Duncan Sandys and the Informal Politics of Britain's Late Decolonisation

Peter Brooke

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9783319651606
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia mondiale

This book throws new light on the impact of informal 'old boy' networks on British decolonisation. Duncan Sandys was one of the leading Conservative politicians of the middle decades of twentieth-century Britain. He was also a key figure in the Harold Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' policy of decolonisation, serving as Secretary for the Colonies and Commonwealth Relations from 1960 to 1964. When he lost office he fought strenuously to undermine the new Labour Government's attempts to accelerate colonial withdrawal and improve race relations in Britain. Sandys developed important private business interests in Africa and intervened personally through both public and official channels on the question of Rhodesia, Commonwealth immigration and the 'East of Suez' withdrawal in the late 1960s. This book will appeal to students of decolonisation and twentieth-century British politics alike.

© The Author(s) 2018

Peter BrookeDuncan Sandys and the Informal Politics of Britain’s Late DecolonisationCambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Serieshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65160-6_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Peter Brooke¹

(1)

Faculty of History, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

End Abstract

Duncan Sandys’ political career offers a unique insight into the nature of decolonisation and its impact on British politics. This book is a study of Sandys’ personal contribution to the end of empire: as a minister, between 1960 and 1964, and, more remarkably, as a backbench rebel from 1964 to 1968. The history of decolonisation has traditionally been dominated by accounts of formal negotiations between metropolitan and colonial governments. But this account demonstrates that the decolonisation period also offered unusual opportunities for informal influence on policy-making. No one took better advantage of these opportunities than Sandys who became the most successful of a number of ‘die-hard’ Conservative rebels seeking to slow the process of decolonisation through irregular channels.

Sandys cut a prominent figure in the early 1960s as Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies in the Conservative Governments of Harold Macmillan and Alec Douglas-Home. He played a critical role in bringing Macmillan’s ‘Wind of Change’ to the colonial world. His ministerial career came to an end with the General Election of 1964, and after a short period as Shadow Secretary of State for the Colonies until 1966, his official role was over. But Sandys’ involvement with colonial and Commonwealth issues did not end there. The following years were a period of dynamic post-officio activism for the former minister. Sandys won considerable parliamentary and popular support, and became a serious if short-lived Rightist threat to Edward Heath’s leadership. In a series of populist campaigns Sandys drew on an emotive and distinctively colonial blend of racial fears and dreams of ‘Great Power’ status. He was the first prominent Conservative in the mid-1960s to galvanise opposition to withdrawal from Aden, majority rule in Rhodesia, race relations legislation and, most effectively, mass immigration from the ‘New Commonwealth’. This public campaigning was complemented by private lobbying. Falling back on the ‘old boy’ networks that he had developed during his time in office, Sandys exploited his contacts with colonial and Commonwealth politicians and British civil servants to put pressure on Harold Wilson’s Labour Government. The success of his efforts constitutes a remarkable and so far undocumented feature of British politics in the late 1960s and invites scholars to reassess the significance of the informal politics of decolonisation.

Sandys has yet to be the subject of a biography. Chapter 2 therefore presents an overview of his career. Particular attention is given to Sandys’ tenure at the Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Offices from 1960 to 1964. The chapter details his ambiguous attitude towards the end of empire, his interpretation of colonial ‘multiracialism’, a sympathy for traditional rulers, and his enthusiasm for direct intervention both in dependencies and newly independent Commonwealth states. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 then consider Sandys’ backbench activism. Chapter 3 evaluates the success of his South Arabia campaign, from 1965 to 1967. Although the British public showed limited interest in the region, Sandys had considerable short-term success in exercising private leverage over the Labour Government. His efforts contributed to a significant shift in British policy, as ministers abandoned Aden’s elected socialist leaders and became increasingly sympathetic to the unelected and reactionary traditional rulers championed by Sandys. This confused approach led in turn to a collapse of power and Britain’s hasty withdrawal in 1967. Chapter 4 details the impact of Sandys’ first popular campaign, for ‘Peace with Rhodesia’ in 1967. The chapter demonstrates that the management of decolonisation attracted more public interest when expressed in ‘kith and kin’ terms of racial difference, but finds that Sandys failed to gain any direct influence on Wilson’s Rhodesia policy.

Sandys’ later campaigns were more successful. Chapter 5 considers his public efforts to rally opposition to Commonwealth immigration and race relations legislation in 1967 and 1968. This was his most effective public campaign, shattering a period of bipartisan consensus at Westminster some time before Enoch Powell’s more infamous intervention. The chapter also traces the colonial origins of Sandys’ thoughts on race relations in Britain. Lastly, Chap. 6 presents an analysis of Sandys’ private efforts to halt the arrival of British citizens of South Asian origin from Kenya in the same period. Sandys’ residual influence in Kenya, combined with his popular support in Britain, proved a potent weapon in his tussle with Labour ministers. The chapter demonstrates that Sandys played a critical role in the Labour Government’s tortured decision to introduce a restrictive and highly controversial Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in 1968.

Several themes are shared between Sandys ’ time in office and his backbench campaigns, and recur throughout this study. Sandys refused to accept Dean Acheson ’s dictum that Britain had ‘lost an empire and has not yet found a role’.¹ His belief that Britain should continue to exercise a global influence was evident in the interventionism of his time in office and his later defence of Britain’s interests in Africa and Arabia. Racial difference was another major concern for Sandys and, on a number of occasions both in and out of office, he sought to defend white privilege. Like many others at the time, Sandys found the prospect of racial violence particularly frightening and believed that it was a universal ‘problem’, whether in the Commonwealth, the USA, or Britain. The role of pledges in the management of decolonisation is also a recurrent theme. Sandys fought tirelessly to defend his ministerial promise that Britain would conclude a post-independence defence treaty with South Arabia’s rulers. Yet he was equally passionate in rejecting the right of entry to Britain that he himself had pledged the Kenyan Asians at the time of independence. Sandys’ double standards were symptomatic of a paradox at the heart of decolonisation: many pledges were made to smooth the transition to independence throughout the empire, yet no constitutional mechanism existed to bind either successive governments at Westminster or the leaders of newly independent Commonwealth states.

The starting point for the current study was a well-established body of literature on the causes of decolonisation, dominated by a number of excellent surveys by John Darwin, John Gallagher, David Low and Ronald Hyam amongst others.² Various ‘push’ factors have been highlighted by scholars. Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson ’s seminal article on the ‘imperialism of decolonisation’ did much to focus attention on the influence of international pressure, notably from the USA and John Darwin points to the importance of Cold War imperatives.³ Other international perspectives have looked to the influence of the Committee of 24 at the United Nations , and the EEC .⁴ The role of colonial nationalists who ‘hustled and harried’ the British before and after they decided to leave has also attracted attention, particularly in regard to Palestine , Kenya and Aden , the colonies that experienced a violent endgame.⁵

Underpinning much of this literature is the premise that the concerns of the metropolitan ‘official mind’ were of primary importance and that policy-makers consciously chose to dismantle the empire as a calculated response to domestic and international challenges.⁶ My own research argues that domestic politics did indeed play a critical role in shaping the course of Britain’s decolonisation, but emphasises the importance of domestic political pressures outside of the ‘official mind’. General surveys also raise a question of periodisation as they tend to focus on the period between 1945 and 1964. Although the rate of decolonisation was certainly slower after 1964 this study argues that that the complexities of dealing with the last few ‘problem children’ (as the Colonial Office sometimes termed them) resulted in a more politicised and public debate about colonial policy in the late 1960s than earlier in the decade.

A number of studies have explored the relationship between domestic extra-governmental pressures and the course of decolonisation in the period before 1964, and have been particularly helpful for my research. Philip Murphy’s early monograph on the Conservative Party offers the most sustained conside...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Duncan SandysSandys’ Career and Decolonisation
• 3. Saving South Arabia
• 4. Making Peace with Rhodesia
• 5. ‘Turn off the Tap’: Immigration and Race Relations
• 6. The Kenyan Asian Crisis and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act
• 7. Conclusion
• Backmatter