Belgiumâs geographical position as a buffer between antagonistic European nations during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made it a political âflashpointâ on the European stage (Marks 2014: 107). It therefore suited the European Great Powers to support its creation in 1830 and subsequently maintain and defend it as a militarily neutral region. This was a matter of concern for Great Britain in particular, since any Great Power who possessed Belgium, and prior to its creation the Netherlands too (Keefer 2011: 18, 67), would have easy access to the British coastline. As commercial and colonialist rivalry grew between Britain and Germany, and tensions between France and Germany over the ownership of Rhineland territories continued, Belgiumâs barrier position gained in importance. Luxembourg had similar geographical significance for the Great Powers. Being at the forefront of industrialization and railway infrastructure on the continent, the economic prowess of the small buffer state grew in desirability. Instrumental in its growth were Anglo-Belgian connections. The first railway connection in the world outside Britain, created ten years after the Stockton-Darlington line opened, ran between Mechelen and Brussels. Prior to the existence of Belgium, the British entrepreneur John Cockerill had established an industrial conglomerate, and by 1850 had contributed substantially to turning Belgium into the one of the largest economic powers in the world (Kaiser and Schot 2014: 182; Declercq 2015: 66).
1 The Neutralization of Belgium and Luxembourg
With the French occupying Belgium from 1795 onwards, the British feared that Napoleon would use the Scheldt estuary to effectuate an attack if not outright invasion of Britain (Jorgensen 1999: 51). In 1814 several near-conspiratorial protocols (Treaty of Chaumont, the First Treaty of Paris and the Eight Articles of London) provisionally awarded the territory of Belgium to the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Barrow 1832: 3197).1 Following Napoleonâs final defeat at Waterloo in 1815, Belgium ceased to be controlled by France and was attached to the United Kingdom of the Netherlands under King William I. In 1830, however, Belgium rebelled against its autocratic Dutch ruler and declared independence. Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the widower of Charlotte of Wales, was established as the first King of the Belgians in 1831. However, the sovereignty of Belgium remained a matter of international concern. Following prolonged diplomatic negotiations and an initial unwillingness on the part of the Netherlands to cooperate, the First Treaty of London (1830) was eventually signed in 1839 by Great Britain, France, Prussia, the Austrian Empire and Russia. According to Article 7 of the Treaty, the Kingdom of Belgium became an âindependent and perpetually neutral Stateâ (Sanger and Norton 1915: 139â141). The United Kingdom of the Netherlands and Luxembourg were recognized as independent and neutral states, but Luxembourg lost its French-speaking territories to Belgium. Like Belgium, Luxembourg was situated at a strategic gateway position between France and Lower Germany, forming a vital section of a potential invasion route between Paris and Berlin. The Duchy was thus, like Belgium, of considerable significance to the Great Powers.
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg had originally been a province with loyalties that tended towards Belgium rather than Germany. Its Grand Duke was, however, the King of Holland until 1866; it was thus part of the German Confederacy and housed a Prussian garrison (MacBean Knight 1914: 143). From the French and Prussian point of view, both desired to annex Luxembourg along with Belgium, and the Great Powers intervened in 1867, guaranteeing continued neutrality for Luxembourg and removing the Prussian garrison from its capital, although the Grand Duchy remained joined to Germany for tariff and customs purposes (ibid., 144).
In the later nineteenth century, Napoleon III wanted to absorb Belgium into France, and his plans were one of the major causes of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870â71. Britain signed treaties with both France and Prussia at this point, committing to protect Belgian independence and preserving its buffer status. Despite further claims being made upon Luxembourg by Prussia, the Grand Duchy was able to remain neutral and was still so in 1914.
2 The Invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium in 1914
A German assault upon Belgium might not, in fact, have been totally unexpected by Leopold II, who had been offered an alliance by Emperor Wilhelm II in 1904. Predicting a war with France at the time, the kaiser proposed that Belgium join forces with Germany: in return it would receive new territories in northern France. When Leopold rejected this bait, Wilhelm threatened that he might nevertheless be forced to proceed âon purely strategic principlesâ (Clark 2013: 181). In 1913, Leopoldâs successor, King Albert Iâwho had succeeded Leopold II in 1909âalso visited Wilhelm II, worried at the number of new German railway lines leading to the Belgian border. Wilhelm once more referred to the likelihood of a war with France, citing French bellicosity as a reason; once more he offered Belgium the opportunity to side with Germany or risk losing its independence. Albert resolved, however, that Belgians should defend their territory at all costs (Marks 2014: 112).
The Belgian refusal to dance to the German tune meant that the Schlieffen Plan for a six-week offensive against France would be put into effect. The plan was for a German attack upon the western flank of the French army in order to drive it towards German and Swiss territory on its eastern flank, and so enclose it. For this to be possible, German troops would have to cross neutral Belgium and Luxembourg. As a neutral state and under the terms of the Hague Convention of 1910, Belgium was prevented from allowing the army of one nation to cross its territory in order to attack another. This agreement had been ratified by both Germany and Belgium (Sobich and Bischoff 2015: 193). For Belgium to disregard its responsibility in this respect would de facto have meant that it had taken Germanyâs side in an act of war and put it on a war footing with France.
German troops occupied Luxembourg on 2nd August 1914, and awaited permission to continue into Belgium. Germany issued an ultimatum to Belgium on the evening of the same dayâdelivered by von Below Saleske, the German ambassador in Brussels, to Julien Davignon, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairsâoffering it a choice between independence as a German ally and being considered an enemy (German Ultimatum 1914). In a clear refusal to grant free passage, issued the next day, Belgium chose war. For King Albert, his government and his nation it was a matter of national honour and duty towards Europe to stand up for their own independence and for international security (Clark 2013: 550). Germany declared war upon France on August 3rd and invaded Belgium, east of Liège, the next morning.
By that time, Britain had already issued an ultimatum to Germany to refrain from hostilities in Belgium. The message from the British government was conveyed by the British Ambassador, Edward Goschen, to the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, who dismissed it with the statement that he could not believe Britain would threaten war because of a mere word, âneutralityâ, upon a âscrap of paperâ (German Fetzen Papier).2 He was referring to the 1839 Treaty of London. Since no official answer to the British warning was received by the deadline of midnight of 4th August, Britain declared war upon Germany. Belgium requested military support from Britain on 5th August. The British Expeditionary Force was initially sent to support the French and linked with the French army at Maubeuge on the Belgian border, from where they entered Belgium.
Having expected a quick and trouble-free march through Belgium, German soldiers were confronted with strong resistance, and Liège only fell after a long and brutal siege, on 18th August. Still, the German plan to arrive in France within three days was delayed by only three weeks. Most of the Belgian army retreated north, to the fortified port of Antwerp on the River Scheldt, whereas German troops ransacked many villages and towns, killing hundreds of civilians along the way. The sacking of the university town of Louvain echoed across the globe. German soldiers reached Brussels on 20th August, and Namur and Charleroi three days later, where they faced the French army. On 23rd and 24th August, the Germans confronted the British near Mons. However, the British and French troops were no match for the Germans and retreated on 24th August well into French territory. Antwerp was taken by the Germans on 9th October, 1914, marking the beginning of the end of the moving front, which settled with the Fall of Ostend on 15th October and the First Battle of Ypres, starting 16th October. Belgium merely retained control of a small strip of territory behind the River Yser near the French border.
3 Some Contemporary Views on the Meaning of âNeutralityâ
When examining Belgian neutrality and the British self-image as Belgiumâs self-appointed saviour, it is interesting to look at the issues from an American perspective. John William Burgess, Professor of International and Constitutional Law at Columbia University, wrote in 1915 on the question of whether Belgian neutrality was a âguaranteedâ neutrality or an âordinaryâ neutrality âenjoyed by all states not at war, when some states are at warâ. He explained that the difference between ordinary neutrality and guaranteed neutrality was âthat no state is under any obligation to defend the ordinary neutrality of any other state against the infringement by a belligerent, and no belligerent is under any specific obligation to observe itâ (Burgess 1915: 167 f.). Guaranteed neutrality, on the other hand, was a question of agreement between particular states, and Burgess considered it doubtful that in August 1914 Belgium possessed âany other kind of neutrality than ordinary neutralityâ (ibid., 171 f.). According to Burgess, Britain, while being the power most interested in preserving Belgian neutrality, procured agreements with France and the North German Union to guarantee this neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War, but these treaties expired in 1872. The German Empire, when founded in 1871, signed no treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality and, Burgess felt, was justified in considering Belgium to have grown into a prosperous and well-fortified world power, with extensive colonies, and no specific right to claim anything other than âordinaryâ neutrality (ibid., 171). Burgess in fact blamed Britain for encouraging Belgium to resist the German march through Belgium en route to France: Britain had in this way declared belligerent intent when it could have remained neutral in a war between the North German Union and France (ibid., 175). When Sir Edward Grey had expressed British expectations, through his envoy to the Belgian government, that ...