âI order you to get prepared and, should he keep on doing mischief, make him sorry!âââYeahâeasier said than done! Why donât you come to make him sorry yourself!â 1 The argumentative speaker is Beelzebub defying Satan , his liege lord, in the York Harrowing of Hell pageant (Y37/201â6). If a demon does not set a bad example to humans, who else will?
âI shall prove to you by arguments that youâre leading these people into trouble: God himself struck them down into hell for their disobedience; you have always taught people what is reasonable and righteous; so arenât you contradicting yourself to come now and claim whatâs been rightfully mine by Godâs order?â Satan reasons ex concessis, in the same York pageant (Y37/254â64), to refute Christ âs claim to the souls confined in the patriarchsâ limbo. Indeed, Satanâs is a strong rebuttal which proves Christâs claim argumentatively fallacious: If Christ is who he pretends, Godâs son (234â52), then his claim that he is now following his father âs orders (225â8) blatantly contradicts Godâs early decree (known to both parties), whilst also contradicting Jesusâs early outward conduct and teachings. 2 This is the ex concessis (argument from commitment), here in its negative form, inconsistent commitment: one does not do what one preaches (Walton 2005, 120â5). Notwithstanding, Christâs rejoinder introduces a new thesis: âmy prophets have preached that I will liberate them after my deathâthat I will redeem them through my sufferingâ (Y37/265â76). Confronted with this argumentum ad verecundiam (âappeal to authority â, here prophecy), the Christian audiences may have overlooked Christâs deliberate ignoring of Satanâs refutation, or non sequitur (âdoes not followâ). Alternatively, Christ prefers enthymemes , arguments which merely imply one of their premises (or the conclusion), here the yet unidentified pre-text: Godâs later order rescinds the early one by fiat.
Ay, thereâs the rub: reasoning and argumentation fail when early performatives (in John Austinâs sense) are overturned on the fly in a bid to win the argument or distract attention from its propositions. Dogma âany hardened ideologyâbypasses or warps the protocols of argumentation every time its champions prove or legitimate a moot point by fiat, or alternatively by a flimsy argumentum ad verecundiam . Such argumentation becomes fallacious through appeal to the prestige of the auctoritatesâauthoritative texts (e.g., Holy Writ ) and figures (e.g., God , angels , prophets) or authors (e.g., the Church Fathers )âinstead of reasoning to truth . To revert to the York Harrowing, in contending that his suffering has altered the early juridical dispensation, Christ makes a move extraneous to the early argument : he argues that a third party can intervene in a dispute to re-settle its terms retroactively, and that this can involve bodily intervention external to the propositional content. It is, in part, what I mean in this book by an oft-repeated phrase, the body of argument : appeals that the body can/should intervene and (re)shape the argument, its goals, protocols and means. Before I examine Yorkâs argumentatively astute demons, a conceptual clarification is necessaryâabout argumentation , truth and the body , all paramount in this book.
1.1 Why Argue about Arguments Anyway?
Let us return to York âs Satan âChrist dispute to consider the implications of an argumentative strategy, the argumentum ad verecundiam (âappeal to authorityâ), 3 which validates the truth value of a statement, hence the overall argument , by explicit reference to the assumed authority of its source. Such recourse does not yield an argument from moderation, restraint or diffidence (OLD, s.v. âuerÄcundiaâ) on the speakerâs part. Rather, according to John Locke, who christened it thus, this âawe-directed argumentâ (or âargument of shameâ) should prompt listeners to humbly accept âthe authority to which the speaker appeals in the argumentâ (van Eemeren et al. 2009, 7) 4 and may therefore force uncritical acceptance. Accordingly, the term is often used nowadays for âa fallacy that involves a wrong appeal to an authorityâ (van Eemeren et al. 2009, 7): the argument insists on the speakerâs or their sourceâs socio-political prestige, rather than on the cognitive element originating from the speakerâs expertise, when relevant to the topic (Tindale 2007, 128â9; Woods et al. 2004, 42â5). 5 Characters in Middle English plays, like medieval people themselves, especially the clergy, often appeal to external sources of authority , like God /Christ âaffirmed to be the indisputable transcendental signifier of truth âor the scriptures, to support a particular proposition, whether or not derived from an article of faith. All intra-dramatic ad verecundiam cases depend on the speakerâs traditionally sanctioned authority in the audienceâs eyes as much as on the auctoritates (authorities) the arguer appeals to. On gospel template, the dramaâs risen Christ often resorts to external legitimation of his claims or acts. Sometimes, however, the devil literally appears in the argumentative detail to point to an argumentâs fallacy . It is the contention of this book that in the later Middle Ages, as the plays suggest, certain arguments from authority could sound unconvincing enough to be challengedânecessarily by the devil , so as to safeguard dogmatic truth . Indeed, the religious argumentum ad verecundiam may fail to persuade non-believers and believers alikeâwhen both adopt a critical distanceâdue to its circularity : believe me for who I am or who/what I name as my guarantor.
What is an argument , though? Broadly, it consists of âtwo or more explicit and/or implicit claims, one or more of which [the premise(s)] supports or provides evidence for the truth or merit of another claim, the conclusionâ (Damer 2009, 14), and is aimed to âpersuade others to accept that claimâ (13). Furthermore, reason-giving through arguments aims precisely âto support or criticize a claim that is questionable, or open to doubt â, which âimplies that there are always two sides to an argument, and thus that an argument takes the form of a dialogueâ (Walton 2005, 1).
According to Douglas Walton, the ânotion of an argument is best elucidated in terms of its purpose when used in a dialogueâ (2005, 1) rather than as a self-standing set of premises leading to a conclusion. Dialogues, therefore, supply âconventional frameworks that make rational argumentation possibleâ, even as they âcan also contain explanations, instructions on how to do something, and so forthâ (2). As a goal-directed conversation, the dialogue for argumentation can b...