The most recent attempts at providing TSG to the Kurdish population in Iraq occurred within the wider framework of rebuilding the state after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the TAL and new 2005 Constitution provided for a specific type of federation . In this arrangement there is one federal unit, a federacy, with Kurdistan as the sole federal region.1 While the 2005 Constitution had the unenviable task of re-creating the Iraqi state, including trying to manage relations between the Shia and Sunni Arabs, considerable attention was paid to providing the Kurds with autonomy. The TSG arrangements seek to balance the Kurds longstanding demand for independence, which had led to numerous rebellions since the collapse of Ottoman rule in the region at the end of World War One, with a desire held by the international community and many Sunni and Shia Iraqis for the preservation of a single Iraqi state.
While these TSG institutions provide the Kurds with a great deal of autonomy and insulated the region from much of the sectarian violence which ravaged Iraq between 2005 and 2008, they failed to convince the Kurds that their future lay within Iraq. In September 2017 the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) unilaterally held a referendum on independence. The existential threat posed to the Iraqi state by the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 and the prominence of Peshmerga (Kurdish forces) in re-taking territory undoubtedly strengthened the Kurds position, for example giving them de facto control over disputed territories , and thus encouraged this secessionist manoeuvre. However, disputes between the Kurds and the central state regarding matters which were not settled in the 2005 Constitution also fuelled this centrifugal momentum. Ambiguity and disagreement over what provisions the Constitution makes for the future of the Peshmerga , hydrocarbons, and disputed territories , made domestic guarantees completely ineffective. The international community has not been able to resolve these difficulties. Furthermore, the international communityās reliance on the Kurds in the fight against ISIS , and international business interest in hydrocarbons under Kurdish, control meant that the territorial integrity of Iraq has not always been the primary concern of regional and international actors. The Kurds also view any international guarantees of their autonomy with suspicion, recalling that the international community has been an unreliable ally in the past. The presence of significant Kurdish groups in neighbouring states also complicates the role of these states in guaranteeing the TSG secured by the Iraqi Kurds.
The Conflict Between Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi State
The Kurds are often referred to as the worldās largest nation without a state. This situation dates back to the redrawing of the global map by the victorious parties at the end of World War One. Despite the Kurds identifying as a national group and advocating for the creation of a Kurdish state, the victorious powers divided them between the states of Iran , Iraq, Turkey , Armenia, and Syria. The architects of the new order ignored the salience and strength of the Kurdish identity.2 In the decades after independence the new Sunni Arab elite in Iraq focused on building an Arab nation. They felt that this would create a strong state capable of defending itself against European imperialism. This policy of creating an Arab nation envisioned the compulsory assimilation of the different minorities, including the Kurds.
Kurdish nationalists, including the Sheiks and their tribal followers, urban intellectuals and professionals, and Kurdish Officers serving in the Iraqi Army, engaged in numerous rebellions against the central state between the 1930s and 1990s. This movement, which itself was wracked by in-fighting, sought to seize on moments of central state weakness to win concessions on autonomy.3 During the 1958 revolution, which replaced the Iraqi monarchy with a republic, Mullah Mustafa, the founder of the modern Kurdish national movement, returned to Iraq from exile in the Soviet Union, hoping that the countryās new military leaders would be open to making an agreement with the Kurds to stabilise their rule. They were initially receptive to his overtures and Article 3 of the 1958 Interim Constitution declared that the Arabs and Kurds were partners in the new Iraqi state but ābefore long competing agendas emerged, hitched to duelling narratives that reflected rival nationalismsā.4
When the Baāath Party came to power in a coup in 1968, it also initially reached an agreement with Mullah Mustafa providing for considerable Kurdish autonomy. It hoped securing his support would strengthen its nascent grip on power. However, the 1973 oil crisis economically strengthened the new regime, so it no longer needed Kurdish support. Furthermore, the new regime concluded a treaty with The Shah of Iran , who had assisted the Iraqi Kurds, settling the Shatt al-Arab border dispute. This allowed Baghdad to hold power without the Kurds and it reneged on its promises. The stateās failure to fulfil these agreements created a profound distrust between the Kurds and the central state which continues to characterise relations. The 2009 draft Constitution for the Kurdish region specifically refers at length to these events.5 The failure of the political agreements led to Kurdish military campaigns for independence or autonomy which were met with ferocious repression by the central state. Reprisals did not only focus on those who had been involved in the violence but also on āever larger sections of the Kurdish populationā creating ever worse relations.6
During the Iran -Iraq war the two main Kurdish groups, The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP ) led by the Masoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK ) led by Jalal Talabani , ultimately allied themselves with Iran . This infuriated Saddam Hussein and he declared them to be traitors to Iraq.7 When the war ended in 1988 he unleashed vicious and widespread reprisals against the Kurdish community. The chemical attack on Kurdish town of Halabja, in retaliation for its alleged sympathy with the Kurdish movement and Iran , killed up to 5000, and up to 10,000 were injured. This was indicative of the genocidal character of the so-called Anfal campaign. The Iraqi Army systematically destroyed Kurdish villages that had supported the insurgences and deported approximately 800,000 people, resettling the area, especially the oil-rich region of Kirkuk , with Arab families.8 The horrors of this campaign drove the remaining Kurdish leadership into exile in Iran .
Saddam Hussein ās invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent international reaction provided another opening for the Kurds to rebel. As the international coalition pushed the Iraqi army out of Kuwait this gave the Kurds the opportunity to return from Iran and rise up against the government. Unfortunately for the Kurds, and the Shia who were rebelling in the South, the international coalition did not assist the rebels. Saddam Hussein ās regime recovered and violently put down the rebellions.9 This violence drove hundreds of thousands of Kurds into Iran and the mountainous border region with Turkey . Confronted by a worsening humanitarian disaster the international community finally acted in April 1991 when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution (UNSCR) 688, calling on Iraq to end repression of its population.10 Operation Provide Comfort began the next day as a no-fly zone was established by the United States, UK, and France, and humanitarian relief and military protection were provided to the Kurds by a small Allied ground force based in Turkey . While there were some negotiations between the Kurds and Baghdad, in October 1991 Iraqi forces unilaterally withdrew to the so-called Green Line, effectively leaving the Kurds to over a decade of US-protected autonomy.11
This autonomy provided an important opportunity for the Kurds to develop self-rule and a Kurdish Regional Government (KRG ) was established. Some notable milestones were achieved, for example, the region held its first free and fair election in 1992. However, economic challenges and internal fighting among the Kurds threatened to undermine the experiment. The 1992 election resulted in a legislative and executive coalition between the two dominant parties, the KDP and PUK . The system which became known as the 50:50 system divided all executive and l...