Within the history of philosophy and across different cultures, few questions have been raised as frequently as what the realization of oneself means . Certainly, one of the very driving forces of philosophy seems to be the clarification of the self and its life. However, in spite of this, within recent years, there have been few serious critical and philosophical efforts to discuss what exactly it means to realize oneself. To this degree, there is a need to critically assess the meaning of self-realization .
Certainly, the topic of self-realization is present in many books concerning ethics, psychology and philosophy of psychologyâas well as religious (or perhaps pseudo-religious) works. Yet, in spite of this, recently, there have been no books which clearly, directly and specifically address such a concept. The publications in this regard have mainly considered the philosophical issue of self-realization in historical terms, i.e. by means of interpretations, and expositions, of past authors, especially the ancient Greeks, Romans, and (often exoticized) Eastern thinkersâsuch as Laozi, Buddha , Confucius, or the Veda. As mentioned, for current theories, the topic is nowadays mainly left to some religious (and dubiously scientific) works, as well as to some researchers in applied psychology. An up-to-date, open and scientifically rigorous, philosophical discourse on the very concept of self-realization is still lacking. We certainly ought to think of this as a gap that needs to be filled in order to enable an open, critical assessment of both religious and political propaganda. We should furthermore recognize the importance this can have for establishing a critical and democratic political agenda concerning issues concerning the individual and social good as well as well-being .
Indeed, it is not actually obvious what it means âto realize oneselfâ. As a matter of fact, both terms included in such an expression are far from clear. What is the âselfâ that is supposed to be realized? A person ? An ego ? A specific form of being which is different from what one âisâ as a whole human being , or as a person ? And what does it mean âto realizeâ? To achieve a goal? To actualize a plan? To create oneself into a specific shape? To draw out oneâs own potential? Perhaps more importantly: Is self-realization an act achieved by the self, or is self-realization something more akin to a re-shaping of the self which we only experience passively? What is the relationship between the selfâs realization and its environment (both social and natural)? Moreover, what of the relationship between the self and the âauthorâ of its realization? Should we not, indeed, distinguish between the âactualization of what one isâ, i.e. of the (assumed) essence of someone, and the shaping of someone or of someoneâs life according to a specific model or ideal?
In order to approach the problem of self-realization in a rigorous and philosophical way, and thus save it from largely unscientific, if not arcane, wisdom , it is clearly necessary to highlight the main aspects entailed by this notion. It is not enough to merely question the relevance of self-realization to our philosophical debate as if it were a unified and clear concept. We should first investigate how the self can be understood, and thus assess the corresponding meaning of its alleged realization. Equally, we need to critically assess what the different doctrines about the ethical realization of an individual imply as regards the ontological status of the self, without treating the two aspects as separate topics.
Although in the past few decades, the philosophy of mind has become one of the main areas of investigation in philosophy, and has bred publications and debates concerning the issue of what it means to be a self, few attempts have been made to connect these theories with the dynamic and normative aspects of selfhood . There have certainly been some individual thinkers, such as Derek Parfit or Bernard Williams, who both proposed theories of self which are simultaneously a theory of what a self is (and is not) while also clarifying the practical-ethical implications that a conception of self can have. However, most debates in philosophy of mind concerning self and self-consciousness lack this broad view. As a result, most theories in ethics do not sufficiently problematize the very concept of the self they presuppose; in other words, they do not sufficiently work out the ontology , or metaphysics , of the self they try to establish the good, and/or the rights and the duties of. Otherwise, authors merely put forth a view of the self, with no attention to the repercussions that their interpretation may have. To put it briefly, the very connection between self and realization has seldom been the focus of recent philosophical theories and investigations.
This could seem especially true for analytic philosophy, mostly because of its (relatively recent) tendency towards hyper-specialization. As a consequence, researchers have focused on singular issues without considering the connections between these issues in a wider picture. For example, by keeping within oneâs area of specialization, one can easily neglect the practical consequences that the limits of self-knowledge has on the social activity of individuals to protect, or to affirm, oneself. Likewise, one can focus on the legal, or ethical, duties towards oneâs body without considering the many questions concerning the relationship between mind and body, i.e. without touching upon what the self can be identified with, and what the limits of oneâs self-identification with the body are.
With that said, several shortcomings can be found in the writings of the so-called continental philosophers as well. Indeed, such writings either aim to principally discuss only the large picture, while neglecting the various issues and competing views concerning specific aspects of the idea of the self, and of the dynamics concerning the very concept of realization. Thus, many continental writings turn out to be at the very least aporetic in the actual philosophical panorama, or they otherwise end up restricting themselves to specific and quite isolated aspects of the self and of its realization. Take, for instance, the innumerable writings devoted to the issue of otherness, and intersubjectivity (especially those in the âphenomenologicalâ tradition over the last 20 years). These writings have undoubtedly offered great contributions to our understanding of the self, and its social dimension. As a matter of fact, the phenomenological tradition has become one of the main voices in the current debates concerning social ontology . Nevertheless, the consequences that the phenomenological insights concerning self, otherness, and intersubjectivity may have for practical and normative issues has only rarely been considered. As a matter of fact, almost no philosophical theory of community and society comparable at least in scope to the ones put forward in the past âclassicâ philosophers, such as Plato , Locke , Comte , or Hegel , has been developed by phenomenologists during the last decades (or at the very least, this has been the case since Sartreâs death ). As for other âcontinentalâ schools, it is clear thatâunless one considers some (often dogmatic) forms of Marxism or Christian thoughtâthere are people working on political philosophy and philosophy of law, such as, for instance, the heirs of the Frankfurt School , who develop their views while more or less leaving aside the more technical current issues concerning philosophy of mind. Hence, in the continental school as well, we find a similar gap between self and self-realization .
We can thus say that in spite of all the impressive research, investigations, debates, ideas, and theories carried out in the past decades, philosophers on both sides of the âdivideâ have only very sparingly been put together in order to develop some kind of systematic view. One could say that the systematic âspiritâ has long since been thought deceased. Whether or not a kind of universal philosophy should really be declared dead or whether or not a resurrection of sorts is possible is not a topic that merits discussion in the introduction of this book. However, we must point out that at the very least a kind of overall view of such a sensitive and concretely relevant issue as that of self-realization can, and probably should, be considered in its entire complexity. It permeates throughout our lives, at both the social and individual level. Moreover, this is entirely the case regardless of whether we want it to or not. It would be more than a merely philosophical irresponsibility to leave this topic to some scattered insights or profit-oriented self-help books. This is particularly true when we consider the danger of leaving such an important topic up to a seemingly not uncommon âschizophrenicâ view that has snuck into popular society and academia alike. Indeed, we find ourselves in a contradictory state in which, on the one hand, we declare the self illusory, insubstantial or non-existent and, on the other hand, we insist on the primacy of individual rights (and duties ), and fight in the name of freedom and self-determination for this insubstantial self, with no consideration as to how these seemingly conflicting viewpoints can possibly coexist. These problems have very real consequences that become apparent when we consider worth of thinking about the issue of individual well-being , or that of the distinction between commonwealth, and private interests. To neglect a kind of systematic investigation into the very complex idea of the self and its realization could also be tantamount to the declaration of the fatuity of philosophy.
Our goal in this volume is to take precisely the opposite stance. We want to contribute to the development and deepening of the plurality of views concerning the nature of the self, how it is constituted, how it works, and what its good, its rights , and its duties are. How the self, in brief, is self or non-self realized, and, once come to life, how it realizes itself. We want to give space to allow the topics of self and self-realization to grow, and thus give space to a wider panoramic to problems that are rooted in our day to day lives.
Of course, possibly because these questions have deep-seated roots in any number of intellectual and cultural traditions, it would be a mistake to limit our discussions in this volume to developing only one systematic view of self-realization . Our aim here is to respond to this task by collecting authors representing a plethora of different intellectual traditions, time-periods, and cultures. By bringing together authors from various different philosophical landscapes, we hope to lead the way to an open, critical discussion about what it means to realize (one)-self and how some specific topics related to the issue of self-realization can be addressed.
Now, one more note concerning the goal of this volume is in order before we can proceed. Indeed, what we must also consider when we discuss the concept of âself-realization â is the fact that realization has at least two main meanings. On the one hand, realization corresponds to the constitution, i.e. the âcreationâ, the âbuildingâ, the âformationâ of something which is called âselfâ (or âIâ, or âego â). On the other hand, realization also points to the process by means of which the (somehow already constituted) self can, or should, be considered as fulfilled. As one may assume from what has been said up to this point, these two sides of âselfâ and ârealizationâ should not be separated. It is clear, as we have already said, that different theories of the self require different understandings of the kinds of realization it is entitled to, and vice versa. However, one cannot reasonably hope to offer in one volume the full-fledged version of all theories of self and realization, and of all the connected ontological, ethical, as well as epistemological issues.
Thus, the following contributions in this volume all offer some views of what self can mean, i.e. some understandings of the self, as well as some views about how the self can be fulfilled, i.e. some ideas concerning the achievement of the self. Each contribution is independent from the others. One could therefore remark that, in the end, also in this volume no full-fledged theory of self-realization is offered, i.e. a theory both of what a self i...