The enlargement of the European Union (EU ) towards the East was the biggest ever expansion in its history. The EU became bigger in the course of enlargement, but it also became more heterogeneous, welcoming countries with an average GDP per capita of less than 40% of the EUâs average (Vachudova 2005: 123). Most of the poorest regions of the community would be located in the new member states after accession. Enlargement would thus not only stabilize Central and Eastern European (CEE)1 countriesâ post-communist transformation process to democracy and market economy , but also redirect most EU transfer schemes from the old member states towards the new ones. It comes as no surprise that the discussion about the desirability of eastern enlargement among the old member states was thus as much centered on honoring historical promises to the region, as it was focused on future access to billions from Brussels (Schimmelfennig 2001). At the same time, the funds were among the most important incentives for the candidates to take up the burdensome road to membership (BuzogĂĄny and Korkut 2013: 1555). However, almost a decade later the biggest obstacle in the way of many CEE countries receiving their fair share of EU money was not old member states â reluctance to grant them access. Rather, it was their own inability to use the money.
Many CEE countries had hardly used their EU funds at the end of their first full financing period in 2013, the European Commissionâs (EC ) seven-year budgetary cycle. A high number of programmes implementing cohesion policy stood at an absorption rate of a third or even less of their total allocation . This was a significant problem in the face of EU financing rules: funds that are not used in time are decommitted, thus entirely lost for the countries with low absorption rates. Accordingly, the EC stressed in 2013 the risk that âby not mobilising the available EU funds promptly, a significant volume of them will be lost and the intended objectives not achievedâ (European Commission 2013: 10). In a similar vein, journalists across the region started to wonder why âbillions in EU funds may go up [.] [the] chimneyâ (ÄeskĂĄ Pozice 2011), why their countries were building âroads to nowhereâ (Ilie 2011), or would ultimately âstarve with money in their pocketsâ (SAR 2011). Thus, especially against the backdrop of old member states â pre-accession fears and candidatesâ motivation, one central question looms large: Why did some CEE countries struggle to use their EU funds ?
It could be argued that these problems come as no surprise. Many observers of the accession process were convinced that the candidate countries would become troublesome new member states . Upon achieving accession, the ECâs leverage towards the region would vanish and new member states could soon start dismantling the earlier changes in a region-wide âbacksliding â (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007). However, this expectation seems ill-founded with regard to cohesion policy and the high desirability of EU funds . Even Euro-sceptic parties in CEE argued for their absorption , and electoral contenders often criticized incumbents for their failure to use EU funds . Thus, against the backdrop of a strong wish to use the money, the ECâs weakened enforcement capacity after accession is an implausible explanation for the low absorption rates in the region.
Alternatively, it could also be argued that absorption problems result from the regionâs low absorption capacities. The inability of CEE countries to handle the complex implementation procedures or to provide the necessary co-financing for EU projects could account for the failure to use EU funds in time. While capacities are indeed crucial for absorption problems , this argument fails to account on its own for much of the variation in the region. For example, it fails to explain why some new member states feature both successful and struggling programmes implementing EU funds . Thus, a purely managerial perspective on the process reveals only half the puzzle of poor absorption.
1.1 Politicization and Absorption Problems: The Argument
This study argues that the so far neglected role of politics and especially the politicization of the implementation process and EU fundâs management structures are crucial for understanding absorption problems . In the study of bureaucracy , politicization refers to a process in which âthe appointment and career of civil servants [is subject] to political willâ (Rouban 2003: 313). Political parties often have great leeway to appoint staff to all levels of the state bureaucracy , trying to either achieve political control or access to resources (similar Meyer-Sahling 2008: 8; KopeckĂ˝ and Mair 2012: 4). These appointments and changes of staff then naturally also influence the success and direction of policy implementation , with two most likely effects.
First, the practice of politicization of the state bureaucracy by political parties holds the potential to strongly affect administrative capacity . Politicization results in the regular exchange of core staff in the state bureaucracy upon the advent of a new government, party, or minister in office. Changes lead to a loss of knowledge and experience, and often also a lack of human resources . Politicization thus goes beyond the mere assessment of low administrative capacity . Rather, it can possibly result in a sudden lowering of well-functioning existing capacity, or systematically impede adaptation in the case of capacity problems. It means that no linear process of improvement is to be expected, not for a lack of resources , but for the very logic of political competition in a member state.
Second, the effect from politicization might well go beyond the weakening of capacities. The desire to politicize the state bureaucracy is often seen as a means to establish control over policy implementation by an incoming new minister or party (KopeckĂ˝ and Mair 2012; Meyer-Sahling 2006: 275â276). The changes of staff are thus often only a first step in a general drive of an incumbent to implement policy preferences. Following staff changes, policy changes will thus further impact the implementation of cohesion policy. If new incumbents are more inclined to realizing own preferences than assuring absorption in general, changes can quickly result in delays of the absorption process, low absorption rates, and subsequently even a loss of funds due to a failure to use them.
Politicization was already found to matter in several ways for the use of EU funds . It features most prominently in allocation studies: Evidence for a distribution of funds following partiesâ interests was found in Bulgaria and Latvia (Bloom and Petrova 2013: 1600), but also in Germany (Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012: 427; Schraff 2014: 286) and Italy (Piattoni and Smyrl 2003: 144â145). In contrast to our broad knowledge on the influence of politicization on the allocation process, only two comparative case studies have so far highlighted its effect on the absorption of EU funds . Milio stresses for Italian regions that frequent changes are âdetrimental to [âŚ] administrative capacity because they undermine the continuity, consistency and coherence required for the successful implementation of a long term programmeâ (Milio 2008: 923). This means that politicization lowers administrative capacity and impacts absorption via the fluctuation of important staff. In a similar vein, Surubaru reports from Bulgaria and Romania that political stability was seen by fundsâ administrators as crucial for the absorption process (Surubaru 2017a: 850). Absorption improved during phases of stable government and thus more limited changes of core administrative staff as witnessed during the Borisov (Bulgaria) and Ponta (Romania) administrations (Surubaru 2017a: 850). However, when political control shifted, not only core staff but even âmiddle managers (Heads of Unit) or even operational staff (administrators)â (Surubaru 2017b: 114) were changed, again harming the absorption process.
Politicization of the bureaucracy has been reported in many different countries, but is a crucial c...