Outline of the Problem
Intelligence has become one of the most telling aspects of national and global security in the twenty-first century. Its role in public affairs, the private sphere, security strategies and policies, even in commercial relations and social media, has grown and expanded immensely (Scott and Jackson 2004, p. 1; Jackson and Siegel 2005, p. 1; Scott and Hughes 2011, p. 6). Much of this phenomenon can be attributed to the rapid civilisational, cultural, psychological and technological transformations of the last quarter of a century. They have brought about enormous progress and modernisation in many parts of the world but have also provoked grievance, rebellion and a feeling of marginalisation among the masses populating underdeveloped regions. The lost sense of community, multidimensional cleavages between nations, communities and social groups, and concern about the future have contributed to uncertainty, anxiety and distrust among the host of actors populating the global arena. In this gloomy scenario, intelligence emerges as a factor contributing to the reduction of uncertainty and to the improvement of situational as well as strategic knowledge about the facts, concepts and principles that apply in a given realm (De Jong and Fergusson-Hessler 1996, p. 105; Fingar 2011, pp. 4–6).
The broad application of the concept of intelligence is a feature of today’s world. Intelligence is a means to an end and this end is security (Gill and Phythian 2006, p. 1). Hence, it naturally sparks the growing interest of statespersons, decision makers and scholars fascinated by the expansion of intelligence disciplines, the increased relevance of information and knowledge, and the growing significance of technological drivers, as well as public officials and social activists who are afraid of information overload, declining standards of intelligence activities, the widening margins of error in intelligence analysis and even the potentially devastating impact of these factors on decision making and democratic governance. It is hard to imagine a strong, robust, effective government without a tailor-made knowledge management apparatus ancillary to the state and society. The importance of knowledge management, information analysis, data processing and intelligence has been a notable feature of government policies and world politics, particularly since 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks all over the world. National security policies and international security cooperation arrangements have begun to highlight growing reliance on early warning, situational awareness, threat assessment and risk analysis. To be effective, these methods need reliable, accurate and precise data and information. Given the immense amount and huge diversity of the information available, selecting, processing and adjusting it to policy requirements and decision-making procedures has become absolutely indispensable. Intelligence has come to play a pivotal role in contemporary security policies and can determine governments’ resilience to threats and hazards.
The latter aspect underpins the present study. Despite the immense proliferation of intelligence methods, means and tools, states have maintained their predominance in the realm of information gathering, processing and analysis, especially with reference to the strategic objectives of their governments and the vital security interests of their societies. In the face of growing competition from private actors offering valuable intelligence products based on open sources, states have widened the scope of their intelligence activities, applying modern technologies to create a variety of end products. They are also aware that the growing interconnectivity of information sources may bring about both positive and negative outcomes. The collection, processing and sharing of available information and data to enhance internal security and preserve public order can stimulate various forms of cooperation. Yet it also may cause the consolidation of existing ‘spaces of insecurity’ (Ingram and Dodds 2009, pp. 1–12; Grenfell and James 2009, pp. 3–19), generating crime, violence and conflict. Moreover, it may induce certain dysfunctional actors (individuals, groups, organisations) to engage in hostile activities undermining public order, attacking state institutions and threatening populations.
Contemporary intelligence must cope adequately with the complexity, diversity and wide range of activities undertaken by countless participants in public life. Accurate intelligence is essential for effective and legitimate security management and is equally important for organisational performance. This rule is binding on both states and international organisations. This book deals with intelligence activities undertaken by the latter. Although international organisations act beyond the traditional supremacy of the sovereign state, this category of international actor is not excluded from intelligence activities. Though largely dependent upon the resources and expertise of their member states, several intergovernmental organisations have successfully developed intelligence capabilities and even managed to hold their own assets. In principle, these are the organisations dealing with regional or global security, including its military and crisis-management aspects, such as the United Nations (Smith 1994; Dorn 1999, 2010; de Jong et al. 2003; Steele 2006), NATO (Laino 2011, pp. 13–14; Kriendler 2013) and the European Union.
Current security challenges for the European Union as an international organisation and as a community of Member States require a consistent, proactive, intelligence-led response. This politically motivated objective has to be shared by EU institutions and agencies and should engage Member States in a more intense form of cooperation. Hence data exchange, intelligence sharing and intelligence-led operations make up a specific security Zeitgeist which inspires national and supranational counterparts to make stronger efforts and invest their resources in the creation of a strategic intelligence community within the EU. Recent developments have only served to prove the well-known principle of knowledge dominance in the realm of security and made the public aware of the size, scope and depth of state policies in this regard. The EU is no exception: the proposals and initiatives it has undertaken in recent years were timely and adequate to the emerging problems of information analysis, knowledge management and intelligence sharing. The proliferation of threats to security demands a functional intelligence architecture. The European Union has responded to this challenge by gradually developing connections and linkages between the relevant authorities of the Member States and systematically engaging available EU agencies and bodies in intelligence-led cooperation.
Intelligence as an Element of EU Security Cooperation
The very word ‘intelligence’ has not been in vogue in Brussels. ‘Intelligence’ seemed to be limited to national use, identified with specific activities such as secret operations, eavesdropping or just spying. ‘Information’ was a politically neutral term and as such was easily accepted by the European Community’s institutions and introduced into communication channels at EU level. For example, in the La Gomera declaration, adopted at an informal meeting of the Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs of EU Member States convened in 1995 in the face of the growing terrorist menace, there was a reference to a ‘need for thorough coordination between Member States by way of improved machinery for police and judicial cooperation, through an increase in exchange of operational information about terrorist groups’ (Council of the EU 1995).
Before 9/11, ‘intelligence’ seldom appeared in EU documents and related policies but was used in describing police cooperation through the European Police Office, Europol. The acquisition, collation and analysis of information and intelligence as well as the provision of strategic intelligence were among Europol’s tasks. It was also mentioned by the Western European Union (WEU) as a defence component of the EU. Following the 1992 adoption of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which contained provisions on foreign, security and defence policies, some initiatives were endorsed for the development of the operational role of the WEU as defined in the Petersberg declaration of 1992. Little attention was paid to intelligence at that time; nevertheless at the Extraordinary Council of Ministers of the WEU in 1995 a Common Concept of European Security was adopted, entailing intelligence capabilities developed in an Intelligence Section and a Satellite Centre set up within WEU’s institutional structure (WEU 1995a). The meaning of ‘intelligence’ as an element of EU security policy was taken for granted by Member States and as such was excluded from deliberations in supranational institutions.
In the aftermath of 9/11, ‘intelligence’ became synonymous with an effective and comprehensive response to the global terrorist threat. However, it still lacked a precise definition and was largely identified with information exchange between the security and intelligence services of EU Member States and overseas partners. The terrorist attack in Madrid on 11 March 2004 forced EU institutions and Member States to accelerate and widen anti-terrorist cooperation, including national intelligence services and relevant EU bodies, especially Europol and the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN). By the same token, there was a growing need for an official interpretation of what constituted information and what constituted intelligence for the purpose of developing cooperation within the legal and institutional framework of the EU.
The first attempt at a single definition of intelligence was made by the Commission of the European Communities. In the 2004 Commission communication on enhancing access to information for law-enforcement agencies, there was an odd remark (added, by the way, in a footnote): ‘For the purpose of this Communication the expression “data” or “information” means “data, information and intelligence” unless otherwise indicated; the term “intelligence” refers to “criminal intelligence”.’ (Commission of the EC 2004, p. 5). Such imprecise wording did not facilitate efforts to work out a cohesive approach to EU cooperation on exchanging information and data relevant to cross-border activities of law-enforcement agencies. Incentives for the specification of the meaning of intelligence in EU policy were included in the European Council multi-annual programme of strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice, adopted in November 2004. In 2006 the Council, acting on the initiative of Sweden, adopted Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between the law-enforcement authorities of Member States. Article 2(d)(i) of the Framework Decision includes the following peculiar provision:
information and/or intelligence:
A question remained as to whether this definition provided a precise and operational meaning of intelligence. As many experts emphasise, information is not synonymous with intelligence. Information and data are raw materials, while intelligence is processed information and data cross-checked against other available sources of information and knowledge. From the functional standpoint, criminal intelligence executed at the national level used to be identified ...