Is God the Best Explanation of Things?
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Is God the Best Explanation of Things?

A Dialogue

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eBook - ePub

Is God the Best Explanation of Things?

A Dialogue

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About This Book

This book provides an up to date, high-level exchange on God in a uniquely productive style. Readers witness a contemporary version of a classic debate, as two professional philosophers seek to learn from each other while making their cases for their distinct positions. In their dialogue, Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe Leon examine classical and cutting-edge arguments for and against a theistic explanation of general features of reality. The book also provides original lines of thought based on the authors' own contributions to the field, and offers a productive and innovative inquiry into on one of the biggest questions people ask: what is the ultimate explanation of things?

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Information

Year
2019
ISBN
9783030237523
© The Author(s) 2019
Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe LeonIs God the Best Explanation of Things?https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_1
Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Joshua Rasmussen1   and Felipe Leon2  
(1)
Azusa Pacific University, Azusa, CA, USA
(2)
El Camino College, Torrance, CA, USA
 
 
Joshua Rasmussen (Corresponding author)
 
Felipe Leon

Keywords

God debateDialogue on GodTheism vs. atheism
End Abstract

1 Purpose

In recent years, philosophers have made remarkable progress on the development and analysis of arguments relevant to the existence/nonexistence of a supreme being. A problem, however, is that many of these developments become lost in the smoke of polarizing debates. We want to explore this topic afresh, by bringing the latest ideas into a new, collaborative investigation of the ultimate explanation of things.
We explore the topic in a friendly, constructive manner. Rather than seek to win an argument, we aim to build upon each other’s ideas in an effort to see more truth. We do not hold up flags for a team or tribe. Nor do we seek victory in a debate. Instead, we seek to learn from each other, as we seek new paths into new lands.
We find that debates often become entrenched in the defense of previous packages. Progress stalls. Time and effort go into the defense of prior positions, leaving unexplored territories unexplored.
We seek another path. We want to see if we can promote significant progress on a universal question through a depolarized style. We want to break new ground, if we can. Our aim, then, is to see if we can bring into view a clearer vision of the foundation of existence.
In view of the wide interest in the question of God’s existence, we also want this book to be widely accessible. While the book is a resource for professional philosophers, we write in a style that is accessible to a broad thoughtful audience. We want everyone who is interested in the question of God’s existence to be able to follow along.

2 What to Expect

For the sake of focus, we concentrate on the following question: What is the best, ultimate explanation of the general features of our world? We do not attempt to tackle all the major themes related to the question of God’s existence. Instead, we narrow our scope to the question of explanation. We use inference to the best explanation as a tool to probe the foundation of things. Together, we seek the best ultimate explanation of everything.
We divide our discussion into three sections. First, we ask whether there is a foundation for universe (along with the related question of what it might mean for the universe to have a foundation). Second, we ask whether, if the universe has a foundation, this foundation is personal. Third, we ask whether the foundation could be a perfectly good, supreme being. Each section divides into a back and forth exchange across several chapters.
By dividing the book into these sections, we are able to organize our path. In the first section, we lay groundwork for later sections. We begin by discussing whether there is a necessarily existent foundation of things. In this way, we separate questions about God’s nature from arguments relevant to particular features of a foundational reality. For example, rather than assume that God would have necessary existence, or that a necessary foundation would be God, we lay down an initial plank in the larger inquiry, as we probe the nature and existence of both God and the foundation. This separation facilitates a progressive inquiry, where each section builds upon planks we put down in the previous sections.
This exchange displays a real-life conversation as friends. We originally began the conversation via e-mail correspondence. We were curious to draw out each other’s views. Rasmussen enters the dialogue as a theist, while Leon enters as a non-theist. We both understand what it is like to see things from the other side, as we have both been on the other side. We also have concentrated much of our professional research on seeking a deeper understanding of the foundation of things, and so we have been curious to see what might come out of a sustained correspondence.
The conversation has indeed reaped special fruits. We followed pathways beyond first and second rounds of debates, and we found ourselves stepping into new lands. At the end of each section, we share some of the things we learned from the dialogue up to that point and give final reflections on the whole dialogue in the Epilogue. On several occasions, we develop new terms to describe our respective views, as we uncover some striking similarities in our vision the foundation. While questions remain and new paths open, one theme that emerges is that a broad naturalism and broad theism can overlap in profoundly substantial ways. There are many other fruits and discoveries, which readers must simply follow in the journey to see.
Part IIs There a Foundation for the Universe?
© The Author(s) 2019
Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe LeonIs God the Best Explanation of Things?https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23752-3_2
Begin Abstract

2. For a Foundation

Joshua Rasmussen1
(1)
Azusa Pacific University, Azusa, CA, USA
Joshua Rasmussen

Keywords

Necessary beingArgument from contingencyNecessary existenceArgument from possible causes
End Abstract

1 Introduction

In order to investigate a subject as deep as the existence of God, it will help to start at the foundation of existence. A classic thought is that the best ultimate explanation of existence—i.e., why anything exists at all—will include reference to a necessary, supreme foundation. In this statement, I will focus on necessity. I will offer three reasons in support of the thesis that there is a necessarily existent foundation. The reasons are (i) from explanation, (ii) from contingency, and (iii) from possible causes. In the final section, I will respond to what may be the most common objection to the necessary foundation theory. My case for a necessary foundation is a first plank in a larger argument (to be unpacked in subsequent chapters) for a foundation of the material world.

2 Reason One: Inference to the Best Explanation

We can wonder what explains the existence things. Why are there any things at all? Why not none? These “why” questions are not about the purpose of existence; rather, they are about the explanation of existence: What, if anything, accounts for the existence of concrete things?1
One classic answer is that there is an ultimate foundation of contingent concrete things, where this foundation exists of necessity. On this foundation theory, reality divides into two sections. There is the “bottom” (ultimate) section, which is fundamental, uncaused, and self-existent. The foundation cannot fail to exist. Its necessity accounts—in some sense—for why it exists at all; or, its necessity accounts for why it has no deeper explanation. The “upper” section of reality, by contrast, is dependent, caused, and ultimately explained by a prior or more fundamental state of reality. On the foundation theory, all concreta—big or small, individual or plural—may have an explanation, either in terms of explanatorily prior states or in terms of a necessary nature.
Before we consider alternative explanations of existence (of why there are any concrete things), I will say more about the meaning of the term “necessity.” In this context, I take “necessity” to denote what must actually be in the most basic sense. We can grasp the concept via examples: It is necessary that red is a color; it is necessary that no prime number is a prime minister; it is necessary that a cube has more volume than any of its proper parts; it is necessary that justice is a virtue; and so on. These examples illustrate metaphysical necessities .
Metaphysical necessities differ from epistemic necessities . Something can be necessary even if no one knows it. For example, it might turn out to be necessary that matter is infinitely divisible, but I am not rationally required to think this. The “necessity” in view concerns the way things in reality must be independent of what anyone thinks. For this reason, something could be necessary even if it is not deducible from some set of logical rules humans beings happen to consider “canonical.” The necessity is about the world, not our current methods of demonstration.2
We can gain a more precise grasp of the relevant concept of necessity by considering its logical properties. I will understand “necessity” in terms of the standard system, S53:
M: □p → p (where “□” abbreviates “it is necessary that”)
K: □(p → q) → (□p → □q)
4: □p → □□p
5: ◊p → □◊p (where “◊” abbreviates “~□~”).
For general readership, here is a translation. I shall speak of necessary, possible, and actual states of affairs—for example, the state of affairs of Bertrand Russell never studying philosophy. (We could also translate everything in terms of propositions.) On this interpretation, axiom M says that if a state of affairs must obtain, then it actually does obtain. From this axiom, we may deduce that any state of affairs that actually obtains also possibly obtains.4 M thus...

Table of contents

  1. Cover
  2. Front Matter
  3. 1. Introduction
  4. Part I. Is There a Foundation for the Universe?
  5. Part II. Is the Foundation Personal?
  6. Part III. Is the Foundation Good?
  7. Back Matter