As the underpinnings of this intercultural work, recognition theory was briefly sketched in the introductory chapter. Chapter Two, the first of the three chapters that constitute the theoretical part of the book, now offers a more comprehensive treatment regarding the central features of Honneth’s model. It begins with an initial focus on the theme of recognition, goes on to render the two distinct but inter-related premises that constitute Honneth’s recognition theory and ends with a brief discussion regarding critique of Honneth relevant to the focus of this project. The key point of delving into recognition theory at this depth is to highlight its descriptive, explanatory and normative prospects for critical sociological inquiry, such as is offered in Part Two of the book. These prospects are dealt with next, including an excursion into scholarly applications of Honneth’s model in various social science fields. Finally, the chapter takes a more detailed look at the use of recognition theory in critical intercultural research. Specifically, it expands on the concepts of esteem recognition and contested value horizon, first glimpsed in Chapter One, fleshing out their relevance for this cross-cultural project and for research into multiculturalism more generally.
The Theme of Recognition
Some deep breaths are required when wading into the rich and complex world of recognition. Meer , Martineau and Thompson (2012a:133) note that the literature on recognition is “vast and overlapping, and hence not easily categorized into distinctive bodies of thought”. This section provides the briefest of introductions to the theme of recognition, its rise to prominence via Hegel , subsequent fields of application and main theorists. The intention is to lead us towards the singling out of Honneth’s theory of recognition as the most suitable for this intercultural study into work experience.
The theme of recognition has historical precursors going back to classical Greece, but modern conceptions originate in the philosophical tradition of German Idealism, in particular the work of Georg Hegel (1770–1831) (Williams, 1997). Hegel’s core insight is that individual identity is dialogically produced through reciprocal intersubjective recognition. “Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or ‘recognized’” (Hegel, 1949:229). This passage encapsulates the basic Hegelian idea underlying recognition theory, the idea that the relationship to another consciousness is a constitutive condition enabling the self to develop a relationship to itself. From this perspective, the relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity is central, in that the self can relate to itself only by recognising, and being recognised by, another. This condition makes the development of subjectivity, and thus self-realisation and autonomy , dependent on recognition from other subjects.
This Hegelian concept of recognition has a tremendous legacy in contemporary thinking. Indeed, regarding its ‘overarching moral category’, social philosophy generally acknowledges a ‘recognition-theoretical turn’ (Klikauer, 2016:39–40). The recognition concept has been applied and contested in diverse fields such as philosophy , French phenomenology , developmental psychology , object-relations psychoanalysis , academic feminism and multiculturalism (Ikäheimo, 2010:343; McBride & Seglow, 2009:7–9; Thompson, 2006:3; Zurn, 2010:3). Meanwhile, Thompson and Yar (2011a:1) note that the idea of recognition has been utilised to comprehend the formation of individual psyches, the dynamics of political struggles, the nature of moral progress and the articulation of a normative conception of justice. Overall, theorists (Meer et al., 2012a:133–136; Seymour, 2010b:1–2) tease out overlapping disciplinary domains that are represented in contemporary treatments of recognition, with each containing significant internal diversity. These are the concepts of recognition within post-Hegelian political philosophy , the notion of recognition in the alienation/emancipation tradition of Frankfurt School critical theory, which also draws from Hegel, and the politics of recognition and group representation within classical multiculturalism debates. Given this diverse legacy, it would not be overstating the case to say that the term ‘recognition’ has many definitions. In the context of this book, however, and while acknowledging debates regarding the presumption of mutuality, that to be recognised by another presupposes that one recognises the other, it is defined as “the mutual acknowledgement that individuals or groups give to one another” (Seymour, 2010b:4). This definition is deceptively simple. The idea of mutual acknowledgement between subjects points to complex relations of recognition that have far-reaching moral and practical implications, some of which are addressed in this work specifically with regard to cross-cultural recognition.
Three influential theorists, Nancy Fraser , Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor , are particularly associated with contemporary notions of recognition (Thompson & Yar, 2011a:4). Their seminal writings were shaped in the early 1990s with, it seems, little productive dialogue amongst them at the beginning (McBride & Seglow, 2009:7). This circumstance may have added to the confusion that tends to be associated with the concept of recognition. However, in the post-Hegelian tradition, Fraser, Honneth and Taylor are aligned in understanding subjective identity as dialogically formed through processes of mutual recognition and thus recognition failure as a critical social concern (Klikauer, 2016; Thomas, 2012:454). Despite their common Hegelian roots and emancipatory ethos, however, there are differences among Taylor’s , Fraser’s and Honneth’s positions. For Taylor (1992), recognition claims have legitimacy when the claimants’ capacities to exercise basic rights, rational autonomy and/or distinctive group identities are impeded. More or less in sympathy with this viewpoint, Fraser (1995) locates misrecognition in social status inequality across gender, race and class, contrasting this kind of misrecognition with economic mal-distribution and arguing for redress in terms of parity of participation and transformation of socio-cultural values. Meanwhile Honneth’s theory of recognition , considered by some scholars the most comprehensive (Roessler, 2012:72; Zurn, 2010:4), brings a very different perspective to the debate. For an in-depth comparison of the theories of Taylor, Fraser and Honneth, refer to Thompson’s 2006 publication, The Political Theory of Recognition.
Alone among recognition theorists, Honneth establishes a theoretical link between intersubjective recognition and the possibilities of subjective well-being. For him, the development of positive self-relations , those essential elements constitutive in the formation of healthy identity and the independent self, is contingent upon the structural conditions that facilitate mutual intersubjective recognition in diverse life-world spheres. Misrecognition , as a deficiency or denial of such recognition, then crucially matters in that it erodes the possibilities of progressive self-relations and therefore self-realisation and autonomy . Critical social inquiry that takes its cue from Honneth can focus on the existing conditions of recognition relations to analyse the prospects of, and barriers to, subjective autonomy and well-being, and thus emancipatory justice, in a given context. In other words, Honneth’s general philosophical thesis leads to concrete analytical tools for social science to diagnose the causes of injustice and the possibilities of redress.
Honneth’s is undeniably a comprehensive theory, presenting as it does a unique take on identity formation and descriptive, explanatory and normative force. His conceptual offerings hold promise for a broader and more complex analysis of (mis)recognition and constitute the justification for employing the model in this book’s critical intercultural inquiry. As sketched in the introductory chapter, Honneth’s conceptions of identity and recognition are markedly different from those typically assumed within the multicultural literature. Whereas multiculturalist calls for the recognition of distinctive racial, ethnic and cultural identities are claims for the recognition of an already defined identity, for Honneth, recognition is constitutive in the very formation and structure of identity. We return to this key distinction later in the chapter, to further explore the ways in which mainstream multiculturalism and Honneth’s Frankfurt School tradition denote different understandings of recognition. Before this though, let us delve into the main features of recognition theory and its application in critical sociological inquiry, beginning with a focus on the central concepts of respect and disrespect.
Axel Honneth’s Recognition Theory
Respect and Disrespect
Noticing groups of Pacific Island youths hanging out in the local shopping mall and down by the train station on late shopping nights during fieldwork, I gain an immediate and tangible sense of a marginalised group struggling for recognition. Disaffection, defiance, anger, hurt, staunchness hit one full on as one walks by. These are the troublesome young people, the ‘social problems’, staking out their territory in the public domain. They clutter up the pavement and subtly blockade the way, necessitating for pedestrians a negotiation around or through their midst, from whence they stare with varying degrees of menace. They make their presence felt in no uncertain terms, they swagger, they talk and laugh loudly, they boast in jocular fashion, conscious of the atmosphere of spectacle...