The works of Hans Blumenberg are widely known and discussed within German academia. Scholars there have long appreciated the breadth and depth of observations he has made about the human condition. In the Anglophone world, Blumenbergâs writings are not widely approached, with the exceptions of the few who have engaged systemically with his work throughout their careers such as Angus Nicholls and Robert W. Wallace. The latter offered a superb translation of two of Blumenbergâs most critical works, Arbeit am Mythos (Work on Myth) and Die LegitimitĂ€t der Neuzeit (Legitimacy of the Modern Age). These translations have proven invaluable in allowing non-German speakers to unpack the thoughts of a philosopher who (as this book will argue) can help us to understand our tumultuous political times. 1
One reason for Blumenbergâs rarity in Anglophone academia may be that he is a relatively challenging author to read. His prose is often dense, and many of the points he makes must be understood within the context of previous philosophical debates that some readers may not be familiar with. Yet many other authors of similar difficulty to read, albeit unique in their philosophical outlooks, have still been widely read in the Anglophone world. One example would be Martin Heideggerâs Sein und Zeit ( Being and Time) an invariably challenging text that provokes much debate to this day, whether read in German or English. Yet Heideggerâs influence has been widespread, with his thought and his understanding phenomenology still underpinning research projects across the humanities and social sciences. While it would be unjustified to compare Blumenberg and Heidegger, it becomes apparent through reading Blumenberg that he has many profound additions to the overarching questions raised by Heidegger and which continue to be discussed. This includes (at least indirectly) our experiences of âbeing-in-the-worldâ. However, more definitively, Blumenbergâs work coalesces well with a canon of philosophical thought that questions our experiences of being, the extent to our freedom, and how alienated we may be from the world around us. This canon is often referred to as existentialism, although many of those who have been attributed the label of âexistentialistâ would have profound disagreements with one another. Blumenbergâs work addresses many of the same questions, and I would argue that we find this most strikingly in his writings on myth.
It may be that the dominant analytic philosophy of the UK and the USA would have limited interest in Blumenbergâs works. Proponents of the analytic tradition of philosophy emphasise clarity and precision of arguments, formal logic, and occasionally make reference to natural sciences and mathematics. Analytic philosophy contrasts with continental philosophy in multiple ways, but most notably in terms of method. Whereas analytic philosophy often tries to solve philosophical problems by reducing phenomena into their parts and the relations in which these parts stand, continental philosophy address questions in a more integrative manner, considering particular issues to be parts of larger unities that can only be understood âfitted into those unitiesâ. 2 Neil Levy similarly remarks that analytic philosophy would see itself as a âproblem-solvingâ activity whereas continental philosophy is closer to âhumanistic traditionsâ including literature and art, and is generally more âpolitically engagedâ. 3 Analytical philosophy privileges rationality over non-rationality, and seeks logical arguments to move towards objective truth. Students of such a school of thought would therefore oppose the understanding of âmythâ proposed by authors such as Blumenberg (described more below), instead viewing it as an inferior mode of thought to be overcome. It may be that the very basis for much of Blumenbergâs work would be dismissed by analytical philosophy on these grounds alone.
Contrary to such assertions, this book aims to demonstrate that key aspects of Blumenbergâs philosophy would offer a unique and much-needed approach to reading contemporary politics. It serves as an introduction to Blumenbergâs thoughts on myth and a political reading of them in contemporary times. While such a project must inevitably engage with other aspects of Blumenbergâs work, it does not claim to provide a comprehensive overview of Blumenbergâs entire oeuvre as political thought. Furthermore, it is strictly an introductory text that contributes to other works bringing Blumenbergâs thought into Anglophone academia, and it will particularly interest those who are concerned with the study of politics. While Blumenberg has traditionally not been understood as a political thinker, these perceptions have begun to shift following publications from the Nachlass . Indeed, these are not just interpretations of his philosophy in a political context, but often explicitly political writings made by Blumenberg himself that were not made public by him for various reasons. As mentioned, it would be beyond the scope of this book to reconceive Blumenbergâs entire canon as political thought, but I nonetheless identify an existential-political thread that we can glean from his conceptualisation of myth.
Blumenbergâs Myth: A Preliminary Summary
For Blumenberg, myth exists as a response to human experiences of what he terms the âabsolutism of realityâ. Briefly described, Blumenberg is one among many philosophers who noted a unique condition for human beings: the lack of an exclusive natural environment that can compensate for some of our deficiencies as a species. On the other hand, what we do have is a remarkable ability to adapt to multiple different scenarios, whether in terms of the very different natural environments in which we have created civilisations, or the variegated social structures we encounter and adapt to as we move between places. While this may sound like a good thing in principle, our lack of a specific environmental ânicheâ means our horizons have broadened to such an extent that we often feel faced with innumerable simultaneous events occurring around us, many of which are entirely indifferent to our existence. We can only mitigate against this vulnerability by finding ways to ground a sense of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) within the world.
The immediate question that needs answering is what exactly Blumenberg means by âsignificanceâ? How do we differentiate it from similar concepts such as âmeaningâ? The first step is to recognise that meaning is a broader and much less specific term than significance. As Chiara Bottici points out when making this distinction, there is meaning wherever there is language. Indeed, the world as explained us through natural science contains mathematical formulae that we can readily access, and these could certainly be classed as a form of âmeaningâ. However, it may still prove to be insignificant for us. 4 On the other hand, ultimate meanings, such as the meaning of life or the existence of an afterlife, may also not be significant for a particular person, or group, in some situations. Ultimate meanings of existence that are answered by religions tend to counteract the plurality of myths that may exist within societies and, indeed, this is an argument made directly by Blumenberg in regard to Christianity. Significance operates in the space between simple meanings and ultimate meanings, and is therefore concerned with making things we experience within the world less indifferent to us.
Over generations, human beings have established concepts, names, and themes that underpin contemporary myths, many of which predate our own lives. The contents of myths are innumerable, but we may frequently associate them with tales of collective origins, with heroes, villains, and prophecies. Myths develop and evolve over time, providing the fundamental themes, names, and other materials that we adapt to suit the needs of present circumstances. This preceding body of myths is the culmination of what Blumenberg refers to as the âWork of Mythâ, as distinguished by the equally important Work on Myth. The latter refers to the process of telling, retelling, and reproducing myths to adapt to the needs for significance at a particular moment in time. While myths must have an element of narrative constancy to act as an appropriate lens to view events, they must also be able to adapt to the needs of the present. Put simply, as times change, so myths must change with them. Myths must therefore be understood as a process which elaborates on a single narrative âcoreâ, but which is in a constant process of being told by people and adapted to specific circumstances. As Blumenberg puts it, myths are âstories that are distinguished by a high degree of constancy in their narrative cores and an equally pronounced capacity for marginal variationâ. 5
Blumenberg explicitly does not see myth as either an inferior mode of thought or something that is necessarily deceptive or false that can be overcome by scientific progress. This places Blumenberg among others in opposition to the long-held distinction between âmythosâ and âlogosâ in philosophy. Briefly, this refers to an assumption that reasoned explanations of the world (logos) had ultimately overcome mythical ones (mythos). Blumenberg is one of many philosophers to argue against this distinction, and instead point out that myths remain central within our societies, albeit in diverse forms. This may be counter-intuitive to many of us, as in our daily lives we may use the term âmythâ to describe a claim or story that is untrue and refutable. Readers will need to be aware that this is not the usage of the term employed by Blumenberg. Indeed, whether a myth is actually true or false is not be of great importance. What matters is the function of myth, or, to use the established terminology how it provides us with a sense of significance within the absolutism of reality.
Why might these observations be political, or at least concern contemporary politics? The first thing to consider is the metaphorical expansion of the absolutism of reality that has been actively created by human beings through technology. Since Blumenbergâs death in 1996, we have seen a plethora of technological advances that enable us to transport information and entertainment across the world instantaneously. Social media in especially has allowed to consume, produce, and reproduce narratives, and many of these are political in content, and many are saturated with what Blumenberg would understand as myths. More specifically, technological change has enabled the work of myth to be accessible, and the work on myth is undertaken at a rate that is unprecedented in human history. One may assume that social media, and âglobalisationâ as a general phenomenon, would actually reduce the size of the world metaphorically, and allow us to gain mastery of it more readily. Surely, we could âknowâ the world more substantively than ever since we are able to learn of events beyond our immediate horizons, in places that we may never physi...