Philosophical Principles of the History and Systems of Psychology

Essential Distinctions

Frank Scalambrino

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9783319747330
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Educational Psychology

Taking philosophical principles as a point of departure, this book provides essential distinctions for thinking through the history and systems of Western psychology. The book is concisely designed to help readers navigate through the length and complexity found in history of psychology textbooks. From Plato to beyond Post-Modernism, the author examines the choices and commitments made by theorists and practitioners of psychology and discusses the philosophical thinking from which they stem. What kind of science is psychology? Is structure, function, or methodology foremost in determining psychology's subject matter? Psychology, as the behaviorist views it, is not the same as the psychoanalyst's view of it, or the existentialist's, so how may contemporary psychology philosophically-sustain both pluralism and incommensurability? This book will be of great value to students and scholars of the history of psychology.

© The Author(s) 2018

Frank ScalambrinoPhilosophical Principles of the History and Systems of Psychologyhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74733-0_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology of the History and Systems of Psychology

Frank Scalambrino¹

(1)

Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University, University Heights, OH, USA

End Abstract

The intention of this project is to furnish us with a principled systematic understanding of essential distinctions with which to think through the history of Western psychology. Throughout the course of this book terms such as “principle,” “system,” “history,” and even “psychology” will be further clarified. The following terms have been selected for clarification in the introduction because they will be essential and fundamental in clarifying terms later in the book. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the material with which we are dealing is history, that is, the history of Western psychology. Thus, we will begin by taking into consideration the principles of historiography—the study of the writing of history; the principles according to which historians inscribe events from the past into historical narratives.

Ultimately, a system dealing with history, especially in the light of historiography, must be philosophical. This is the case because there is too much disagreement as to what “psychology” refers to—especially when considered across the history of Western psychology. In other words, when different participants in the history of a discipline disagree regarding the very elements of what constitutes participation in that discipline, then there is too much essential disagreement, that is, disagreement about the essence of the discipline, to suggest there is an essential systematic order to the elements constituting the discipline. Rather, what is needed is an explication of the choices being made by participants in the history of such a discipline.

Just as a discipline can tolerate a plurality of choices constituting its practice, the distinctions regarding which such choices are being made may be understood as constituting a systematic understanding of that discipline in general. For example, throughout the history of psychology, including today, we find essential disagreement as to what “psychology” is even supposed to be the study of; is psychology the study of biology, spirituality, behavior, mind, unconscious drives and motives, or the use of freedom? Though it may be tempting to say “all the above,” some understandings, as the history of psychology illustrates for us, of what constitutes the elements of psychology are essentially distinct from other understandings—we will clarify this later in the book in terms of “incommensurability.”

Thus, choices—and commitment to those choices—constitute the activities of the discipline of psychology from out of the potential ways psychology can be practiced, and the best indicator of how psychology can be practiced is how psychology has been practiced, that is, its history. What is more, the choices and commitments which constitute the discipline of psychology are made from within a system of distinctions. Now, though it may not be possible to reveal or explicate the entire system of such distinctions, it is possible to become more or less familiar with it. Therefore, (stated in the other direction) by increasing our familiarity with the system of essential distinctions from which choices and commitments constitute the activities of psychology, we increase our ability to think through the activities of contemporary psychology and the history of Western psychology.

1.1 What Is History?

In regard to the study of history, there are several standard distinctions which are essential for our understanding of the history of psychology. We will discuss the following distinctions: (a) distinct understandings of “History,” that is, “History v. the Past,” (b) “Original v. Reflective v. Philosophic History,” and (c) “Understandings of the Past: Cyclical v. Linear v. Chaos,” (d) distinct understandings of “Historiography,” that is “Presentism v. Historicism ,” (e) “Western Historical Periodization,” (f) “Sacred v. Profane History,” (g) “Internal v. External History,” (h) “Primary v. Secondary Sources,” (i) “Witting v. Unwitting Testimony,” (j) “Salient v. Deterministic Selection,” (k) “Author Intent v. Reader Utility.”

(a) “History” refers to the re-presentation of the past, or, as historians like to say, “History” refers to “what historians do.” “The Past,” then, is supposed to refer to everything that has already happened. This initial distinction points to the importance of historiography, that is, the “writing” or activity of constructing the narratives which constitute history. (b) G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831), in his Philosophy of History, provided the following distinctions. “Original History” refers to simply recording events from the past; the best practice of which being “the annals of history” or recordings of events as they transpire. “Reflective History” refers to re-presenting history with importance placed more on the Present time in which the history is being re-presented than on when the events occurred. Hegel divided “Reflective History” into “Universal,” “Pragmatic,” and “Critical” history.

Whereas “Universal History” aims to re-present an entire history of, for example, some movement, culture, people, or nation, “Pragmatic History” re-presents historical events as if they were presently happening, that is, making them “Virtually Present”. Hegel characterized “Critical History” as a “History of History,” that is, “a criticism of historical narratives and an investigation of their truth and credibility” (Hegel 1901: 50). Finally, “Philosophic History” refers to the “thoughtful consideration” of history. In other words, according to Hegel. , when historians seek to identify the presence of “universal laws” to which historical narratives may be subordinated, then the resulting narrative may be called “philosophic.” Thus, philosophic history may be understood as the decoding of original and universal history to identify the presence and development of various socio-cultural and economic evolutions, which original and universal histories leave concealed.

(c) Our initial distinction between history and the past, should cast the cliché “history repeats itself,” in a more complicated light. That is to say, we are not as concerned with the habitual tendencies of historiographers as we are with witnessing patterns repeating throughout the past. Thus, the past may be characterized according to different principles. Understanding the past as “Cyclical” when writing historical narratives, especially reflective and philosophic narratives, means that patterns discernible in the past may be found endlessly repeating across histories. In the West the Cyclical understanding of the past is often associated with ancient Greek cosmological thinking and historians who limit the influence of technology to “change our cycle,” while also discerning endless repetition given the potentials of “universal human nature” (cf. Deleuze 2006; cf. O’Brien 1969; cf. Sarno 1969; cf. Vico 2002). A “Linear” understanding of the past provides a different principle for historical narratives. If the past has a linear character to it, then it is headed toward some culmination. When traversing the line is thought to provide a culmination better than the line’s point of departure, then the linear historical narratives are construed as “Progressive,” and when the line is conversely understood, then they are considered “Regressive.”

It is important to note, a number of historians and philosophers of history articulate their historical understanding of our own presence in history as at the conclusion of a Progressive Linear understanding of the past, for example Francis Fukuyama (1952–) and Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007). Thus, Fukuyama speaks of “the end of history” as the end of the idea of historical progress (1992). Similarly, Baudrillard saw Progressive Linear understandings of the past as “utopian-based,” and with the failure of economies and politics to accomplish such a utopia has come the collapse of the idea of progression toward such a goal; for example, Baudrillard points to several moments in history each of which he declares to be “the illusion of the end,” such as the “World Wars,” the “Cold War,” and “Y2K” (1994; cf. Baudrillard 2006).

Finally, some historians characterize the past in terms of Chaos, rather than a cycle or a line. The following quote from Richard Rorty (1931–2007) provides an excellent description of the writing of history in regard to the past as Chaos, especially with its reference to Pragmatic history.

The final stage of the Pragmatist’s Progress comes when one begins to see one’s previous peripeties [reversals of condition or fortune] not as stages in the ascent toward Enlightenment, but simply as the contingent results of encounters [e.g.] with various books which happened to fall into one’s hands. This stage is pretty hard to reach, for one is always being distracted by daydreams: daydreams in which the heroic pragmatist plays a Walter Mitty-like role in the immanent teleology of world history. But if the pragmatist can escape from such daydreams, he or she will eventually come to think of himself or herself as, like everything else, capable of as many descriptions as there are purposes to be served. There are as many descriptions as there are uses to which the pragmatist might be put, by his or her self or by others. This is the stage in which all descriptions (including one’s self-description as a pragmatist) are evaluated according to their efficacy as instruments for purposes, rather than by their fidelity to the object described (Rorty 1999: 92)

The past characterized. as Chaos, then, not only casts historical narratives in the light of contingency, it completely undermines the idea of progress. In other words, whereas historical events may be contingently determined and yet indicate progress toward a goal in a (cyclically or linearly) unfolding past, this understanding of Chaos characterizes the past as neither progressing cyclically nor linearly.

(d) As will become clear by the end of the book, the distinction between “Presentism” and “Historicism” is essential for thinking through a number of the systematic aspects in the history of Western psychology. There is much to be said about this distinction; to start with, we can recognize its affinity to the distinction between Original and Reflective history, especially the Pragmatic and Critical types of Reflective history. That is to say, “Historicism” refers to the study of the past in the past’s terms. In other words, insofar as it is possible to “fuse” the horizon of our understanding with the horizon of the understanding of the past in question , Historicism seeks to understand the meaning and value of the past as it would have been understood at the time it happened. Thus, Historicism holds an affinity to Original History.

Conversely, writing history from the perspective of “Presentism” means interpreting and evaluating the past in terms of presently accepted values and understanding. We may distinguish between mild and strong versions of Presentism. Mild Presentism holds an affinity to Reflective History in that viewing ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction: The Project of the Philosophical Archeology of the History and Systems of Psychology
• 2. Some Historically Based Essential General Distinctions
• 3. Pre-Modern to Early Modern: From Mirror of God to Mirror of Nature
• 4. The Early Modern Battle for the Archimedean Point
• 5. Modernism to Post-Modernism: Method as Archimedean Point
• 6. Conclusion: Post-Modern Turning Away from Method
• Back Matter