The Prague Spring marked the end of de-Stalinisation in the USSR. 1 Over the previous 15 years, the Soviet leadership had searched for ways to rekindle popular faith in the communist system after the traumas of Stalinism. Following Nikita Khrushchevâs âSecret Speechâ at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, rank-and-file party members were encouraged to take a more active role in debating and implementing policy. Most prisoners were released from the Gulag in the first few years after Stalinâs death as the new leadership relied more on persuasion and material incentives, and less on terror and coercion, to mould people into Soviet citizens. Censorship was relaxed, though fundamental aspects of the political, social and economic system were still beyond criticism in the USSRâs public culture. 2 These ambitious attempts to foster new forms of âparticipatory citizenshipâ were curtailed with Khrushchevâs ouster from the Kremlin in October 1964. 3 But until the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Leonid Brezhnevâs team still saw gradual economic reform and limited intellectual and cultural openings as a means of winning popular legitimacy. 4
Soviet relations with Czechoslovakia and other East European satellite states reflected the broader dynamics of de-Stalinisation. Czechoslovakia remained politically, militarily and economically dependent on the USSR. At the same time, the late 1950s saw the emergence of special organisations devoted to promoting new types of transnational contacts between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Their goal was to demonstrate the international success of Soviet-style socialism. Soviet travel to Eastern Europe was a particularly important means of fostering faith in the communist project among the population of the USSR: trips to the satellite states were meant to include ordinary blue-collar workers, eclipsing âany significant expression of ethnic or national difference⌠in favor of a shared socialist/working class identityâ. 5 Soviet and Czechoslovak citizens engaged with the transnational friendship project for a variety of reasons, ranging from personal memories of World War II âto professional interests to attempts to further transnational friendships made in other contexts to a desire for goods and culture unavailable at homeâ. 6
The 1950s and the 1960s also witnessed the rise of new transnational contacts that were beyond the Kremlinâs control. 7 Especially (though not exclusively) in the USSRâs western borderlands, Soviet citizens learned about the outside world from western radio stations broadcasting into the country, as well as East European newspapers, radio and television. East European broadcasts and publications featured items that Soviet censors considered âantisocialistâ. 8 At the same time, the Soviet leadership was reluctant to stop the flow of news from the USSRâs satellite states, lest socialist friendship be exposed as a mere propaganda façade. By the late 1960s, Soviet leaders looked upon a fast globalising world with apprehension. When Alexander DubÄek launched his reforms in Czechoslovakia, people in the USSR were surprisingly well-informed about the momentous events across their western border.
As Soviet citizens commented on the Czechoslovak crisis widely, Thaw-era notions of what it meant to be Soviet and what it meant to be socialist crumbled. From the Politburoâs perspective, the Czechoslovak events were part of a broader international crisis facing communism that encompassed student protests in Poland, escalating tensions with China and a break with Nicolae CeauĹescuâs socialist Romania. 9 In this context, Czechoslovakia represented the most sustained and ambitious attempt to reform a regime that very closely resembled the Soviet model. DubÄekâs experiment was thus a testing ground for Soviet policies and ideas. Commenting on the Prague Spring reforms and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, leaders and citizens of the USSR reflected not only on their countryâs foreign policy, but also on the extent to which it was possible to increase political participation, open borders and relax censorship without undermining party control over society and inducing instability. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia was a clear sign that the Brezhnev leadership would no longer pursue or tolerate attempts at democratisation within the blocâs communist parties or in society more broadly. Ambitious attempts to increase citizensâ participation in debating and implementing policy thus ended with a bang in August 1968.
This clear anti-reformist direction created deep rifts in Soviet society. Some citizens turned to illegal means to defend the de-Stalinisation agenda. At the same time, faced with a major crisis of the socialist system that challenged Soviet ideas of progress, leaders of the USSR were able to rally many citizens around the idea that Soviet interests had to be protected against the supposed chaos emanating from Eastern Europe, as well as a potential âfifth columnâ at home. In various public forums, citizens underlined their loyalty to the Soviet homeland and its titular ethnic groups. While it is impossible to judge levels of genuine belief, these public articulations of Soviet patriotism shaped social and political dynamics in the USSR during the late 1960s. The âsearch for socialismâ that had animated stateâsociety relations over the previous fifteen years was over in 1968. Instead, ethnically and geographically defined Soviet patriotism, often framed in xenophobic terms, became the main tool of social and political mobilisation in the USSR.
My analysis encompasses developments in Moscow, where the top Soviet leadership as well as members of the intelligentsia followed the Czechoslovak crisis in detail. But the chapter focuses in particular on Soviet Ukraine. Ukraine lay in the west of the USSR and it shared a border with Czechoslovakia. 10 Its inhabitants were therefore very well-informed about the Prague Spring. In the borderland region of Transcarpathia, memories of Czechoslovak rule in the interwar period made the crisis seem very close to home. 11 Moreover, the example of Czechoslovakiaâs rising autonomy from Moscow followed by a military crackdown on DubÄekâs reforms carried particular significance in the USSRâs non-Russian periphery, which itself had a complicated relationship with the Soviet centre in Moscow.
Official Reactions
The Prague Spring sparked a crisis of identity among the Soviet leadership. Throughout the first half of 1968, Brezhnev in particular was keen to salvage the idea that political and economic reform was possible in the Soviet bloc and, by extension, in the USSR itself. He was therefore reluctant to crack down on âsocialism with a human faceâ that promised to lend Soviet-style regimes new legitimacy. But other members of the Politburo were also painfully aware that DubÄekâs reforms challenged Soviet-made visions of what it meant to be socialist. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia pushed Soviet leaders to search for new sources of legitimacy at home and abroad, as attempts to involve citizens in debating and implementing policy were now associated with chaos and violence.
In conversations with Soviet diplomats in Prague in early 1968, DubÄek presented his reforms as a fight against âviolations of party disciplineâ, excessive bureaucracy and attempts to concentrate all political power in the hands of just one individual. These ideas echoed Brezhnevâs own slogans that had helped him to justify the overthrow of Khrushchev in 1964. 12 In January and February 1968, the Kremlin did not therefore express alarm at the unfolding events in Czechoslovakia. The tide turned in March when, concerned by the removal of former party leader AntonĂn NovotnĂ˝ from the office of president, major changes in Communist Party cadres and increasingly free mass media in Czechoslovakia, Moscow issued a stern warning to Prague. Even then, members of the Politburo insisted that some of the most confrontational phrasing prepared by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the head of the KGB Yurii Andropov be dropped from the letter they drafted. 13 An eyewitness recalled âlong and heatedâ arguments in the CPSU Politburo during deliberations on the Czechoslovak crisis. 14 Top Soviet leaders were clearly at a loss about how to interpret DubÄekâs policies. Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, for example, was a very harsh critic of Czechoslovak reforms in March 1968, but seemed to take a more positive view of DubÄek after a visit to Karlovy Vary in May. He continued to question the idea of a military intervention in Czechoslovakia at Politburo meetings: âWe will take our armies in, and then what?â. Even in early August, shortly before the invasion, Moscow harboured hopes that the bilateral Äierna nad Tisou agreements would help to avoid open confrontation with Czechoslovakia. 15
Soviet leaders knew that their own legitimacy was at stake in Czechoslovakia. Albeit highly critical of the mooted idea to introduce a multi-party system in Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev still wanted inhabitants of the socialist camp to believe that communist parties and state institutions could bring more prosperity and opportunities for citizens to participate in power. 16 In May 1968, the head of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgornyi was likewise alarmed that an overly heavy-handed approach in Czechoslovakia would convince âenemies of socialismâ that th...