Youth unemployment has been one of the main factors triggering the Tunisian revolution that provoked the fall of the Ben Ali regime on January 14, 2011, although (graduate) unemployment was a problem long before. Six years later, in 2017, and despite a democratic political transition process, youth unemployment remains very high and one of the most difficult challenges in terms of social cohesion and economic transition of Tunisiaās society and its economic system. New political freedoms, a new constitution, and a set of democratic reforms have been achieved, but the uncertainty of the political transition process has negatively impacted the macro-economy, has caused an economic crisis, and unemployment has increased. The socio-political revolt of 2011 has raised local and global awareness for the urgency of job creation in Tunisia , in particular for the younger generation.
Since 2011, there have been numerous attempts, projects, and programs addressing youth employment , initiated by Tunisian policy officials, NGOs, and the international donor community. However, the results of these programs are not yet significantly tangible. Six years after the revolution , in 2017, the general unemployment rate remains at about 15%, and youth unemployment at about 33%, varying between 30% and 40%, depending on age, region, or sectors. Graduates are particularly concerned, with about 31% (2014, BAfD et al. 2015: 2), and female graduate unemployment is twice as high as that of males (INS 2015). The flare-up of social protests in January 2016 (in Kasserine and its surroundings) and in 2017 (in Tataouine and its surroundings) showed that the socio-economic discontent of the younger generation remains profound.1
Indeed, the framework conditions for combating youth unemployment are challenging: The regional context, global economic and financial developments, and the domestic political and economic situation have paralyzed job creation efforts. The regional political context is not beneficial for the Tunisian economy, because the wars in Syria and Libya, increasing violence in Iraq, and the presence of the Islamic State (IS) and other radical violent groups in the Maghreb threaten small countries like Tunisia 2 and discourage foreign and domestic investors. The Libyan conflict in particular, has a negative impact on the Tunisian economy and labor market , due to the return of an significant number of Tunisian labor migrants from Libya to Tunisia ; a considerable number of Libyan refugees living in Tunisia ; the amplification of the informal sector ; the breakdown of an important economic partner; and the overall insecure situation hindering more foreign investments . Next to the uncertain regional context, the global economic and financial crisis, as well as rising food prices, have provoked economic disruptions in the export-oriented economy (e.g. decreasing demand from the EU, more expensive imports, less expensive exports, and the textile sector crisis), and destroyed jobs instead of creating new ones. But most of all, it is the domestic political and economic situation that makes job creation difficult. Due to the number of consecutive governments (the current Youssef Chahed government is the seventh since 2011), important reforms have been postponed or not implemented.
The Tunisian revolution and post-revolutionary phase have intensified macro-economic imbalances and structural problems: Tunisia has large fiscal and external deficits; has lower growth rates than before 2011; spends much on civil service wage bills, energy, and food subsidies; and has a predominant public sector and an increasing informal sector . The high expectations of the population after the Tunisian revolution āin terms of new job opportunities and higher wagesāmade that the different transition governments partly responded to the social demands, but at the expense of rising deficits and debt. Unfinished reform agendas (fiscal reform, subsidy reform, business climate improvement, public sector reform, and inter-regional equity) hinder domestic and foreign investments from increasing, and thus from promoting sustainable growth . Low wages and rising food prices and living expenses continue to incite strikes and social protests. The economic crisis does not help consolidate the fragile political transition process of the young democracy.
These difficult framework conditions increase the pressure on the Tunisian labor market , and unless major reforms are implemented, youth unemployment will remain high during the next two decades (Weinmann 2014). Labor force participation was below 50% over the past decade. Large cohorts continue to enter the labor markets, due to the demographic situation. In order to absorb the additional young labor market entrants, an additional 450,000 new jobs would be needed over the next 10 years (Weinmann 2014), compared to 60 million by 2020 for the whole MENA region in order to absorb the number of workforce entrants and stabilize youth unemployment (AHDR 2016). Existing jobs are in danger, because various economic sectors go through difficultiesāsuch as the tourism sector and its related sub-contracting industries, or the phosphate industry. These developments contribute to increasing precarious social situations and anxieties about the future. Unemployment is the second most important concern of the younger generation, right after security concerns; 81% fear losing their jobs (Arab Youth Survey 2015).
A central pattern of the Tunisian labor market is the mismatch of skills between job offer and job demand . The education system continues āproducingā the next cohorts of graduate labor market entrants, while there is no corresponding job demand by the private sector . Thus, the gap between labor demand and supply continues to grow. Currently, about 100,000 registered non-academic job vacancies remain open, despite about 650,000 registered job seekers (among them some 250,000 graduates ). This mismatch is mainly due to the great increase in graduates of higher education on the one hand, and an economic system dominated by sectors that mainly employ non-qualified laborers on the other.
Starting from these introductory observations, this book investigates various sets of underlying causes that are relevant to youth unemployment and skill mismatch in Tunisia : economic causes, such as the lack of an overall economic dynamic and low job creation in disadvantaged regions , and demographic causes, such as the large population of young people. In addition, a challenging political situation since 2011, as well as inefficient labor market policies , do not foster employment and skill-matching. The study contends that next to these causes, the skill m...