literature and a wide adoption of multicultural policies in western liberal societies – Will Kymlicka declared a victory for the liberal (multi)cultural position.¹ This declaration was, as we now know, premature. In the theoretical arena, the liberal egalitarian and feminist critiques of various forms of multiculturalism shifted the focus of debate from liberal multiculturalism back to the basic tenets of liberalism, questioning the need, feasibility, as well as the desire for a specific theoretical framework of multiculturalism.² In the political arena, many of the previously adopted policies of cultural accommodation were questioned, and the main concerns shifted from the accommodation of people’s cultural differences to the questions of integration, in the landscape of deep – sometimes even hostile – diversity.

The above characterization of the multiculturalism debate as a simple ‘yes or no’ affair neither, of course, pay sufficient respect to the early debates on multiculturalism, nor to the later attempts to formulate ever more sophisticated approaches to cultural diversity. The apparent theoretical, as well as political, backlashes against multiculturalism have already been questioned, and there have been several notable attempts to reformulate and reconceptualize the liberal multicultural position anew.³ The notions of cultural heterogeneity, gender equality and respect for human rights are now at the centre of any theory of multiculturalism, and there have also been attempts to extend the traditionally state-centred debates on cultural diversity to the global arena.⁴ Many of the multicultural policies, including the sensitizing of school curriculums and granting of religious exemptions, have become common policies in liberal states, although there is, no doubt, live controversy and debate on many of these policies in public arenas.⁵

Given the rise, fall, and (partial) resurrection of multiculturalism both in theory and in practice, it has become important to see why this development has taken place, and why, even among current theorists of multiculturalism, there is certain unease about the liberal multicultural project in practice. It has also become important to assess the benefits, as well as the limitations, of the liberal multicultural project, and to look for ways forward. In this book, I take up these tasks by situating the contemporary debates on particular cultural policies into the broader theoretical frameworks of liberalism and liberal multicultural theory. I show how the traditional debates on liberalism and liberal multiculturalism have provided frameworks for the more concrete debates on state policies, and how these policies – as legitimate responses within liberal societies – may be developed. While I argue that there are certain limitations to the proper scope of liberal multicultural theories, I also argue for a need to refocus these theories from the common questions about the justifiability of differentiated treatment to the questions of allocation – that is, to the questions of to whom, and according to which principles, should differentiated treatment be extended.

Liberalism, liberal multiculturalism, and state policies

As a political philosopher, my starting point for the debate on multiculturalism lies in the various normative questions of cultural accommodation and cultural policies within liberal democratic societies. Why should the liberal state be concerned about people’s cultural differences or culturally induced disadvantages? How should the state respond to these differences? Upon what grounds should the liberal state base its cultural policies? Can these policies, including a variety of minority- or culturally-differentiated rights, even be justified within the liberal framework? And if they can, to whom should they be granted?

As demonstrated by the above questions, there are certain links between liberal multicultural theories and liberal multicultural practice, although the exact nature and content of such links may be contested. To what extent should liberal multicultural theories guide the actual policies of the liberal state? To what extent should cultural concerns be taken into account when designing state policies? What are the policy implications of the liberal justification of minority rights? What guidance do liberal multicultural theories give to the allocation of these rights?

In this book, I discuss both the more traditional normative questions of liberal multiculturalism, and the latter questions of linking the liberal multicultural theories and political practice. I will show that liberal multicultural theories have been successful in clarifying the grounds upon which the liberal responses to cultural diversity should reside and in showing that the culturally differentiated rights are not necessarily incompatible with the basic liberal values and principles. The liberal multicultural project is, however, primarily a theoretical project, and thus gives no definitive guidance on the policies of the liberal state. It does, however, provide normative frameworks within which the liberal responses to cultural diversity should reside, including normative frameworks for the allocation of culturally differentiated rights.

Before discussing the complex questions of allocating minority- or culturally differentiated rights⁶ within the liberal framework, let us pause for a moment to look at the general domain of discussions in which theorists of liberal multiculturalism have engaged. This domain can be seen to incorporate three levels of debate. Firstly, there are the debates inherent to liberal theory (Theory 1). Secondly, there are debates about how this theory should be modified or applied to circumstances of cultural diversity (Theory 2/Application 1). And thirdly, there are debates about the actual cultural policies that the liberal state should adopt as a response to cultural diversity (Application 2). These three levels of debate can also be used to explain why the liberal multicultural project has come under attack, and why, even among the current proponents of liberal multiculturalism, there is still certain unease about the applicability of liberal multicultural theories in practice.

The first level of debates (Theory 1: Liberalism) operates at the level of traditional liberal theory, and is primarily occupied with questions concerning basic liberal commitments, values and principles. As will be shown during the course of this work, the liberal theorists of multiculturalism share certain commitments to the primacy of the individual and to some form of state neutrality, although they differ in their views on how to interpret these commitments. They also differ in their views on the ordering of the key liberal values of individual freedom, autonomy and equality, although these values and commitments have – and, as I argue, also should have – a central place in any liberal theory of multiculturalism.

The second level of debates (Theory 2/Application 1: Liberal multiculturalism) forms the very core of debates on liberal responses to cultural diversity. This incorporates questions about the normative bases for state responses to cultural diversity, and about the justification of different kinds of cultural policies, including minority rights. This level of discussion operates in close relation to the first level (Theory 1: Liberalism), and may perhaps better be viewed as an extension or theoretical application of the initial theory framework of liberalism (hence the expression ‘Theory 2/Application 1’).

The third level of debates (Application 2: Actual state policies) is somewhat different from the two previous levels as it operates mainly in the political rather than theoretical arena. How should the liberal state respond to particular cases of cultural conflict? What policies should it adopt in any given circumstances? While the actual state policies should, no doubt, be consistent with the theoretical frameworks described above, in this book I show that liberal multicultural theories provide very little guidance for the actual policies of the liberal state. Instead, they stay – and also should stay – relatively silent with respect to actual state policies, leaving substantive scope of legitimate variation to the state policies in any given circumstances.

This gap between the two first levels of discussion (Liberalism and Liberal multiculturalism) and actual state policies can be further illustrated with the help of the work of Will Kymlicka, and his initial framing of debates on liberal multiculturalism. In his ground-breaking works Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989) and Multicultural Citizenship (1995), Kymlicka set the task of answering the question of whether the cultural claims of minority groups could be reconciled with liberalism. This question incorporates two distinct (although interrelated) questions about the role of culture and cultural claims in liberal politics, and the compatibility of culturally differentiated or minority rights with the basic liberal values and principles. As I discuss especially in Chapter 2 and 3, Kymlicka’s arguments were not always clear and addressed several different issues (the exposition of which was often wanting), but the general aim of Kymlicka’s work was, nevertheless, obvious: the reconciliation of cultural claims and multicultural policies (minority rights) with liberalism.

Importantly, the initial questions posed by Kymlicka are located firmly within the two first levels of debate described above (Liberalism and Liberal multiculturalism). The first question relating to the role of culture and cultural claims in liberal politics, is a question about the rationale for the liberal state to take cultural considerations into account when designing state policies. This question about state rationale (A) combined with the question about the compatibility of minority rights with liberalism (B) form the very centre of debates on cultural accommodation and, as I will argue, the liberal multicultural project has been relatively successful in answering these two questions. Many liberal theorists of multiculturalism (including Kymlicka), however, also wish their theories to be applicable in practice, aiming to give guidance to the policies of the liberal state. These questions of actual state policies (C), however, operate at a very different level compared to the two previous questions (A & B) and, as will be seen during the course of this work, there has been a tendency of the liberal theorists of multiculturalism to conflate these three questions of rationale (A), compatibility (B) and actual state policies (C). While I argue that the liberal multicultural project has been successful in showing that there is rationale for the liberal state to take cultural considerations into account (A), and that the culturally differentiated rights (variously construed) are not necessarily incompatible with the basic liberal values and principles (B), the scope of the arguments given by the main theorists of liberal multiculturalism does not extend to the questions of state policies (C). This has to do with the location of the questions on different levels of debate, and with the analytic separation of the three questions (A, B and C). The three levels of debate and the location of each question within the debates are illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 1.1 Three levels of debate on liberal multiculturalism

While Kymlicka’s initial framing of debates is, by no means, the only way to approach questions of cultural accommodation within liberal democratic societies, the influence of Kymlicka’s approach on later discussions on multiculturalism cannot be overestimated. Not only have people used Kymlicka’s framework to argue for a variety of minority rights in different contexts, the alternative liberal theories of multiculturalism have also posited themselves in relation, and in opposition, to Kymlicka. Furthermore, and perhaps more problematically, Kymlicka’s initial questions – those of the reconciliation of cultural claims and multicultural policies with liberalism – were widely adopted. Much of the subsequent theoretical discussion on multiculturalism has operated precisely at the level of trying to justify (or reject) the taking into account of cultural claims at the level of liberal policies and the possibly, although by no means necessarily, resulting differentiated rights.

Given the initial framing of debates, the approach developed in this book is very critical of the applicability of liberal multicultural theories in practice. The theoretical nature of the liberal multicultural project renders it relatively silent with respect to actual state policies. The key debates and central disagreements of liberal multiculturalism are located firmly within the liberal theoretical frameworks, and attempts to extend the scope of the arguments conducted at the theoretical level to the level of policy application have, to a large extent, failed. Many of the critiques, even the so-called retreat from liberal multiculturalism, may have to do with these internal difficulties, and the promises of the liberal multicultural theorists to provide more than they can deliver.

Having said that, the successes of the liberal multicultural project, discussed especially in Part I of this book, have also opened new discussions and provided ways for the liberal multicultural project to move forward. In Part II, I thus embark on one of these ways: that relating to the questions of allocating culturally differentiated rights in practice. These questions of allocation, it should be noted, are analytically separate from questions of justification, although, as I will show, the proper modes of allocation are also dependent on the rationales for having any particular right in the first place. The minority- or culturally differentiated rights are, of course, of various kinds, and the principles of allocating these rights must also take these variations into account.

Minority rights and membership-based allocation

The questions of allocating minority rights within liberal democratic societies can be described as follows. Let us presume that culturally differentiated rights (variously construed) are legitimate policy options of the liberal state. The culturally induced disadvantages are proper concerns of the liberal state, and one of the ways to alleviate these disadvantages is by granting culturally differentiated rights. The question arises: to whom should these rights be granted. The dominant position, among liberal theorists of multiculturalism, is to view these rights as group-based or membership-based rights that are granted either to groups as collectives or to individual members of groups by virtue of their membership in the group in question.

This view of minority rights as primarily group-based or membership-based rights is, however, problematic for several reasons. As I argue, especially in Chapter 5 and 6, there are no uncontested criteria for establishing one’s membership in any particular group. This may, already, question the default criterion of group membership as the relevant criterion of allocation. Further, as minority rights are always defined in particular contexts, they are also inherently tied to particular cultural norms and practices, and to particular interpretations of these practices. There is, however, no inherent link between one’s group membership and one’s adherence to the norms and practices that the rights in question are aiming to accommodate, and the criteria of allocation should take this into account. Instead of viewing culturally differentiated rights as primarily group-based or membership-based rights, in this work, I argue that culturally differentiated rights should be viewed primarily as rights of individuals who either do or do not happen to be members of any particular cultural or religious groups.

The variety of culturally differentiated rights and the variety of normative considerations relevant to such rights pose certain challenges to any account of multiculturalism, including the individuated approach developed here. Minority rights differ, both with respect to the structure as well as the content of such rights. The above-mentioned differentiation between individually exercised ‘membership rights’ and collectively exercised ‘...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Introduction
• Part I  Justifying Minority Rights: The Grand Theories and Their Constraints
• Part II  Liberal Multiculturalism and Allocation of Minority Rights
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index