Democratic Governance in Northeast Asia: A Human-Centered Approach to Evaluating Democracy

A Human-Centred Approach to Evaluating Democracy

Brendan Howe

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137550453
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Comprising case studies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, this edited volume explores the key characteristics of democratic governance in Northeast Asia. Each democracy is assessed on the extent to which it enables the flourishing of social capital; prioritizes the interests of all as characterized by freedom from fear and want; and empowers all to participate in the democratic process and governance. With particular focus on the experience of minorities, this volume contends that the acid test of democratic governance is not how well the government represents the interests of the elites, or even the majority, but rather how it cares for the needs of vulnerable groups in society.

1

Measuring the Quality of Democratic Governance

Brendan Howe

Abstract: This chapter introduces variables related to the quality of governance in Northeast Asia democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). It is critical of the prioritization of macroeconomic well-being over social or political development by the neoliberal project and by states in the region. It posits that “good democratic governance” as opposed to merely efficient governance, is that set of policy prescriptions and practices which prioritizes the interests of the most vulnerable sections of society, and that the most foundational interests of these individuals can be found in newly emerging human-centric discourse in the fields of both security and development. It introduces a broad spectrum of views on democratic governance in both theory and practice, as well as containing short previews of the chapters which follow.

Keywords: democracy; governance; human development; human security; Northeast Asia; social capital

Howe, Brendan, ed. Democratic Governance in Northeast Asia: A Human-Centered Approach to Evaluating Democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. DOI: 10.1057/9781137550453.0005.

Introduction

This volume explores the key characteristics of democratic governance in Northeast Asia and its shortcomings. It examines theoretical and practical variables related to the quality of governance in all three democracies in the region (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) from a people-centered perspective. This requires a radical departure from traditional quantitative research methods which experience three major limitations: (1) they tend towards large-scale, state-centric, aggregate measurements of government and electoral efficiency rather than the quality of democratic life enjoyed by the citizens; (2) they tend to assume a one-size-fits-all model of democracy, missing regional divergence and cultural nuances; and (3) they reflect the tyranny of the majority under which significant sections of the demos may effectively be disenfranchised, persecuted, or sacrificed on the altar of conformity or for utilitarian measurements of the collective good. It does not address the literature on democratic transition – that is, which social and economic conditions are most likely to stimulate the emergence of democratic forms of governance, or consolidate them, as the three case study countries are all already considered to be consolidated democracies. Nor does it address the question as to whether democracies or authoritarian regimes offer the best hope for economic development, except tangentially through the analysis of democratic governance performance and the well-being of the citizenry.

Essentially it is critical of the prioritization of macroeconomic well-being over social or political development by the neoliberal project and by states in Northeast Asia. While this “econophoria” – whereby the solution of all society’s ills is sought through economic development – has contributed to remarkable patterns of economic growth, it has also seen the rise in importance of challenges to human well-being in both absolute and relative terms (Buzan and Segal, 1998, p.107). Kenneth Christie and Denny Roy (2001, p.5) have also highlighted the prioritization of macroeconomic development, noting that it “has assumed cult-like status” in East Asia. Far from a “rising tide lifting all boats,” this volume contests that the neoliberal project, as well as Northeast Asian developmentalism, has left significant portions of the population of the region behind. Vulnerable groups do not have their interests looked after by regional democratic governments, but rather are often sacrificed to the national development projects. The first task carried out in this volume, therefore, is a reflection on the nature of governance, democracy, and the relationships between those who govern and different representations of “the people.”

“Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs” (CGG, 1995, p.2), an ongoing and evolutionary process which looks to reconcile conflicting interests in order to protect the weak, through the rule of law, from unjust exploitation, and introduce security for all. Governance is also a process through which collective good and goods are generated so that all are better off than they would be acting individually. Governance is the process of governing or resolving the collective action problems inherent in the social construction of modern polities. For Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2009, p.xi), therefore, a “fundamental question in political science and political economy is which factors determine the institutions of collective decision making.” That is to say, how do we end up with different manifestations of governance in the institutions of government in different countries or parts of the world? Also, however, the question often asked is which manifestations perform better the central tasks of governance. Acemoglu and Robinson (2009, p.xi) identify the key division as being between democracies and “nondemocracies,” but also note that “not only is there great variation in the timing of democratization, there also are significant qualitative differences in the form that political development took.”

Good governance means different things to different people depending on their disciplinary, cultural, and organizational background. Indeed, it is an essentially contested concept with no single and exhaustive definition, nor a delimitation of its scope, that commands universal acceptance. From a neoliberal institutional perspective good governance refers to efficiency in the provision of services and economic competitiveness, comparing ineffective economies or political bodies with viable economies and political bodies (Agere, 2000, p.1). For instance, historically, “the IMF’s main focus has been on encouraging countries to correct macroeconomic imbalances, reduce inflation, and undertake key trade, exchange, and other market reforms needed to improve efficiency and support sustained economic growth” (IMF, 1997). Likewise the World Bank (2000) has emphasized that overall economic growth is crucial for generating opportunity, and that market reforms can be central in expanding opportunities for poor people assuming adequate mechanisms are in place to create new opportunities and compensate the potential losers in transitions. “Access to market opportunities and to public sector services is often strongly influenced by state and social institutions, which must be responsive and accountable to poor people” (p.7).

The contributors to this volume contend, however, that “good governance” as opposed to merely efficient governance, is that set of policy prescriptions and practices which prioritizes the interests of the most vulnerable sections of society, and that the most foundational interests of these individuals can be found in entitlement rights covered by the newly emerging human-centric discourse in the fields of both security and development. Human security is an emerging multi-disciplinary paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities at the level of individual human beings. The complexity of threats in people’s daily lives now involve transnational dimensions and have moved beyond national security, which focused solely on the threat of external military aggressions. Such threats range from poverty, to unemployment, drugs, terrorism, environmental degradation, and social disintegration (UNDP, 1994, p.11). The international community has also begun to see security threats not only between, but also within, states and focus on people in addition to states (WHO, 2002, p.218). The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, which is seen as the seminal text for the emerging paradigm, stressed the need for “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” and characterized human security as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (p.23). There are thus both internal and external pressures on governments to govern “well” rather than just efficiently. Indeed, “democratization is a process which transcends the nation state because its focus is on political and economic equality for all of humanity” (Paul, 2010, p.13). These pressures have led, despite regional and national variations, to something of an “overlapping consensus” on good governance (see Rawls, 1987, pp.1–27).

Democracy is almost universally proclaimed as the best form of governance. Lucian Pye (2010, p.21) notes that even the greatest enemies of democracy in practice, authoritarian governments, pay it the compliment of cynically labelling themselves as democracies, some as “people’s democracies” and others as “democratic republics” (or, we could add, the combination form of People’s Democratic Republics), and that this fact “is proof that in the modern world the legitimacy of governments depends upon an acknowledgement of the superior virtues of democracy.” He also warns, however, that “while there have been no alternative visions of regime types to compete with democracy, the achievement of sustainable and genuinely liberal democracy has been difficult. The rhetoric of democracy has been easier to master than the practice” (p.22). The contributors to this volume contend, therefore, that governance legitimacy is as dependent on aspects of distributive justice as it is on democratic credentials.

Recent discourse has further focused on the role played by social capital in generating and maintaining good democratic governance (Putnam, 2001; Putnam and Feldstein, 2004). Social capital constitutes the cultural component of modern societies, is generated through the interactions of all members and strata of society, is important to the efficient functioning of modern economies, and is the sine qua non of stable liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1999). Well-functioning democracies allow social capital to flourish, but also social capital is essential for the smooth functioning of democratic governance. Indeed, concern with civic virtue and community life within the liberal tradition is an important part of resisting the push toward centralization and the disappearance of small communities; and the big question concerns how to “foster a pattern of associative life that supports the liberal democratic political project . . . Pluralism is important because groups can be oppressive” (Macedo, 2010, pp.64–66).

Democratic governance should therefore function to reconcile the conflicting interests of all, and to generate collective good for them. At the most fundamental, the interests of the people may be summed up as freedom from fear and want. These concepts are best encapsulated in the paradigms of human security and human development. Governing in the interests of the people is not sufficient, as it denies equal participation to individuals and groups. As pointed out by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p.xii), because the elite loses under democracy, it naturally has an incentive to oppose or subvert it. If one is not empowered to participate fully, individual and community growth may be limited, but also, no matter how enlightened an elite is put in charge, they are unlikely to be sufficiently informed and concerned about the basic human needs and wants of the least empowered sections of society. Social capital again comes in here. Finally, given the inherent danger of a dictatorship of the majority or the sacrifice of vulnerable groups in the interests of aggregate gain, truly “good” democratic governance would not only represent all sections of society, but would also empower them, and contain elements of distributive justice, whereby the needs of the least well-off are prioritized.

Thus, in this volume, each Northeast Asian democratic case study is assessed on the extent to which it allows the flourishing of social capital; prioritizes the interests of all as characterized by freedom from fear and want, but in particular those most vulnerable to having their interests sacrificed for those of the dominant group; and empowers all to participate in the democratic process and governance. Each country also provides micro case studies of vulnerable groups excluded from one or more of these areas of qualitative democracy. The work considers convergence and divergence between the quality and experience of democratic governance in the three countries as well as in their subsidiary micro cases.

Democratic theoretical framework

Since the rise of the modern state there has been a need for a form of collective decision-making that takes into account competing desires in an increasingly complex and interdependent environment. The contemporary consensus is that democracy is the best/only form that this collective decision-making can/should take. The concept of democracy or “rule by the people” has assumed such a positive normative value that to be seen as criticizing its fundamental tenets (or being overtly “undemocratic”) is to be stigmatized as a social pariah, and to be seen as deviating from its accepted tenets in practice is to invite the label of “rogue state.”

Most commentators start with the assumption that everyone’s interests should be protected and everyone’s autonomy maximized. Throughout history there are examples of individuals and groups choosing participation in the political process over other (such as material) gains. Thus poverty-stricken independence is generally seen as preferable to (relatively) well-off dependence and/or occupation, a destitute state of freedom as preferable to being a well-fed slave. As a result, even benevolent dictatorship is automatically rejected. Likewise the various elite models of government – even if other groups are better able to look after our interests they should not be allowed to do so. Rather it is intrinsic to our development as human beings that we should be allowed to make our own mistakes and (hopefully) to learn from them. Furthermore, no matter how enlightened an elite is placed over the common people, it is unlikely that they will give equal consideration to interests that they do not share and which are not represented among their number. This may not be as a result of any callous disregard, but merely due to the pressure of time and the complexities of government. Thus in order for the wishes of all to be represented, the whole of the people must rule and exercise power collectively. According to Ross Harrison (1993, p.4), “For someone to exercise power is for their wishes to be effective. So someone is a ruler if it is the case that what happens, happens because it is in accordance with their wishes. If, then, the people rule, this means that the people’s wishes are effective.” One of the objectives of the current research, therefore, is to identify how Northeast Asian countries measure and vary on participation and political empowerment.

The following research findings allow a richer understanding of the democratic process in place in the case studies and more accurate assessment of the strength (or shortcomings) of democracy in qualitative terms. Like governance, democracy can be viewed as an essentially contested concept. While the concept of rule by the people is all very well in theory and perhaps in cases of small political communities administered by direct democracy, it is clear that the complexities of administering modern states require some degree of alienation of administrative power. Every required political decision cannot be submitted to the masses for their approval. It is impossible for millions of individuals to be given equal opportunity to express their views, or for their divergent views to be taken into account and given equal weight when decisions are made. Moreover, only if absolutely everyone agrees which option is preferable and it is thus chosen to be implemented can we truly say that what happens, happens because it is in accordance with everyone’s wishes, and that everyone rules. Rather the tendency is for modern “democracies” to be ruled by representatives in the interest of the majority.

It can be argued that these necessary departures from the pure theoretical form of democracy negate the validity of claims by all modern political systems to be democratic. If, however, we accept that political systems can depart from an “ideal” position in practice and yet still retain democratic characteristics, we can move to a more useful Wittgensteinian definition of “family resemblance,” that is, numerous political systems may be accepted as democracies despite varying degrees of “democraticness” and can be compared in the degree to which they restrict the right to, opportunity for, and actual occurrence of socio...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Measuring the Quality of Democratic Governance
• 2  The Deterioration of South Korean Democracy
• 3  Migrant Workers in South Korean Society
• 4   Japan: A Superficially Democratic State?
• 5  Non-regular Workers in Japan
• 6  Taiwanese Democracy
• 7  Debating Unpopular Issues in Taiwan
• Conclusion: Old Flaws and New Challenges
• Index