Historical links and cultural ties between the Admiralty and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) were extremely strong. Senator George Pearce, the Australian Defence Minister from 1914–21 to 1932–34 described the RAN on its creation as a ‘navy within a navy’, a logical outcome for a ‘nation within a nation’. 1 Due to almost complete reliance on the Admiralty the RAN developed as a mini-version of the Royal Navy (RN). As Millar pointed out ‘The Royal Australian Navy developed integrally with and as a direct offspring of the Royal Navy, absorbing its customs, traditions, procedures, skills, equipment and vessels’ 2 and ‘Until very recently, when national “flashes” were introduced, Australian naval officers, unlike those in the army or the air force, have been visually indistinguishable from British naval officers. Even their accents are more likely to be more “British”, and their sense of loyalty to and affinity with the mother country to be stronger’. 3
Communications between the respective heads of service were extremely important, especially during the early part of the post-war period. Lower-level communications played their part in keeping the links between the navies strong. Lower-deck servicemen of both services frequently interacted with each other and these interactions somewhat illustrated the competitiveness and rivalry common to any two military forces, although this was to some extent, tempered by the shared traditions and cultures of the respective services. The RAN had total dependency on the Admiralty during the early post-war period. This reliance decreased over a period of time, but the drift away from the Admiralty was not an easy one due to the cultural and historical ties between the services. Even so, the drift was assured due to the growing independence of the RAN, a self-assuredness that somewhat mirrored the experience of Australia itself.
At the highest levels, the respective heads of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy dictated the relations between the two services. As Table 1.1, the Professional Heads of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy makes clear the succession of First Sea Lords and Australian Chiefs of Naval Staff did not coincide with each other. As such the respective heads of service occasionally had to deal with quite different personalities filling the same role as their predecessor. These personal traits were also affected by external influences such as the strategic stance taken by Australia and Great Britain in various stages of the post-war period. High-level national strategy affected lower-level concerns and cannot be ignored when one considers inter-naval relations. In the same sense, national goodwill between countries can in some way be reflected in the interpersonal relations of the nations concerned.
Table 1.1
The Professional Heads of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy
First Sea Lords of the Admiralty | First Naval Members, Australian Commonwealth Naval Board and Chiefs of Staff | ||
|---|---|---|---|
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, RN | October 1943 to May 1946 | Admiral Sir Louis H. K. Hamilton, RN | June 1945 to February 1948 |
Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Cunningham, RN | May 1946 to January 1948 | Vice Admiral Sir John A. Collins, RAN | February 1948 to February 1955 |
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser of North Cape, RN | January 1948 to December 1951 | Vice Admiral Sir Roy R. Dowling, RAN | February 1955 to February 1959 |
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, RN | December 1951 to April 1955 | Vice Admiral Sir Henry M. Burrell, RAN | February 1959 to February 1962 |
Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten, RN | April 1955 to May 1959 | Vice Admiral Sir W. Hastings Harrington, RAN | February 1962 to February 1965 |
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Lambe, RN | May 1959 to May 1960 | Vice Admiral Sir Alan W. R. McNicoll, RAN | February 1965 to April 1968 |
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Caspar John, RN | May 1960 to August 1963 | Vice Admiral Sir Victor A. T. Smith, RAN | April 1968 to November 1970 |
Admiral of the Fleet Sir David Luce, RN | August 1963 to February 1965 | Vice Admiral Sir Richard I. Peek, RAN | November 1970 to November 1973 |
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Varyl Begg, RN | February 1965 to August 1968 | Vice Admiral Sir H. David Stevenson, RAN | November 1973 to November 1976 |
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Michael Le Fanu, RN | August 1968 to June 1970 | ||
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton, RN | June 1970 to March 1971 | ||
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Michael Pollock, RN | March 1971 to March 1974 | ||
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Edward Ashmore, RN | March 1974 to February 1977 | ||
The First Sea Lords and the Australian Chiefs of Naval Staff corresponded with each other on a regular basis. The correspondence took place on many levels from the very personal and private to the more business-like. The correspondence reveals an alteration of the relationship between the two services as well as insights into the individual personalities of the various heads of the Royal Navy and the RAN. Some of the information contained in the messages was of a trivial nature, but this reinforces the fact that overall, the respective heads were comfortable in their dealings with each other. The correspondence also reveals a level of affection and friendship between some of the personnel concerned.
The direct communication between the Admiralty and the Australian Navy Office was sometimes viewed with a level of suspicion and misgiving by outsiders. Australian Ministers of State, the central office of the Department of Defence and Governors-General at times commented adversely on the close liaison between the services. 4 This resulted occasionally in the respective heads of service reinforcing the need for confidentiality. When informing the British First Sea Lord (1946–48) Admiral Sir John Cunningham, of the findings of a recent Australian Council of Defence meeting, the Australian First Naval Member, Admiral Sir Louis Hamilton requested ‘that you do not quote me as your informant outside of the Admiralty’. 5 The suspicion with which Hamilton’s direct communication with the Admiralty was viewed, was amplified because Hamilton, though a Royal Navy officer, acted as the head of the RAN and reported to the head of the Royal Navy. This was acknowledged by Hamilton himself. 6 There is little evidence that Hamilton ever acted in anything but the interests of the RAN. Hamilton served as the Australian First Naval Member from 1945–48 and he was crucial in harnessing Admiralty assistance for the creation of the RAN Fleet Air Arm.
Hamilton’s successor Vice Admiral Sir John Collins, the first Australian Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) to graduate from the Royal Australian Naval College continued corresponding with Cunningham’s successor as First Sea Lord, Fraser of North Cape. Collins held the post of CNS between 1948–55 while Fraser was First Sea Lord from 1948–51. Collins found this practice useful ‘particularly when questions arose that were not altogether suitable for the official channels’. 7 Collins also found it necessary to highlight the need for discretion and asked First Sea Lord Rhoderick McGrigor to ‘treat this letter as a personal chat to you. It’s the sort of thing I could so much more easily say in conversation than commit to paper’. 8 McGrigor revived the title of Fleet Air Arm and was head of the Royal Navy between 1951–55. Sensitive information was indeed sent by both services to the other. In late 1954, the Admiralty passed on comments made by Marshal of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Sir Jack Slessor during a visit by him to Australia in which he questioned the role of Australian Naval aviation. 9 This was information that Slessor did not discuss with the Australian CNS although he did do so with the Chiefs of Staff of the other two services. The CNS John Collins appreciated the information about Slessor’s report and ‘the ammunition you provided to counter the attack’. 10 Collins’ successor Vice Admiral Roy Dowling was also aware of the sensitive nature of some of the issues discussed in the personal correspondence between the respective heads of service: ‘By the way I have no doubt that in future I shall have certain information or comment which must not come to the ears of my political masters. Dangerous’. 11 Dowling was very much an advocate of close ties with the Royal Navy and served as CNS from 1955–59. When informing First Sea Lord Louis Mountbatten about issues with proposed South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) naval exercises, Dowling stipu...