These [individuals] ask for … the same thing: fairness, and fairness only. This, so far as in my power, they, and all others, shall have.—Abraham Lincoln, letter, May 30, 1860
How ought we justly allocate economic resources among individuals? That is the central question of this book. I believe that we possess the power to translate one of our most fundamental, shared moral intuitions into a clear account of a unique, determinate answer to our motivating question. That is to say, a philosophically and politically defensible, administratively feasible, and economically efficient distribution of economic resources among individuals.
Contemporary inequality greatly concerns political scientists, sociologists, economists, philosophers, and a growing constituency of voters and policymakers who are uneasy with both the outcomes as well as the key drivers of our economy. Although much of this concern is accentuated by the 2008 financial crisis and consequent Great Recession, inequality of income and wealth further attracts considerable intellectual attention as a sustained phenomenon that has been rising in most wealthy nations, and between nations, since at least 1980.1
Perceptions of this inequality are often coupled with a prevalent feeling that current levels of economic inequality represent a moral wrong that demands both individual action and institutional policy2 as inequality is too great, poverty is too widespread, and economic mobility is too low. This moral sentiment begs three questions3: why should we reduce economic inequality, to what extent, and how can we feasibly do so?4
Egalitarians answer the first question by arguing that inequality is a bad in and of itself. Yet, very few confront the second question with a strict principle of equality to the exclusion of all other conflicting principles of justice. Rather, the strategy of most contemporary solutions to inequality has been to seek a stable, delicate balance between conflicting principles of strict equality and strict efficiency, often with the inclusion of a principle of sufficiency or priority that specifically focuses on those below, or furthest below, the poverty line.5 A growing body of research pursues a second prong, arguing that too much inequality is itself inefficient in our real-world, non-ideal market, and thus, both the principles of equality and efficiency recommend that we ought to better the economic situation of either the most disadvantaged or the middle class, broadly defined.6 For example, the International Monetary Fund recently stated, “The evidence of the economic damage from inequality suggests that policymakers should be more open to redistribution than they are.”7
While this book is seriously concerned with economic inequality among individuals, it takes an atypical view of the relationship between inequality and injustice. Rather than present a similar solution as those described above, I propose to answer our three motivating questions differently and, I hope, more effectively. Fortunately, many individuals are in search of an original solution to economic inequality as recent evidence shows that Americans “object to inequality and increasingly believe government should act to redress it, but not via traditional redistributive programs.”8 I thus bring a new normative principle9 to center stage that is far more widely shared, and much more deeply felt, as a core principle of distributive justice than are equality, efficiency, sufficiency, or priority with respect to the distribution of economic resources.10
In selecting a new principle of justice as my foundation, I do not recommend moral monism, that is, that this is the only distributive principle of value. Even at its most ambitious, I will merely want to strengthen the case that this distributive principle is first among equals. More conservatively, however, I suggest that this principle “belongs on the list of genuine intrinsic values”11 and that a salutary step to balancing multiple principles of distributive justice is to more fully understand and consider each of the relevant, separate principles in isolation at the level of both concept and consequences. Better understanding of concept and consequences may further inform our intuitions, arguments, and policies.
Although it may come as a surprise to those currently concerned with inequality, poverty, and economic immobility as moral wrongs to be undone, the principle of justice that will serve as the foundation of this book is desert. Desert is currently a sorely underutilized principle in the anti-inequality, anti-poverty, and pro-economic mobility literature on public policy and in fact is most often used in support of anti-egalitarian arguments, ideologies, as well as policy implementation.12 This is not surprising as two core intuitions of desert—(1) that some individuals deserve more than others and (2) that it is better if individuals receive what they deserve13—appear to naturally pull away from equality. So why do I place desert at the center of my proposal?
I will argue that desert via a merit-based view of responsibility is a normative ideal that hinges upon a fundamental moral intuition and is among “the best candidates to fill a theoretical role whose contours are dictated by the normative beliefs that we already hold.”14 I will thus follow Miller and attempt to use political philosophy to offer “a clearer and more systematic statement of the principles that people already hold”15 and would want to hold upon considered reflection. That political right and left share a common intuition is buttressed by the fact that the most revered Presidents of the United States on left and right, both Presidents Roosevelt (FDR) and Reagan, repeatedly and explicitly stated their support for this fundamental moral intuition16 and I believe it implicitly guides most major economic policy in the United States.17 As such, I hope that this makes my solution attractive to the vast majority of individuals without regard to partisan affiliation. Second, I place desert at the center of my proposal because the problem of unequal economic distribution may be usefully divided into at least two logically separate considerations—(1) inequality and (2) undeserved inequality—and it is only the latter that we object to18 because only the latter is unjust.19 The principle of desert, properly implemented, completely eliminates undeserved inequality by ensuring that each individual receives exactly what they deserve, no more and no less. In addition, it does so via ex post interv...