Africa, one of capitalism’s last frontiers, has become an important site for the competing political and economic interests of diverse emerging powers. This interest in Africa is understandable, as is the jostling by African elites to position themselves favourably to benefit from this attention. The scenario provides new opportunities for development, but also dangerous avenues for exploitation by these emerging powers.
Although the involvement of emerging powers in Africa has been the focus of many analyses, this topic has received renewed interest as a new wave in the relationship is, arguably, currently under way. The rise of powers such as Turkey, South Korea and Indonesia, and the faltering of some of the more established emerging markets, are pointing to significant changes in the relationship between these powers and Africa. These changes necessitate the re-evaluation of this relationship within the global capitalist order.
The rationale for writing this book therefore emerged as a result of increasing attention (by investment banks, think-tanks and the media) directed at these powers and their involvement in Africa. It was premised on the realisation that the so-called ‘new entrants’ into the African space have not yet been adequately dealt with in the literature. Although as academics we should be sceptical of the seductiveness of the narratives surrounding emerging markets, there is evidence to suggest (Chaps. 10, 11 and 12) that this is a developing pattern and that the involvement of these new entrants is likely to increase, making this book particularly relevant at this moment in time.
Obvious indicators to look beyond the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) states can be found in alternate concepts such as MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey), MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey), CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) not to mention the follow up to the BRIC report, the N11, which outlined other pre-eminent emerging markets. Although these concepts (acronyms or groupings) lead us in the right direction, viewed from a broader perspective they are also considered fairly meaningless. What are much more important are the more durable practices and engagements over time in Africa, which is what this book seeks to discuss. The intention behind compiling it has therefore been to continue to look beyond the typically discussed BRICS states, and to think slightly broader and deeper in terms of access to African markets and resources, patterns of capital accumulation and their geopolitical strategies.
But such a book would not be complete without also focusing on the established emerging powers such as the BRICS and their involvement in Africa. The rise of South Korea, Turkey and Indonesia, amongst others within the African space, is particularly interesting in view of the competition with their fellow non-Western nations but more commonly discussed states such as the BRICS. Furthermore, despite many efforts to document and analyse such accounts, it is surprising that the general understanding of the BRICS in Africa remains fairly shallow: Are the BRICS saviours or sub-imperialists? Do they diversify and deepen dependency, or present an anomaly to dependency theory? Are they drivers of sustainable African development, or do they push Africa further into resource dependency?
Given the general theoretical lacuna on emerging powers, this book is therefore also preoccupied with theorising emerging powers within the broader capitalist system vis-à-vis their relationship with Africa. The phrase ‘new wave’ therefore also denotes new trends and patterns in respect of the BRICS in Africa, as well as an attempt to embed these patterns within appropriate theoretical frameworks. By so doing, this book aims to engage in a broader theorisation of the middle tier of global capital accumulation, which is undeniably led by China. The site of Africa is instructive in the sense that it presents some of the most striking examples of the predatory practices employed by these powers today. The phrase ‘new wave’ in the title of this book, is therefore not intended to sound hyperbolic. Rather, it suggests that these patterns are complex and that our analyses, concepts and theoretical frameworks should be adaptable to the realities of the situation.
New Entrants into the African Space
Neoliberal domination following the Cold War resulted in prosperous expanded rounds of accumulation, culminating in the formation of new sites of global economic power. This played a role in shifting some economic power away from the West. This shift has partly been reflected in the literature on global power relations, which has seen an increase in focus not only on the BRICS states (Kurečić and Bandov 2011; Martynov 2011; Renard 2011; Roberts 2011), but also on some of the other countries in the groupings and alliances mentioned above (Ozkan 2010; Kim and Gray 2016). These ‘near-BRICS’ (Önis and Kutlay 2013) states have demonstrated aspirations to be similar to their BRICS counterparts by extending their global reach, not least of all in Africa (Shinn 2012).
Although global trade with Africa remains very small (around 3 % of world trade), prominent emerging powers (see Table 1.1) are noteworthy trade partners to Africa, now accounting for an estimated 46 % of this trade (World Bank 2016). The total value of imports from Africa by selected emerging powers presented in Table 1.1 bears testimony to their high level of engagement with Africa. BRICS dominance aside (with the exception of Russia), emerging powers are proven to be heavily involved in buying African resources, goods and services as well as trading in Africa. However, BRICS dominance is not as clear-cut as it may be presented. First, other emerging powers such as the Republic of Korea and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are rivalling Brazil in respect of total trade with Africa. Second, many emerging powers beyond BRICS outstrip Russia’s total trade with Africa by some distance. Third, five of the emerging powers listed have a trade deficit with Africa. Three of these belong to BRICS namely China, India and Brazil. All the other emerging powers listed, with the exception of the UAE and Mexico, have a trade surplus with Africa. Finally, the Republic of Korea and Turkey, amongst others, have higher export levels to Africa than Brazil. These figures suggest that the BRICS are certainly by no means the only emerging powers worthy of attention on the continent. Even though this data does not take foreign direct investment, donor assistance and other forms of economic interaction into account, it still makes a compelling case for examining the role of other emerging powers in Africa beyond the usual suspects.
Table 1.1
Selected emerging powers and their bilateral trade with Africaa
Country/region | Total trade with Africa | Percentage of total trade with Africa (%) | Imports from Africa | Percentage of total imports from Africa (%) | Exports to Africa | Percentage of total exports to Africa (%) | Balance of trade with Africa | Export to import ratio |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
China | $216,155,777.35 | 18.75 | $112,454,089.48 | 19.68 | $103,701,687.88 | 17.84 | –$8,752,401.60 | 0.92 |
India | $73,319,253.38 | 6.36 | $39,693,056.58 | 6.95 | $33,626,196.80 | 5.78 | –$6,066,859.78 | 0.85 |
South Africa | $40,724,790.17 | 3.53 | $13,265,605.41 | 2.32 | $27,459,184.75 | 4.72 | $14,193,579.34 | 2.07 |
Brazil | $26,685,051.44 | 2.32 | $17,059,797.28 | 2.99 | $9,625,254.16 | 1.66 | –$7,434,543.12 | 0.56 |
Korea, Rep. | $26,519,301.61 | 2.30 | $11,638,845.57 | 2.04 | $14,880,456.04 | 2.56 | $3,241,610.48 | 1.28 |
UAE | $25,513,594.13 | 2.21 | $15,104,892.40 | 2.64 | $10,408,701.72... |