Curriculum Studies in China

Intellectual Histories, Present Circumstances

W. Pinar, W. Pinar

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137374295
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Teacher Training

Scholars from three continents collaborate to create a truly global understanding of curriculum in the world's most populous country. This book discusses major topics in curriculum studies in China and shows how Chinese scholars understand their field's history, circumstances, and place in a globalized world.

Part I

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The Essays

Chapter 1

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Curriculum Studies and Curriculum Reform in China

1922–2012

Zhang Hua

Introduction

Curriculum studies includes curriculum history. Curriculum history is the unfolding development of curriculum studies. For any curriculum field in any nation, theoretical construction and historical perspectives are integrated. In China, with its long history of wisdom traditions for more than 2,500 years, a historical focus is a natural character of Chinese curriculum field (H. Zhang and Zhong 2003). To understand the Chinese curriculum field, it is necessary to inquire into Chinese curriculum history. In the construction of Chinese curriculum studies, we need to critically examine the wisdom traditions and historical situations in China.

As a spiritual world with its own intellectual tradition, curriculum studies in China is not necessarily a mirror reflection of curriculum reform and other practical affairs of curriculum. But curriculum practices exert influences upon curriculum studies directly or indirectly: “In the contemporary field, theory and practice are often regarded as embedded in each other” (Pinar et al. 1995). In essence, curriculum theory is practical, even for “pure theory.” Curriculum practice is theoretical, even for the “value-free practice.” In China, curriculum studies have been closely related to curriculum reform. The birth and development of curriculum studies are significantly influenced by curriculum reform—a major characteristic of Chinese curriculum studies.

In this chapter, first I will tell a story to explore the meaning of history and the value of an era’s spirit. On July 11, 1921, after more than two years of academic trips and lecturing in China, John Dewey went back to United States. Hu Shih, Dewey’s most important Chinese graduate student, wrote a short retrospective paper on the same day, “John Dewey in China.” In generalizing Dewey’s philosophy, Hu argued that “experiment or practice is the only touchstone to test truth” (Hu 1921/2001, 51).

In the early 1950s, there was a national movement to criticize Dewey’s philosophy and Hu’s thoughts; it lasted for more than 20 years. In the educational field, Dewey and Hu Shih were condemned as representatives of reactionary education. In 1978, China adopted an Open Door policy. After intense debate, the government reached the following conclusion as the new mainstream ideology: “Practice is the only standard by which to test truth” (Special Commentator 1978). Ironically, this is a restatement of Hu’s words.

That is the force of historical tendencies. At least from the early twentieth century on, the worldwide historical tendencies are democratization and internationalization. The two tendencies are intrinsically related to each other. Democracy is not limited to specific areas or countries. It must be applied all over the world, both as means and as ends. Otherwise it is a lie. In curriculum studies, internationalization is democratization. As a consciousness and a lifestyle, internationality means peaceful, interactive, and concerned living with and taking responsibility for the people in other countries or cultures. Internationalization is not the universalization of diverse culturally situated values, orientations, behavior norms, or social systems, but an ongoing complicated conversation of cultural uniqueness. Democratic life attitude and style constitutes the core of internationalization. Internationalization is cultural democratization. I argue that the Chinese curriculum field must be based on democratization and internationalization. Modern China has experienced two important national curriculum reforms: the 1922 Curriculum Reform and the 2001 Curriculum Reform. As an academic field of study and practical engagement, curriculum studies in China has enjoyed significant progress as a consequence of both reforms.

The 1922 Curriculum Reform and the Genesis of Curriculum Studies

In 1903, the Qing dynasty adopted the first modern school system, which basically copied the model of Japan.¹ In 1905, the Imperial Examination, the traditional system to choose government officials, was ended. In 1911, Qing dynasty was overthrown and the Republic of China was founded. The first curriculum reform in modern China began in 1922, during the period of the May Fourth Movement or the New Culture Movement.

The May Fourth Movement is a watershed event between traditional China and modern China. On May 4, 1919, thousands of university students in Beijing protested the Northern Warlords Government for betraying China’s interests in the Versailles Treaty after World War I, which transferred German rights in Shandong to Japan. In the days that followed, millions of students all over China joined the demonstrations. Workers in Shanghai, Beijing, and other cities went on strike to support students’ claims. Finally the students won. On the surface, the May Fourth Movement was a struggle against domestic feudalism and Western imperialism. In essence, it was a widespread movement of democratization in China. Regarding the May Fourth Movement, the famous historian Yu Ying-shih wrote:

The May Fourth Movement has a broad sense and a narrow one. Narrowly speaking, “May Fourth” means the students’ patriotic movement which happened on May 4th, 1919, in Beijing. Broadly speaking, “May Fourth” means a nation-wide cultural movement or thought movement which lasted for many years before and after that day. The upper limit can be traced back to the literature movement which happened at least two years before May 4th in 1919, i.e. 1917. The lower limit is Northern Expedition which occurred in 1927. (Y. Yu 2005)

In this essay, I adopt the “broad sense” of the May Fourth Movement. As a cultural or thought movement, its basic characteristic was democracy-claiming and science-seeking.

In the circle of thought and history, two analogies are often drawn to describe the May Fourth Movement. One is the Renaissance; the other is the Enlightenment (Y. Yu 2004; Hu 1926; Hu 1934; Schwarcz 1986). As nearly all the leaders of the May Fourth Movement advocated that the vernacular tongue replace classical language and the recovery of the dignity and honor of Chinese culture, the “Renaissance” metaphor fits here. As the May Fourth Movement initiated aggressive claims for democracy and science along with a strong critical spirit, it is often analogized to Enlightenment. Barry Keenan wrote: “The fervor of new ideas characterized the May Fourth period (1915–1924) with a sort of esprit critique reminiscent of the French Enlightenment” (Keenan 1977, 22–23) But I think neither the “Renaissance” or the “Enlightenment” can reveal fully the meaning of the May Fourth Movement as it was both the embodiment of cultural crisis in China, and the requirement of cultural transformation.

Three orientations followed from the May Fourth Movement: liberalism, radicalism, and conservatism. They are the main melodies attuning the transformation of Chinese thought and society over the past 100 years. Understanding the essence of each and the relationship among them reveals the transformative processes of Chinese thought and society, including curriculum reform and curriculum studies.

Liberalism: Liberalism is a trend of thought that tries to reconstruct Chinese traditional culture based on democracy and science. The main representatives of liberalism are Hu Shih, Fu Sinian, Jiang Menglin, and Zhang Dongxun. In the field of education, the main representative is Tao Xingzhi. The aim of liberalism, in Hu’s words, is “to make a successful connection between world civilization and the best part of our own civilization” (Grieder 1970, 160–161). In this sense, liberalism is a cultural reform. Hu imagined a tableau of the process of cultural reform in China as follows:

Slowly, quietly, but very obviously, a Chinese Renaissance will become a reality. The product of this cultural rebirth will have a doubtful appearance of the West. But after uncovering the appearance, you will find its constituent elements are essentially Chinese. The plentitude of weathering and etching will make the essentials much clearer. Due to the encounter with science and democracy in the new world, Chinese humanism and rationalism will have been revived. (Hu 1934, ix–x)

Liberalism in China has three characteristics: first, it views individual liberty, independent thought, and social democracy as central. In order to guarantee the human right of liberty and social democracy, it advocates a scientific attitude and methodology. Second, it adopts a critical spirit to analyze and solve problems in Chinese traditional culture and contemporary society based on the standards of liberty, democracy, and science. Third, it labors to recover the intrinsic elements of liberty, democracy, and science in Chinese traditional culture, recalling them as the seeds of a new civilization, helping our ancient civilization to germinate new branches.

Radicalism: In this view, at least from the mid-nineteenth century on, China has been experiencing a long-term radicalization process (Y. Yu 1993). The main provocation is the invasion of Western countries and the clash between Chinese culture and Western culture. There are said to be three rounds of cultural communication between China and foreign countries. The first round is the incorporation of Indian Buddhism into Chinese culture, from the East Han dynasty in the first century to the Tang dynasty in the mid-seventh century. The establishment of Chinese Buddhism, Zen, symbolized the accomplishment of the incorporating process and Buddhism thus became an organic part of Chinese culture. Overlapping this process was China’s cultural borrowing from the Arab world. From the seventh century to thirteenth century in late Song dynasty, China completed the incorporation of Islam civilization, which is now another organic part of Chinese culture. These two cultural incorporations, each taking up around 600 years, were peaceful, constructive, and mutually beneficial. The third round of cultural intercommunication, however, was different from the previous two. From the mid-nineteenth century on, the West has been invading China for commercial interests. The basic ways for Western countries to invade China are, as suggested by Mu Qian, “sending businessmen as the vanguards in order to gain benefits and having soldiers and warships as the props to make a big show of their powers” (Qian 2004, 15). During the continuous business, military, and cultural conflicts between China and the West, China was oppressed. Chinese people started to thoroughly reflect the problems of Chinese society and culture and opened up a restless stage in Chinese history—the stage of radicalization.

Radicalism is, then, the inevitable outcome of invasion. In the history of Chinese thought, radicalism means an attitude (and an attendant body of thought) that thoroughly denies Chinese traditional culture. The basic content of radicalism is Chinese Marxism. Its concrete forms are early Chinese Marxism in the 1910s and 1920s, the ideological trend of the “new Enlightenment” or the “new rationalism” in the 1930s, and Marxism as the mainstream ideology in China from the 1950s through the 1970s. The leading figures of radicalism during the May Fourth period include Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and Lu Xun. Radical thinkers adamantly argued for rejecting Chinese traditional culture, especially Confucianism, and replacing it with Marxism-Leninism, thereby building a socialist-communist China.

Conservatism: In China, conservatism is a trend of thought that tries to reconstruct the society based on Chinese traditional culture, including Confucianism. Conservative thinkers do not oppose democracy and modernization. In contrast, they try to realize the ideal of democracy and modernization in a practical and steady way—based on Chinese culture. For them, cultural integration is inevitable. To borrow the words of Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909), a famous Confucian in late Qing dynasty: “Chinese learning is the fundamental structure; Western learning has practical use.” The main content of conservatism is Confucianism. Because it absorbed some elements of western culture and modernized the original ideas, it is a modern Confucianism. The representatives of conservatism are Liang Shuming (1893–1988), Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei (1877–1927), Chen Yinque (1890–1969), Mei Guangdi (1890–1945), and Wu Mi (1894–1978).

Liang Shuming is a leading figure in conservatism. His ideas are very typical and representative. Liang Shuming is seen as “the last Confucian” in China (Alitto 1979). When Liang Shuming was 28 years old, he published Eastern-Western Cultures and Their Philosophies. In this book, Liang Shuming defined culture as “the life style of human beings” (Liang 1921/2006, 57). The problems of human beings and their related attitudes and lifestyles determine cultural difference. Liang discerned three attitudes or directions of human life. When human beings inevitably encounter problems in their lives, the first attitude is to march forward courageously to solve the problems in one’s surroundings and reconstruct the environment to meet one’s needs. This is “a struggle attitude” and “the original direction of life” (57). The second attitude is to turn back to one’s mind, reflect on one’s behaviors and control one’s desires in order to adapt to and make peace with the readymade environment. But the problems in the surroundings that threaten one’s life are not solved. This is “an in-harmony-with” attitude or “a-feeling-at-home-wherever-one-is” attitude and “the second direction of life” when the society has grown rich (57–58). The third attitude is to reject the human world and sidestep the problems of human life. This is an attitude of renouncing the world and “the third direction of life” when the society gets to the most advanced stage. If the first attitude requires reconstruction of the environment through problem-solving, and the second attitude means changing ourselves to adapt to circumstances, the third attitude invites us to “let go” of the problems we encounter.

Based on this understanding of human life, Liang recognized three typical cultures in the world. The first is “Western culture,” which adopts the first direction of life. Its fundamental spirit is “the will of marching forward” and both “science” and “democracy” are derived from this primacy of will (Liang 1921/2006, 31). The second is “Chinese culture,” which expresses the second direction of life. Its fundamental spirit is “the will of controlling desire and going to the mean” (59). The third is “Indian culture,” which adopts the third direction of life. Its fundamental spirit is “the will of turning back” (59). Liang claimed that each culture has its own unique characteristics. We cannot judge which culture is better: “Every culture is essentially a specific attitude or direction; no attitudes and directions are unbiased, each has its good parts and bad parts; that means we can’t say which culture is good and appropriate, and which is not so” (186–187).

I think that Liang made at least three contributions to understanding Eastern-Western culture. First, he articulated the relationship between a culture and a way of life. Second, he genera...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• Part I   The Essays
• Part II   The Exchanges
• Part III   Curriculum Studies in China
• Part IV   Epilogue: The Participants Comment
• Appendix
• List of Contributors
• Index