On 17 February 2008, following a two-year status process overseen by the United Nations,1 Kosovo declared independence.2 The decision was greeted by very different reactions around the world. While the newly created Republic of Kosovo was quickly recognised by the United States and other key Western states, such as Canada, and Japan, Kosovoâs claim to sovereign statehood was strongly rejected by Russia and China, as well as many emerging regional powers, such as Brazil, India, South Africa and Indonesia. Significantly, these differences over Kosovoâs status were also mirrored within the European Union (EU). While the overwhelming majority of the EUâs 27 members recognised Kosovo as an independent state in the months following the declaration of independence,3 five countries chose not to do so: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. More than a decade later, they have still not recognised Kosovo.
Given the highly contentious manner in which it emerged, there is perhaps a tendency to think about the way in which the international community interacts with Kosovo in distinctly binary terms: the recognisers and the non-recognisers. This division naturally leads to assumptions about the quality of the relationship Kosovo enjoys with the wider world. Amongst the recognisers, or so the thinking goes, relations are good, and the ties are strong and fruitful. Meanwhile, as the non-recognisers refuse to accept Kosovoâs statehood, they must necessarily keep their distance. To be sure, there are some states that sit firmly within these categories. For instance, amongst the recognisers, there are those states that have built up strong relations with Kosovo across a range of areas. In some cases, these states have been at the forefront of efforts to help Kosovo cement its status on the international stage. Likewise, at the other end of the scale are the non-recognising countries that resolutely oppose Kosovoâs claim to statehood and steadfastly refuse to have anything to do with it. Some of these countries have been instrumental in trying to prevent Kosovo from being recognised by other states or from joining international bodies.
However, this simple division tells an incomplete, if not wholly wrong, story. In truth, the two broad campsârecognisers and non-recognisersâare far more heterogeneous than is often realised. Over the course of the past ten years, a wide variation of positions has emerged. While recognition is important, there is a tendency to forget that it is merely one element, albeit an important one, of the wider process of interaction between states. It is, in many ways, a starting point (although not the only starting point). The subsequent establishment of working political, economic and cultural relations is the basis for deeper and more sustained engagement between countries. It is in this regard that the binary divisions between recognisers and non-recognisers begin to break down. One thing that has become very obvious is that recognition does not necessarily mean engagement. The past decade has shown that there are many countries that have recognised Kosovo but have little, if any, actual interaction with it, whether in terms of formal diplomatic relations or in terms of wider economic and cultural engagement. Equally, the past decade has also shown that non-recognition does not automatically preclude any form of interaction. Around the world, there are a number of countries that have not recognised Kosovo, but nevertheless have developed a range of relations with it, including regular contacts between officials.
To this extent, rather than think of a binary relationship determined by recognition and non-recognition, it is important to also consider engagement as a separate and distinct dimension of Kosovoâs interaction with the wider international community. By establishing recognition and engagement as distinct, but nevertheless interrelated, aspects of Kosovoâs external relations, we can in turn construct four broad definitional categories to describe the nature of third-party interactions with Kosovo: âstrong recognisersâ, âweak recognisersâ, âsoft non-recognisersâ and âhard non-recognisersâ. Even then, it may be worth thinking in terms of a spectrum of attitudes within these broad categories, rather than thinking of them as discrete boxes. Even amongst âhard non-recognisersâ there is a degree of pragmatism between those that do not recognise and actively try to prevent Kosovo from integrating into the wider international community, and those that oppose recognition and have little engagement, but are not trying to lobby against Kosovo. Therefore, while recognition is certainly a binary choice, the ways states actually interact with Kosovo tell a very different and far more interesting and nuanced story than recognition alone.
Engagement and Recognition by EU Member States
Just as these different degrees of recognition and engagement are clearly identifiable on the international stage, they are also seen within the European Union. Here again, there has been a tendency to think that there are the member states that recognise Kosovo, and thus have excellent relations with Pristina, and the member states that have not recognised, and which have little to do with Kosovo. This could not be further from the truth. Indeed, the four categories identified above are particularly apt in the case of the EU. In the European context, the âstrong recognisersâ are the United Kingdom and Germany. Britain emerged as the strongest advocate of Kosovoâs statehood from the outset and was at the forefront of international efforts to secure Kosovoâs acceptance by the international community. Germany has also been another strong supporter. However, its path to recognition was slower. Unlike Britain, it had some initial reservations about supporting independence. But once these initial concerns were overcome, it too emerged as a key ally for Pristina as it sought to gain international acceptance. At the other end of the scale, the âhard non-recognisersâ in the EU have been Cyprus and Spain. Both have taken a wholly uncompromising position towards Kosovo. Yet again, though, there have been some very interesting divergences between the two of them. At the time of Kosovoâs independence, Cyprus was seen to be the ultra-hard-line member of the European Union. However, since 2008, it has moderated its approach and there have been some, admittedly very limited, contacts between Nicosia and Pristina. In contrast, Spain has gone the other way. Over the past ten years it has progressively become tougher in its approach towards Kosovo. Spanish officials now avoid any direct or indirect contacts with officials from Kosovo, even in multilateral settings.
In between these two poles of strong recognisers and hard non-recognisers, we can also see examples of âweak recognisersâ and âsoft non-recognisersâ. Within the recognising group of states, there are some countries that have accepted the independence of Kosovo but either have not developed official ties or have done so in a relatively limited capacity. For example, although the Czech Republic recognised Kosovo and established diplomatic relations with it, it does not have an ambassador in Pristina. As for Poland, although Warsaw also recognised Kosovo, it has not formally established diplomatic relations with Pristina. In both cases, the degree of interaction with Kosovo is very limited. In contrast, there are three EU members that have not recognised Kosovo, but nevertheless have had fairly significant and sustained contacts with Pristina. Greece has been at the forefront of these countries. Athens maintains very cordial bilateral relations with Pristina. Indeed, the levels of engagement have been so extensive as to suggest that Greece recognises Kosovo in all but name. Likewise, Slovakia has also built up good ties with Kosovo. This has in the past given rise to speculation that it would be the first of the five non-recognisers to change its position and recognise Kosovoâalthough this seems unlikely now. Finally, there is Romania. While it has had the least direct contact of the three, and in many ways can be regarded as sitting in between the soft and hard non-recognisers, it has nevertheless been willing to engage with Kosovo in ways that Spain and Cyprus have not (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1
Categorisation of EU member state relations with Kosovo
Policies towards Kosovo (country cases) | Recognition | Non-recognition |
|---|---|---|
Engaged | âStrong recognisersâ Germany UK | âSoft non-recognisersâ Greece Slovakia Romania |
Not engaged | âWeak recognisersâ Czech Republic Poland | âHard non-recognisersâ Cyprus Spain |
Kosovo and the Making of EU Foreign Policy
While the positions of these nine EU members all present interesting case studies in their own right and can shed valuable light on the ways in which these states engage in recognition and engagement, studying their positions is valuable for two further reasons. First, the way in which different members have reacted towards Kosovo can contribute to our understanding of how the European Unionâs external policy is formulated and operationalised in cases where there are profound differences of opinion between the member states. The European Union operates by consensus on matters of foreign policy. The Common Foreign and Security Policy remains an area where each member state has a right to a veto. Without the agreement of all members, or at least the âconstructive abstentionâ of dissenting members, the EU is unable to act.4 As has been noted, âthe EU does not come close to having exclusive jurisdiction over foreign policyâŚtacit or explicit agreement is needed of all the member states is needed for the Union to act internationally.â5 To this extent, the foreign policy of individual member states is important.6
The deep divisions over Kosovo have been especially significant in this regard. While Kosovo may not be as important an issue for the EU as other matters, such as managing the fighting in Ukraine or addressing Iranâs nuclear programme, two issues that have been prominent in EU foreign policy in recent years, it is nevertheless a crucial issue for the EU insofar as the Western Balkans is considered to be the Unionâs backyard. The countries of the region are understood to be potential future members of the EU. To this end, divisions over Kosovo have the potential to be profoundly disruptive for the European Unionâs flagship policy of enlargement. However, despite their differences over status, the EU has managed to forge a common position on Kosovo. For example, following the declaration of independence, the EU was able to establish a rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Thereafter, the member states found a way to allow the European Commission to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo, a step that is widely understood to be the first step towards eventual membership. Kosovo has highlighted the extent to which the EU is often able to forge pragmatic alignment on points of common interest, even when there are fundamental differences of opinion of the core substance of the issue at stake.7 Indeed, one thing that emerges strongly across the case studies is the degree to which various EU members, despite their own internal concerns, have nevertheless considered the consequences of their actions within the context of wider European unity. Even where individual states strongly oppose any form of engagement, they have often, though not always, sought to find ways to allow the EU as a whole to engage with Kosovo.
However, the fact that divisions emerged and have persisted also tells us a lot about the way in which domestic factors can often interact with, and override, the desire to work within a European consensus. This raises interesting questions regarding the way in which domestic factors can compete with the desire for European unity. When looking across the cases, it rapidly becomes apparent just how much internal politics played a defining role in determining the positions of many EU members, and thus, the EU as a whole. In some cases, as noted widely, there were deep concerns about the internal and international implications of accepting Kosovoâs unilateral declaration of independence. This was seen very strongly in the cases of four non-recognisers: Cyprus, Spain, Romania and Slovakia. However, almost every other country, including Germany, also grapples with these issues. (Curiously though, it did not seem to feature in British decisio...