Differentiate or Bust?
Brexit has been a shock, awakening us to the instability of the present European political order. Instability may lead to more political differentiation , and can pave the way for a multi-speed or a two-tiered Europe . The many crunches in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the refugee crisis as well as destabilised neighbourhoods and new global challenges all call for action. Several European leaders now support the idea, spearheaded by Germany and France, of formalising the concept of a multispeed Europe , where member states could choose the speed of their integration.1 Integration as a one-way street may thus end. We may see a change from a union of different speeds to one of different statuses—a two-tiered Europe . Is this type of political differentiation a problem, and if so, what kind of problem is it?
It is vital to clarify this issue also because it is still unclear what the European integration project is ultimately meant to achieve. The European integration process is unfinished and the European Union a project under construction. The lingering question is whether there is a third way between inter-governmentalism—based on treaties between sovereign states—and supranational state building. At the age of 60, the European Union needs more flexibility to revitalise itself, argues The Economist (2017) in a special research-informed report on the ‘Future of the European Union’ in March 2017. Under the heading ‘Differentiate or bust’, The Economist claims that the EU must embrace greater differentiation or face potential disintegration. In stark opposition to this view, the distinguished German professors Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss (2016: 21) argue that the EU and modern societies in general ‘typically suffer from excessive or misguided degrees of differentiation that jeopardize their capacity to gain and maintain control over their collective fates’. For them, the brute alternative is, ‘integrate or bust’.
Instead of setting out to examine who is right in this question, I will analyse the basic problem of differentiated integration , what it is, and why it could be a problem from a democratic point of view. One aspect of the problem, which eventually will shed light on the question of the relationship between integration and economic success, is whether a politically differentiated Europe can be stable. The EU is already differentiated and the effects are discernible. I shall address the principled problem of political differentiation —why it is or can be contested. Many are concerned with the economic and social effects of differentiation; whether it is beneficial in terms of prosperity and welfare and whether it produces negative externalities and represents a moral hazard. However, who decides about this? A democratic sovereign is needed to define and address externalities and moral hazard correctly and non-arbitrarily. Therefore, I locate the problem of differentiated integration as one of political freedom—of democratic autonomy.
The book deals with the principled problem involved in political differentiation under conditions of complex interdependence and economic integration. Pace Keohane and Nye (1977), I use the concept complex interdependence as a description of the multifaceted ways that patterns of interconnectedness and affectedness have evolved all over Europe. The term economic integration describes forms of cooperation of a more encompassing nature, not only interconnected and aligned economies but a highly regulated state of affairs. Members of the Single Market are required to adopt all relevant EU regulations and accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Under such conditions, parties may exclude themselves from decision-making processes, without being able to exclude themselves from all or any of the effects of these. Under such conditions, often less by design than default, political differentiation can undermine the fundamental conditions of democratic self-rule.
The claim of this book is that types of political differentiation affect the requisite conditions for a functioning self-ruling republic. Equal freedom for all, which is the first principle of justice, is at risk in a politically differentiated order. When those subjected do not have the same rights and duties, when different policy fields and groups of countries are governed by different rules, there is a risk not only of legal uncertainty, but of arbitrary rule, of dominance . Dominance is linked to asymmetries arising from political differentiation, which in itself may have roots and causes in the asymmetric distribution of power and resources. The basic problem, which political differentiation raises under conditions of cascading interdependence, is the exercise of arbitrary power as parties are obliged to follow laws, the making of which they cannot influence.
This book sets out to identify the basic problem of political differentiation in Europe and what it takes to overcome it. To identify problems and discuss solutions, I apply a conception of democratic autonomy , which requires that those subjected to laws are at the same time their authors. By applying this normative standard to certain developments of the European differentiation processes, I clarify dominance relations and specify their causes and implications. Through this analysis, I also establish what the standard implies with regard to assessment criteria and institutional reform. I draw on the insights of sociological theory and international relations theory to conceptualise the systemic effects of differentiation. There are not only policy consequences of differentiation, there are also polity ones. I will analyse the consequences of differentiation on the EU as a polity through the concepts of segmentation and hegemony , which will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2. The overall aim is to establish the conditions under which political differentiation raises a problem of dominance.
The Development of a Differentiated Europe: Core and Periphery
The idea of a Europe of different speeds is not a new one, and ideas of differentiated integration have been discussed since the very beginning of the European integration process. Policy makers and academics have discussed several models of differentiation, including the multi-speed and multi-tiered Europe, avant-garde Europe, concentric circles, variable geometry, Europe à la Carte, and enhanced cooperation, to mention but a few. Today, however, more EU policies than ever are marked by concentric circles of integration and lack of uniform application (De Witte et al. 2017).
The EU currently consists of multiple overlapping groupings: not all countries are members of the Euro or of the Schengen zone, and groups of countries can work together on defence, or decide to pass a new law because of flexibility in the EU rulebook. However, until recently, this type of differentiation has been seen as temporary. The states that are not members of the core, of the Eurozone, have been under an obligation to join at some later stage. The financial crisis, in particular, changed the situation. It was the Eurozone crisis that first reinforced differentiated integration , and the development of the Monetary Union in its aftermath is the clearest example of differentiated integration.
Brexit will contribute to the formalising of European differentiation. Because of it, a more differentiated European Union is foreseen. Even though the incongruence between the Single Market and the Single Currency will decrease when the UK leaves the Union, any arrangement involving the UK as an ex-member will necessarily be a new departure in differentiated integration (Lord 2017). These developments raise the prospect that states may come to permanently occupy different roles and statuses, and that this will come to be considered a defining feature of the EU. The internal differentiation between a political Euro-Union working ever-closer together—Core Europe —and a periphery of hesitant member states that can join the core at any time would then not be a temporary phenomenon.
In the recent years, many have argued in favour of various forms of differentiated integration as a solution to EU’s challenges. In 2012, Jean-Claude Piris, official chief legal adviser to the Council of Ministers, wrote a book advocating a two-speed Europe. The ideas of enhanced cooperation and a multi-speed Europe have also recently received interest. Earlier in 2017, Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande urged their fellow leaders to commit themselves to a union of ‘different speeds’ (Deutsche Welle 2017). ‘We must have the courage to accept that some countries can move forward a little more quickly than others,’ Merkel stated. Further, a European Commission white paper on the Future of Europe presented five possible scenarios one of which was labelled ‘those who want more do more’ and outlined a multi-speed model of differentiation for the EU. Accordingly, ‘Coalitions of the willing’ may join forces and work together in specific areas (European Commission 2017).
This view is, however, not shared by all European leaders. States that risk being left on the periphery are reacting negatively to such a development. There is fear of new divisions and dividing lines in Europe, of first and second-class Europeans.2 Leaders from Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland have expressed concern over the possible shift to a multi-speed Europe, worried that it could side-line their views (Strzelecki 2017). Denmark and Greece have also objected to the idea of a two-tier Europe, fearing they would be treated as outsiders and excluded from important decision-making forums. Another concern regarding the idea of a differentiated Europe is that if the EU members are not able to agree on common principles, the Union will eventually fall apart. Finally, there is a fear that too much variation within Europe will lead to a highly inefficient and unstable political order.
Three Orders of Differentiation
There are several different models and conceptions of differentiation. By 1996, Alexander Stubb (1996) claimed to have identified as many as 30 forms of differentiated integration . Differentiated integration depicts institutional variation and different forms of association. Yet political differentiation is a theme with variations.3 It ca...