The Formation of the BRICS and its Implication for the United States

Emerging Together

M. Schaefer, J. Poffenbarger

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137387943
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Schaefer and Poffenbarger assess whether the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are attempting to balance US power and analyze the United States' responses to the creation of this IGO through a mix of theoretical and policy-focused approaches.

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Introduction: Are These BRICS for Building?

Abstract: Schaefer and Poffenbarger contend that the BRICS exist as a possible balancing coalition that could seek to constrain the United States, working to end its “unipolar moment.” The balancing literature is reviewed to show the complete spectrum of balancing behavior from soft balancing to traditional forms of hard balancing. Schaefer and Poffenbarger review the functionalism literature in regards to the development of international organizations (IOs). The BRICS currently exist as a diverse and informal IO. If the body seeks to strongly check US power functional cooperation will have to take place to spur increased formalization. The United States must recognize that the BRICS is a response to US foreign policy, and that it should consider engaging in policies that limit challengers.

Schaefer, Mark E. and John G. Poffenbarger. The Formation of the BRICS and Its Implication for the United States: Emerging Together. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. DOI: 10.1057/9781137387943.0003.

Are these BRICS for building?

The creation of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is a unique case in the study of intergovernmental organization (IGO) formation, as well as a potential case of alliance formation and balancing behavior.¹ The BRICS began as the BRIC states and included Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The grouping has since added South Africa as its fifth member. The BRIC began with just a name. The name originated in 2001 with Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs as a term for emerging financial powers. The influence of these emerging states in global finance and their potential as a source of greater global power drew the states to begin meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006, during the G8 Summit in 2008, and to begin annual BRIC summits in 2009.² The BRIC states began to take their status as emerging powers seriously as the fallout of the 2008 global financial crisis became apparent.³ The weakness of the Western Order certainly created both uncertainty and opportunity for these emerging powers. Each of the BRICS members sat on what they felt was a turning point for their development and status in the international system, and yet these economic and power gains were largely influenced by a global economy that is regulated largely from Washington. The 2008 meeting of BRIC finance ministers saw a call for a larger say in world politics and a larger role in the regulation of the global economy.⁴ During the 2009 meetings the leaders of the BRIC states escalated their rhetoric when they jointly called for collective decision-making, coordinated action, and a return to a multipolar world.⁵ These requests should resonate with United States and the foreign policy community, as they are camped in the rhetoric of balancing. Policies that seek to return a unipolar system to multipolarity sound of balancing in many forms, whereas policies that work toward collective action among emerging powers can certainly be read as soft balancing, what must be determined is the level of willingness behind such goals.

It is this rhetoric and the escalation of the BRICS formation that drew our attention to the BRICS. This study began as a work to attempt to come to grips with strategies that can be employed by states to avoid balancing and encourage bandwagoning. The work is based on the assumption that states have an interest in mitigating balancing behavior and in turn maximizing their power in the international system; however, we would not contend that power maximization and the avoidance of balancing would translate into an unfettered existence in the international system. Rather, if strategies are employed to prevent balancing and encourage bandwagoning, the state seeking to avoid opposition will likely have to make sacrifices and substitutions. These externalities to avoid balancing do fetter and constrain, but they will likely represent acts of negotiated self-restraint. In short a unipolar power should work to maintain its peerless position, but in order to do this some multilateral action will be necessary. The BRICS have the potential to position themselves as a counterweight and balancer of the United States. Their balancing can take many forms from reputational challenges and soft balancing to more overt forms of hard balancing. Obstacles remain for the BRICS as they attempt to forge a bloc, but the grouping does represent the best potential challenging bloc to the United States’ current power asymmetry, and a warning to the ways that the international system can respond to unilateral uses of power and actions that are seen to disregard the established norms of the system.

The BRIC formation before the inclusion of South Africa held roughly 42 percent of the global population, 14.6 percent of GDP, and accounted for 12.8 percent of global trade.⁶ These realties in and of themselves make the grouping important, before one even begins to consider the possibility of coordinated policy action and international institution voting. South Africa’s inclusion in the grouping is demonstrative of two realities. First, the growing economic prowess of the state, and secondly the belief among BRICS members that their grouping and cohesion in key areas can help expand their rights in international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. South Africa’s influence on the continent of Africa can certainly pay dividend in increasing institutional support from other African states.⁷

The potential power of the BRICS grouping is currently hampered by its lack of codification and coordination. The states within the grouping, each champion a return to a more multipolar world and each claim to desire more coordinated and multilateral actions; however, it is not clear at this time whether the BRICS states are willing to put aside self-interested aims and power calculations for BRICS-interested concerns. The grouping seems to be a likely platform to challenge the institutional power of entrenched Western powers. However, China and Russia currently oppose the expansion of permanent member status within the Security Council to fellow BRICS members Brazil and India.⁸ Moreover, the BRICS face two significant bilateral divisions. China and Russia have had contentious relations dating back to conflicts over the centralization of leadership in Communism. China and India have had similarly cool relations highlighted with border disputes and balancing behavior.

These fault lines point to likely problems for the collective action possibilities of the BRICS grouping. It is likely that each state shares certain common interests, chiefly a desire for more power in the international arena and to limit the power of the United States. Yet, each state may fall prey to the trap of individual interests that bring more unilateral power aspirations and variations in domestic political concerns. The BRICS certainly represent a diverse background in terms of government type, military power, economic systems, growth potential, and political culture concerns. The question remains, can states with so few apparent commonalities find sufficient common interests to forge a lasting IGO? Given the possible weaknesses of the group’s cohesion and ability to take collective action and this project’s US policy-centric focus, the work will subject the BRICS formation to several tests of strength and cohesion. The project will look to both the balancing and functionalism literatures to attempt to assess the barriers that exist for joint BRICS action and the balancing possibilities that may be present for the grouping. It is our hope to present both the basement and the ceiling for the BRICS as an active counterweight to the United States. The work will also delve into the recent foreign relations and broad strategic culture of each the BRICS states. This wide-ranging use of foreign policy analysis is undertaken to shine a light on both latent similarities across the grouping and as a way to better pinpoint the existence of bilateral frictions among the membership. The work will then turn toward an analysis of United Nations vote coordination. A high degree of vote coincidence would suggest the possibility that, at a minimum, there exists a foundation of mutual interests across the BRICS. Such mutual interests could therefore be transformed into more concrete challenges to the power position of the United States, and thus constitute preparatory balancing foundations. On the null side of the house, low-to-no coincidence in UN voting rates would suggest that currently complimentary self-interests do not tend to exist among the states in question. The UN voting data can also illustrate if the bloc has begun to act in coordinated ways and if those actions are specifically directed at the United States. The work will survey the ongoing actions of the BRICS in Africa and the developing world. The BRICS have staked African development issues as a key first issue for the formation. The BRIC decision to become the BRICS with the inclusion of South Africa, the creation of the New Development Bank as a counterweight to the IMF, and the BRICS early strategy of gaining power through a mobilization of developing states will be evaluated to look for instances of functional cooperation. These independent views of the BRICS will frame the examination of the United States’ responses to the formation. We would contend that the more the BRICS behave as a bloc the more seriously the United States should treat the formation, as this work follows the assumption that the United States should be working to deter and/or eliminate overt attempts to balance its power. The project will end with an analysis of the United States’ current responses to the BRICS as well as some policy options that we would contend that the United States should employ in their relations with the BRICS states.

Hegemony and preponderances of power literature

Gilpin (1981) offers a cyclical view of world politics, whereby states rise, become overextended, and thus fall to a rising power. States become overextended when they attempt to stretch their international involvement past the point that their economic strength can sustain. Gilpin argues that each state must be aware of its limitations, and thus avoid actions that can cause such strategic overstretches that leave the hegemonic actor vulnerable to other states. All states seek to increase their control over the international system; therefore states use cost/benefit analysis to determine moves in the international system. Gilpin cites three sources of hegemonic power. First, the hegemonic actor acquires power by gaining dominance in both economic and military realms. In order to act as the hegemon a state must gain a preponderance of power in the international system. Second, a hegemon must gain the highest level of international prestige among the other states in the system. It is the maintenance of this form of power that seems to be most interesting today, as numerous scholars have entered the debate as to whether prestige and legitimacy are of importance to truly dominant powers. Third, a hegemon must create a system of international control, whereby sets of rules and norms are generated for the system. The hegemon further perpetuates its dominant position in the international system by providing public goods. However, questions abound as to whether it is necessary for the hegemonic actor to abide by its own rules.⁹

Our view of the international system is based upon the work of Gilpin. We see the United States as a preponderant power, which is significantly more powerful than its potential rivals. We contend that it possesses a preponderance of military, economic, and prestige power. However, we believe this does not mean that the United States can forget about possible balancing actions by other states. We do not believe that its power gives it total power, complete control, and an international system free of obstructions. In short, power is not enough, the United States still needs bandwagoners and it needs these bandwagoners so it can move more unencumbered and reduce the risks of losing power. It is our belief that power preservation should be a primary concern of dominant actors in the international system, and thus the more that a dominant actor can reduce balancing behavior the more likely it is to maximize its period of dominance. It is also our assertion that a dominant actor should be attuned to the power stakes inherent in each of its possible policy actions, as it should be in the business of maintaining relative power advantages.

Layne (1993) provides a compelling counterpoint to some of Gilpin’s arguments. He claims that no matter the benevolence of US actions the unipolarity that the state currently possess will be fleeting as new states will rise to challenge and balance the preponderance of power that the United States enjoys. He argues that power balances power in a Waltzian framework, as he contends that no matter how gently the United States walks it will still manage to step on the toes of some states. The author argues that differential growth rates will certainly move in ways disadvantageous to any hegemon, and thus challengers will rise.¹⁰

Layne’s work provides a response to those who argue that hegemony can be sustained. He does illustrate that challengers must make the decision to take on the role of a hegemonic balancer.¹¹ Thus, it is possible to argue th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Introduction: Are These BRICS for Building?
• 2  Are the BRICS a Sum of Their Parts?
• 3  The BRICS in Action, Well Maybe
• 4  The Power of Development and the Africa Strategy
• 5  Are These BRICS for Real? The Impact on the United States and the US Response
• Bibliography
• Index