Liberalism rests on the liberty to pursue individual preferences . In this sense, the success of liberal institutions depends on their institutional capacity to maximise the preference satisfaction, utility or happiness of individuals. While much literature aims at fulfilling the utility-based telos of liberal institutions, there is less inquiry on the evolutionary consequences of such institutions. This work uses evolutionary theory to assess two central aspects of liberalism. First, the monograph appraises the capacity of liberal democracy and free markets to maximise preference satisfaction. In particular, it re-evaluates public choice theory’s claim that free markets are a suitable alternative to the shortcomings of western liberal democracies regarding the satisfaction of preferences . Second, and most importantly, the monograph assesses the desirability of the liberal satisfaction of preferences concerning its institutional sustainability.
Altogether, The Evolutionary Limits of Liberalism scrutinises the sustainability of liberal institutions. By appraising the liberal satisfaction of preferences from the standpoint of evolution, this work focuses on evolutionary fitness as the object of maximisation. Such an approach contrasts with the standard focus on the maximisation of preference satisfaction taken by rational/public choice approaches.
The monograph asserts that both liberal democracy and markets have a high potential to maximise the preference satisfaction of individuals. Public choice approaches are correct in emphasising the good performance of markets regarding preference satisfaction, although these approaches underestimate the good capacities of liberal democracy in that regard. Yet, to maximise individual preferences does not mean to maximise the evolutionary fitness of individuals and their groups. After analysing the evolutionary impact of the liberal satisfaction of preferences , the book argues that such a practice reveals maladaptive tendencies which impact negatively on the fitness of the groups that promote it. From an evolutionary point of view, the liberal satisfaction of individual preferences is not particularly desirable. Therefore, the free market is an unsuitable alternative to liberal democracy’s shortcomings because both institutions operate under a liberal meta-morality that potentially weakens groups in the evolutionary process of inter-group competition. Whether in market or democratic liberalism, it is the ethic of the liberal satisfaction of preferences that leads to maladaptiveness and thus to institutional unsustainability.
This book represents a unique research that uses the evolutionary model of multilevel selection to reassess the classical claims of public/rational choice theory regarding preference satisfaction in markets and liberal democracy . It also constitutes a novel biopolitical evaluation of the evolutionary desirability and sustainability of the liberal satisfaction of preferences . Within political theory, no extensive and consistent research has utilised contemporary multilevel selection theory to analyse the theoretical underpinnings of liberalism. In particular, this research suggests the adoption of a more realistic account of social behaviour than the one offered by standard rational/public choice theories to build a robust political theory. While the cognitive sciences have already been demonstrating that the assumption of universal rational egoism is unverified, multilevel selection theory offers explanations for why moral and behavioural pluralism is present in society. By integrating behavioural and evolutionary science within political theory, this work develops an evolutionary political theory of preference satisfaction which operates in the tradition of scientific realism and that represents a more accurate explanation of public choice.
The study of the impact of liberal morality on the evolutionary fitness of social groups is another essential contribution to knowledge. Because morality is a collective phenomenon under selection, to research the impact of morality on group fitness is of high importance to understand institutional sustainability. The monograph contributes to the deepening of this important research in relation to liberal morality , which is of high relevance for contemporary liberal societies. Ultimately, this work specially interests all of those who want to understand the desirability and the limits of liberal institutions in our increasingly challenging times.
1.1 The Outline
The book focuses on the nature of preferences and their social impact. The academic fields of economics (Samuelson, 1938; Sen, 1986; Sunstein & Thaler, 2006), psychology (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Tversky & Simonson, 1993) or philosophy (Brennan & Lomasky, 1993; Goodin, 1986) have studied preferences from various angles. However, when comparing the satisfaction of individual preferences in markets and politics, public choice theory is the classical framework of study. Such a framework is the comprehensive body of theory that applies the tools of economic reasoning to the study of politics and markets. Public choice theory , in the classical liberal tradition of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock , asserts that largely unrestricted markets are a possible and probably better-suited institutional mechanism to satisfy individual preferences than current western liberal democracies (Buchanan, 1999a, 1999b; Buchanan & Vanberg, 2001). These authors claim liberal democracies suffer from intrinsic structural shortcomings (e.g. rent-seeking , rational ignorance , etc.) and that free markets reveal comparative advantages. Put differently, this classic public choice tradition postulates that the aim of fulfilling the liberal satisfaction of individual preferences is better achieved by reforming/limiting current liberal democracies and instituting a classical liberal market-oriented society. Such public choice theorists reveal disappointment with current liberal democracies . They believe that only market liberalism and politics “as exchange” can provide a good basis for fulfilling the liberal satisfaction of preferences .
Based on this argument, the monograph employs evolutionary theory to reanalyse if free markets1 are truly a suitable alternative to the shortcomings of liberal democracy 2 in respect of preference satisfaction. Above all, the monograph aims at understanding how desirable the liberal satisfaction of individual preferences is from an evolutionary perspective. It assesses the impact that the morally liberal aim of satisfying/maximising individual preferences has on the evolutionary fitness of individuals and groups that embrace this aim. The assessment of the positive or negative impact of liberal morality on fitness is fundamental in determining the sustainability of such an ethic. In sum, the book analyses the capacities of democratic and market liberal institutions to satisfy individual preferences and assesses if the liberal satisfaction of preference is sustainable in terms of evolution.
To achieve the proposed aim, this work introduces the main arguments in public choice literature about free markets being a suitable alternative to liberal democracy’s shortcomings. In particular, the work introduces the shortcomings of liberal democracy and the institutional market-enhancing solutions, as well as public choice’s main behavioural assumptions, which rest on rational choice theory .3 Afterwards, the monograph puts forward the evolutionary framework. The evolutionary perspective that reanalyses the claims of public choice theory relies on the model of multilevel selection theory—a group selectionist model which asserts that natural selection takes place not only at the level of individuals but also at the level of groups (Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson & Wilson, 2007). Based on the insights and logic of multilevel selection theory, the monograph proposes a new set of behavioural assumptions as an alternative to the ones used by public choice theory . This new set of assumptions is pluralistic and make up the “pluralism of types ” approach.4 Such a new set will become the basis to discuss the potential for preference satisfaction in markets and politics, reanalysing the postulates found in public choice theory . Furthermore, the monograph discusses the role of morality in shaping preferences and in providing group cohesion under inter-group competition to understand the impact of moral institutions on group evolutionary fitness . Such an understanding is important to assess the desirability of a liberal morality that aims at satisfying individual preferences . Ultimately, after presenting this comprehensive evolutionary framework, the book assesses the main claims of public choice theorists and answers the work’s main questions from this evolutionary perspective.
In more detail, the chapters have the following content. After the general introduction, Chapter 2 introduces the key definitions and methodology, focusing on the behavioural assumptions of rational/public choice theory and on the rational/public choice methods for comparing preference satisfaction in politics and markets. This chapter also introduces the evolutionary model of multilevel selection theory al...