Introduction
Over the last decade, a radical form of the democratic ideal has been in vogue. In response to the narrowing of political alternatives through conventional channels, a particular resurgence of democratic engagement âfrom belowâ has sprung up to challenge dominant socio-political orders in a variety of locales over issues ranging from the neoliberal economic order and its resulting socio-economic inequalities, unresponsive managerial technocracy, and unrepresentative forms of governance. Though far from an exhaustive list, episodes that have clearly embodied some of these goals have included the transnational Occupy Movement, the Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong, the Quebec Student Strike, and some instances of the Arab Spring. As Simon Tormey has argued, âone of the most striking features of the contemporary world is the readiness and facility of ordinary people to mobilize in defence of something or against some injusticeâ (Tormey, 2015).
In many ways, this recent development within political practice has been mirrored in political thought, with much of contemporary political theory informing and reflecting these recent challenges from actors outside of dominant political channels. Although it could be argued that many forms of contemporary democratic theory have reflected this recent development in the real world of democratic struggles, the one current that has perhaps reflected this best is what has been referred to as radical democracy or, for some, agonistic democracy/pluralism. While the radical democratic label has often been applied to several other theorists within contemporary democratic thought, it is possible to pinpoint four thinkers who have spent the bulk of their intellectual energies on developing and articulating the core elements of the project. These thinkers are none other than Chantal Mouffe, William Connolly, Bonnie Honig, and Jacques Rancière.1 Though many of these authors may not identify with each other given their philosophical differences, the abundance of similarities and sympathies across their works and the fact that they have often been in explicit conversation with each other provides us with sufficient bases to state that the four can be grouped together in a tighter âschool of thoughtâ.
Of course, because their projects do diverge at points, there has been some debate within contemporary democratic theory as to what constitutes radical democratic thought and further debate as to whether radical democracy and what has been called agonistic pluralismâa name openly put forth by some theorists such as Mouffe and Connollyâshould be placed together as congruent political projects (Wingenbach, 2011). Both of these debates have occurred for the reason that multiple authors have subscribed to similar ontologies and political principles while maintaining some key differences when it has come to emphasizing a particular ontological basis or a resulting political goal. Yet despite these differences, as Little and Lloyd have pointed out, various radical democratic authors, including the four aforementioned, can be grouped together for several common assertions which involve not merely the recognition of human plurality but also a continued political commitment to it (Little & Lloyd, 2009). According to Little and Lloyd, the major theoretical commonalities between these various radical democratic thinkers and proposals are that,
- 1.
democracy is understood as a fugitive condition or open-ended process, and thus perpetually amenable to disruption and renewal.- 2.
the political is apprehended as ontologically conflictual or contestatory.- 3.
civil society rather than the state is construed as the principal, even exclusive, site of democratic struggle.- 4.
democracy is not a form of government or a set of institutions but rather a moment marking the practice of politics itself.- 5.
radical democratic politics is oriented towards the contestation of prevailing regimes of cultural intelligibility (and thus exclusion). (Little & Lloyd, 2009)
In expanding on Little and Lloydâs classification with a specific eye to the projects of Mouffe, Connolly, Honig, and Rancière, all four begin with some version of the âparadox of politicsâ which fundamentally stems from each of the theoristsâ post-foundationalism. Since each starts with the assumption that there is no ultimate and indisputable foundation for either political rule or the organization of the political community, democratic politics necessarily involves negotiating the effects of this lack of foundation. This so-called paradox of politics takes two forms, with some theorists employing elements of both in their analysis. In the first form, the establishment of any political community, no matter how rational, complete, or representative of the demos it might appear, always involves a subordinated remainder or supplement that is subject to either exclusion on the one hand or conquest and conversion on the other. In the second form, though political rule is necessary in that someone or other will always be in a position of power relative to others in the political community, no one is fundamentally ordained with the right to rule. All forms of political rule thus are both oligarchic and arbitrary. For Mouffe, Connolly, Honig, and Rancière, a radical democratic moment (though some of the theorists may simply say a political one) occurs when this paradox is revealed through a collective abandonment of prescribed titles and functions and the launching of a political challenge against the dominant order whose very dominance is without foundation. Radical democracy thus involves both a âstepping outâ and a political challenge.
In terms of their political project thus, though some of the theorists favour certain elements over others, all four agree to the necessity of keeping the political contest open to renewal through âstepping outâ of assigned titles and functions and, further, in a manner that maintains an agonistic relation between those involved in the contest. In defining agonism, the theorists posit a scenario whereby sets of actors engage in a spirited public contest in which the contendersâ fundamental visions or worlds are contested, yet avoid coercive efforts to close the other down. As Mouffe argues, in agonistic relations âothers are not seen as enemies to be destroyed, but as adversaries whose ideas might be fought, even fiercely, but whose right to defend those ideas is not to be questionedâ (Mouffe, 2013). Antagonism by contrast occurs in moments when such coercion is not avoided.2 Though the commitment to renewal is fundamental due to their belief in the contingency of every socio-political order, the necessity of agonistic relations between constellations of forces involved in any radical democratic contest is the crux of their project. For without these agonistic relations, the contests would be unable to continually provide some of the progressive consequences that the theorists indicate in their work. These include the affirmation of political equality, the public litigation of decisions made oligarchically, the unsettling of long-settled orders and the uncovering of certain wrongs and, finally, the transformation of the socio-political world in a manner that is more representative of previously marginalized groups.
With this stated, it is clear to see why the radical democratic project is reflected in the aforementioned political movements. Indeed, many of these movements, having âstepped outâ of their normally assigned titles and spaces to challenge the dominant socio-political order, affirmed the radical democratic ideal of contestation being conducted by anyone at all and, in making their voices heard for the purposes of redressing past wrongs, attempted to transform the socio-political order. As Christian Volk has explained, the radical democratic perspective, âallows us to interpret protest as a struggle for experiencing political action, for redefining when, where, how, and who may legitimately speak in matters of politics, and for establishing a counter-hegemonic discourseâ (Volk, 2018).
The problem for these movements however and, in turn, the problem for radical democratic theory is that these admirable political goals were cancelled out when each of these events took a turn towards antagonism. While the ideals of uncovering remainders, enacting renewal, affirming political equality, and transforming the socio-political order for redressing past wrongs ought to be defended, radical democratic thought faces a problem with its empirical bases. Indeed, when reviewing the contents of their major works, it becomes very clear that, in comparison to their very thorough theoretical inquiries, their explanation of the circumstances in which a political contest could take an agonistic form is fairly underdeveloped. The primary reason for this is the fact that the theorists tend to place their bets squarely on the possibility that the recognition of difference by contending parties in a given socio-political order will create the conditions for agonistic relations between them. While some of the authors, particularly Mouffe and Connolly, make great efforts to articulate ways that political actors could become more willing to accept plurality in the polity, they do so without making reference to the dynamics of contention present in actual radical democratic contests.
As one preliminary example, Connolly blames antagonism on deep resentments that are the general product of the worldâs pressures and contradictions but which eventually become directed at others. This is done to provide a justification for the worldâs problems that does not involve or taint our own identity. According to Connolly, lessening this resentment through genealogical inquiry and a cultivation of care for the various contingencies of the world could loosen the resentment and turn antagonism into something more agonistic (Connolly, 1991).
While this argument contains a convincing rationale, it is presented without empirically establishing that actual socio-political antagonisms in identifiable periods of contestation are consequences of such resentment. Though this may be the case in some periods of contestation, this approach, abstracted from actual episodes of political contest, is unable to establish if the factor of resentment and the subsequent delegitimization of others is the sole cause of antagonism between different sets of political actors. As such, we cannot simply assert that the key to the maintenance of agonistic relations between political actors is a greater recognition of difference and contingency.
Of course, this is not to say that this recognition of difference is not essential to the type of radical democratic politics that the theorists are proposing. Undoubtedly, any type of democratic politics which is not monist or unitarian involves the legitimacy of opposition and thus must have the recognition of difference as a starting point. Indeed, recognizing the adversary as embodying a varying interpretation of the socio-political world and not as a growth on the social body to be eradicated can go some way in ensuring the maintenance of pluralism.
Yet there are clear reasons why this sole recognition of difference cannot suffice. From a purely theoretical point of departure, politics has often been understood as the absence of war in the sense that it does not involve the annihilation of oneâs opponents, operating instead as a contest between adversaries. However, as in all contests which, by their very nature, demand a winner (or at least a reward), the fact that one does not resort to cancelling out the very existence of their opponent does not automatically render them incapable of utilizing other coercive or antagonistic methods, beyond the allowance of the agreed upon rules of the game, to eventually reign victorious (or, again, at least ensure their reward) at the conclusion of the contest.
The same logic applies to contests of a political nature. Indeed, a set of political actors can coercively block (and be blocked in turn by) their opponent from key and limited spaces of the polity to ensure victory or reward without desiring or attempting the opponentâs existential destruction. Undoubtedly, many of the aforementioned recent examples of democratic contestation which were eventually repressed or transformed into instances of antagonism, including some of the episodes within the Arab Spring, Occupy Movement, and Umbrella Revolution, were less a result of a misrecognition of difference than an effort by the dominant force to prevent those âstepping outâ from further challenging or altering their desired socio-political order.
With this stated, what is of the utmost importance when envisioning the possibilities of a radical democratic politics based on the principle of agonism is keeping in mind that the recognition of difference is only a necessary, and not sufficient condition, for maintaining agonistic relations between contending sets of actors with varying socio-political projects. What the four theorists miss despite their insistence on viewing the world âpoliticallyâ as opposed to consensually or morally is the fact that âthe politicalâ is a fundamentally Janus-faced concept. Though the possibility of political contestation would not be possible without it, recognizing the nature of the political means more than simply recognizing difference to every identity, the âconstitutive outsideâ to every contingent hegemonic articulation, the remainders to every consensus, or the supplement to every police order. For, indeed, this concept of the political is one primarily rooted in negativity. As accounts of the aforementioned recent political events hint at and as the case studies in this book will go on to demonstrate, there is also something fundamentally affirmative about each and every attempt to engage in political contests for the purposes of victory or reward.
And what is the meaning of this victory, this reward? In essence, it is establishing or negotiating the appropriat...