Political Elites and Decentralization Reforms in the Post-Socialist Balkans

Regional Patronage Networks in Serbia and Croatia

Alexander Kleibrink

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781137495723
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Across the globe, more powers are being devolved to local and regional levels of government. This book provides an innovative analysis of such decentralisation in transition states in the Balkans. Using new and rich data, it shows how political elites use decentralisation strategically to ensure their access to state resources.

1

Centre–Periphery Relations in the Balkans

Young democracies and transition societies face many challenges that typically emerge in the early stages of state-building processes. Among them, one central concern for national governments stands out: the core objective to consolidate the newly acquired national statehood and unity. In this endeavour, elites in the central government (centre) are in a continuous struggle with elites in the state’s subnational units (periphery). Nationalist elites often perceive demands for decentralization as a threat to the national unity of the state. Centralists base their argument for unity on the alleged and historically grown indivisibility of nation and state (Gellner 1983; Diamond and Plattner 1994; Brubaker 1995b; Hechter 2000; Migdal 2004a: 21–22; Bunce 2005). Without such “an ultimate unity of allegiance” the legitimacy of centralized rule is questioned (Laski 2003: 5).

As Stein Rokkan has shown, centre–periphery relations are, thus, “relevant to almost all organisations and institutions of a political system” (Rokkan and Urwin 1982; Flora et al. 1999: 7). Against this background, it is not surprising that the question of why some states are more decentralized than others has been central to political analyses ever since the writings of Montesquieu and the authors of the Federalist Papers in the United States (Wibbels 2006: 165). While centre–periphery structures tend to be relatively stable in mature democracies with consolidated institutions, in transition societies they are more in flux because of the rapid institutional changes. This is why the analysis in this book concentrates on the aspect of relations between centre and periphery rather than on the structural features and cleavages in which they are embedded.

Former Yugoslavia provides a rich environment for the study of centre–periphery relations because of its multi-national composition and the quasi-inbuilt need for some kind of decentralization arrangements since the foundation of a joint southern Slavic state following the First World War. This was reflected during the imperial and socialist rule in the changing division of powers between different levels of government. Indeed, borders and questions of territorial integrity were at the forefront of the civil wars in the 1990s in former Yugoslavia and remain highly divisive today. In this part of Europe, “unresolved security problems [ … ] seem to prioritize capacity-building at state centres at the expense of regional revival, and dictate a hardening of borders, rather than softening them” (Batt 2002: 27). Subnational elites and regions in the periphery have put forward particularistic demands to gain more autonomy from central governments in order to guarantee cultural rights and achieve better prospects for steering their economic development (Wolczuk 2002b: 205; Scherpereel 2007). This tension in centre–periphery relations exemplifies vividly how “issues of the social and territorial boundaries of the community surface in the construction of new democracies” (Horowitz 1994: 41).

In its most extreme form, such demands may lead to the “Balkanisation” of states; that is, an increased fragmentation of states and the often-violent secession of subnational entities as the result of ethnic conflict. While the break-up of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s provides ample evidence for this and has been reflected in a wide array of academic studies, we know much less about the underlying mechanisms of non-violent centre–periphery relations and how elite interaction in this context matters for differences in decentralization reforms. It is regrettable that the more enduring aspects of centre–periphery relations in former Yugoslavia have received far less scholarly attention than those focusing on ethnic violence. This neglects the myriad of peripheral regionalist movements in this part of Europe that have challenged centralized policies and politics without resorting to violence or secession.

How can we then explain decentralization reforms when elites in the centre have few incentives to accommodate demands for more decentralization from the periphery? This conflict is particularly strong in transition societies such as Yugoslavia’s successor states that have a recent history of ethnic conflict. In what follows I develop a novel argument for understanding decentralization reforms in such conflict-laden contexts. On the basis of a comparative study of Serbia and Croatia, I argue that elites anticipate their access to electoral and patronage resources before adopting decentralization reforms. The resource-dependent approach I suggest emphasizes that differential elite access to these resources is associated with different kinds of decentralization reforms that result in varying territorial structures. I substantiate this association by dissecting two causal chains that have resulted in different outcomes in Serbia and Croatia. The added value of this book lies in the analysis of these two less-studied cases in the post-socialist Balkans. Moreover, the book provides original micro-level data on the relationship between anticipated elite access to patronage resources and elite decisions to support decentralization reforms. My analysis contributes to our understanding of comparative politics and the study of centre–periphery relations in post-socialist transition states. At the same time, I complement the existing literature on the Balkan states that has obsessively focused on ethnic identity as the prime causal factor explaining decentralization and conflict in this region and in other multi-ethnic societies.

By stressing the importance of elite access to resources, this book fills a gap in the academic literature on the study of Balkan societies. Non-violent and contemporary decentralization processes in the Balkans have been almost absent in the literature. This constitutes a selection bias because many studies only concentrated on secession which is only one possible outcome of centre–periphery relations. Yet many observers still persist in the belief that the civil wars in the 1990s are a highly illustrative example of the association between ethnic conflict and decentralization. In this view, the escalation of conflicting demands for decentralization and centralization was inevitable. But contemporary centre–periphery relations in the Balkans are more complex than this simplistic notion from the past suggests.

After the end of the Cold War, there was a surge of studies on ethnic conflict and civil war in the literature on comparative politics and international relations (Horowitz 1985; Posen 1993; Diamond and Plattner 1994; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hechter 2004; Jenne et al. 2007; Cederman et al. 2009). Given the large number of intra-state conflicts since the fall of the Soviet Union, and the decline of wars between states, scholars have increasingly focused on the causes of civil and ethnically motivated conflicts. Unfortunately, many studies take for granted the fact that the appearance of war and conflict is solely an outcome that has to be explained. But we should be careful when engaging in one-dimensional analyses of such complex phenomena. In this light, the term “ethnic conflict” in the sense of ethnically motivated hatred is misleading because it assumes a historically determined sentiment that under certain conditions explodes into violence.

Kaplan’s simplistic notion of historical hatred among the different ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia that was determined to break out one day is an example of such a one-dimensional view (Kaplan 1993). Several others have already provided more nuanced and profound descriptions of ethnic violence as a collateral of the struggle by elites for political and economic power (Mueller 2000; Gagnon 2004). Indeed, we do not get very far by simply treating ethnic identities as fixed (Chandra 2012). Analysing decentralization reforms necessitates a more encompassing approach because ethnicity and other socio-economic factors crystallize jointly through centre–periphery relations. This is why this book provides an important complement to the research on ethnic conflict in transition societies.

There is a vast literature on the traditional federal or regionalized states in the western hemisphere (de Winter and Türsan 1998; Keating 2003a; Swenden 2006; Erk and Koning 2010; Hooghe et al. 2010), but very few detailed studies on decentralized states in other parts of the world. By now we know much about the reasons why federal systems vary across the globe, but we have much less to say about the variation between the myriad of unitary states that have some form of decentralized powers short of federations (Hooghe and Marks forthcoming).¹ But theory development in the area of comparative regionalism, as in the social sciences, depends more broadly on the study of those relatively unknown and understudied countries (see Geddes 2003: 32).

Post-socialist transition societies are very exciting cases in this regard because centralization and authoritarian rule have suppressed peripheral interests for almost five decades, and democratic institutions are now giving them more voice (Keating 2003b; Pitschel and Bauer 2009). Empirically, we observe on average a much more pronounced tendency to decentralize in transition countries than in advanced and established democracies in the western hemisphere (Marks et al. 2008: 177).

1.1 Problem definition and research question

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between centre and periphery in post-socialist states in the Balkans. I argue that it is more appropriate to start from general patterns of centre–periphery relations and elite interaction than to solely focus on their ethnic dimension or on other structural factors. The process of the territorial structuring of states is not merely about top-down imposition by the central government. Rather, it is at least as much a bottom-up process in which regional elites pursue broader cultural, socio-economic and political goals that aim at more autonomy from the central government. However, the results of these endeavours vary greatly. While some regions have been relatively successful in obtaining more autonomy, others have failed. Against this background, the research question this book seeks to answer is the following: How can we explain the varying outcomes of decentralisation reforms in Serbia and Croatia? To answer this question, I begin by examining the role of political elites and parties in the centre and periphery who are key actors in my analysis. Given the importance of regional political parties for driving decentralization demands, a broader approach that encompasses different kinds of relations across the centre–periphery divide has the advantage of covering the complex interactions and varying preferences inside a region (Greer 2007).

The countries that have emerged from former Yugoslavia provide a rich testing ground to explore these processes and varying outcomes. They are critical cases against the background of the civil wars in the 1990s and the predominance of identity-driven politics and violence in the past. A comparative case study of two states and two regions within these states constitutes the core of the empirical analysis in this book. Istria in Croatia and Vojvodina in Serbia are illustrative examples of places that have a historical regional identity marked by their ethnic minorities; Italian in the former, Hungarian in the latter. As these two cases clearly exhibit, we can observe very different ethno-regional movements in the Balkans, whose pursuit of economic, political and cultural goals has led to varying institutional outcomes. Istria and Vojvodina both share common legacies as a part of socialist Yugoslavia. They are historically grown regions with ethnic minorities. Both are part of states where national unity is still a highly contentious issue that stirs debates and contestation by nationalistic elites when autonomy demands are voiced. Yet autonomy demands from the periphery have led to very different decentralization reforms in the two regions: while in Serbia the national parliament granted a new autonomy statute to Vojvodina that triggered a more far-reaching decentralization initiative, Istria’s efforts of pushing for more autonomy and general decentralization have not led to any significant institutional change. Such variance is puzzling given the commonalities that stem from their past of belonging to the same ethno-federal state and their long-standing regional identity, which separates them from other regions in their respective states.

A very important factor for understanding the decision to adopt or reject decentralization reforms is the role of political elites and parties. As the two cases outlined above vividly illustrate, it is not sufficient to have the necessary social and cultural pre-requisites for decentralization to be successful. It is rather the political willingness of elites who can make use of these pre-requisites and other resources to actively pursue regional interests that may lead to an institutional accommodation of regional autonomy demands. This also resonates well with the findings of scholars working on decentralization processes in Central and Eastern Europe who have highlighted that domestic factors, and particularly political elites, have been central in shaping territorial reforms in post-communist states (Hughes et al. 2004; O’Dwyer 2006a; Brusis 2010).

1.2 Regional autonomy and decentralization

The language and the choice of terminology have a strong and subtle influence on the way we perceive reality. The same holds true for relations between centre and periphery. Regionalism as a very broad school of thought has, for instance, mainly used the term regional autonomy to analyse centre–periphery relations and adopts the perspective of the periphery (Keating and Loughlin 1997b; Suksi 1998). It looks at historically grown regions with particular characteristics that separate them from other regions in their respective nation-states. Expressed differently, regional autonomy stresses regional community and the struggle for autonomy in cultural, socio-economic and political aspects. As such, the term is somewhat normative, especially when one remembers that regionalism as an approach is itself an “ism”; that is, it is about a political ideology. Most importantly, however, regional autonomy as a term focuses more on the political–legal status of a region and less on the continuous process of centre–periphery relations. Autonomy has a teleological outlook as it implies a narrowly pre-defined final status.

The term “autonomy” is derived from the Greek autonomia and literally means “self-law”. Adapted to regional affairs, it means regional self-rule or the law-making powers of a region. From the view of a central state, this notion is very much contested because it implies special treatment for one or more regions and in its strongest form is associated with as little interference from the centre as possible. This has been true in the case of Yugoslavia throughout recent history. Terms such as autonomaši in Serbia and autonomisti in Croatia indeed carry with them rather negative connotations.

Elazar (1987), one of the scholars who established the field of comparative federalism, identified self-rule and shared rule (the degree to which regional governments co-determine national policy-making) as the essential features of federations. The main distinction between a federal and non-federal state is that, in the former, the federal government is not entitled to withdraw unilaterally any power or competence from the subnational government. This is where the term “autonomy” comes in. In abstract terms, autonomy refers to what Huntington (1968: 20) saw as delineation between the values and interests of a political institution and those of other social forces. Autonomy can be seen very broadly as the “self-governance of a demographically distinct territorial unit within the state” that is enshrined either in the constitution or in a separate autonomy statute (Weller 2009: 115).

More substantially, autonomy refers to the “legally entrenched power of ethnic or territorial communities to exercise public policy functions (legislative, executive and adjudicative) independently of other sources of authority in the state, but subject to the overall legal order of the state” (Weller and Wolff 2005: 13). It is important to note that central authorities are not allowed to unilaterally withdraw autonomy rights without the consent of the autonomous community. Thus, mere deconcentration of powers according to this understanding would not be an autonomy-granting process. Rather, autonomy stands between the federal and unitary endpoints of a continuum. It is this continuum in which decentralization processes take place (Hutchcroft 2001: 31).² Hence, the term decentralization implies a more process-oriented way of approaching centre–periphery relations.³ I adopt this term in my analysis because it denotes the process of attaining regional autonomy rather than the political–legal status that would be the outcome the process.

We can place different categories of decentralized states on this broader continuum. It is better to adopt more clearly defined categories of decentralized states than to focus on the ambiguous term “autonomy”, which is multi-faceted and sometimes blurry as an analytical category as discussed above. Swenden proposes four different kinds of contemporary states with regional layers of government based on the degree of fiscal, administrative and legislative powers of regionally elected assemblies and executives: confederations, federations, regionalized states and unitary decentralized states (Swenden 2006: 13ff.).⁴ I discard confederations and federations from further discussion because the main focus of this book is the self-rule of subnational units, not the additional shared rule at the federal level that is, as I previously mentioned, the key defining feature of federations. Very different rules apply to centre–periphery relations in federations because the periphery can veto certain policies and legislation. Hence, I only discuss regionalized and unitary states within the domain of my research question.

Let me now first turn to regionalized states. Regionalized states have established regional tiers of governance with elected assemblies and governments that still “...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1. Centre–Periphery Relations in the Balkans
• 2. A Framework for Studying Elite Access to Resources
• 3. The Role of Institutional Legacies from Yugoslav Decentralization
• 4. Access to Electoral Resources
• 5. Information Exchange and Cooperation
• 6. Access to Patronage Resources
• 7. Conclusions
• Appendix
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index