The Dilemma of Post-“Arab Spring” Transition
Arab states founded post-World War II (WWII) have struggled to establish legitimate foundations. First, monarchies have been suspect of preserving antiquated patrilineal rules in defiance of modernity and popular legitimacy. Second, national republics have embraced a non-inclusive Arab nationalism that they opted to implement with brutality.
A skewed territorial demarcation of republics and monarchies, largely blamed on the colonial construct modeled after the Sykes Picot’s arrangement, is among the many factors that claimed to have caused the political deformation. 1 States have been suspect of conspiring against their own populations to serve compradorial elite cartels (Luciani 1990). Consequently, states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, mostly run by kleptocratic dictators disguised as secular nationalists or monarchs, confronted a chronic state of instability where civil unrest, repression, domestic violence, military coups, breakups, and, lately, popular uprisings have chronically imprinted their life cycles. The regimes created during this period, and the personalities behind them, managed to sell the idea, however, that they had achieved stability in their countries. However, the suppression of internal conflicts, notably in multi-ethnic or sectarian communities’ in countries such as Syria or Iraq , came at the expense of human rights, peaceful alternance of power, and economic and social development, among others.
Efforts to scaffold the legitimacy deficit in Arab states under the “transitionalism” project coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of Third Wave theory (Huntington 1991). The project aimed to inject gradual reform mechanisms that can, cumulatively, spark a gradual democratic transformation. International development and empowerment projects overwhelmed many countries through a variety of political contexts, most recently articulated under the “Theory of Change ” (Rowland and Smith 2014; Collins and Clark 2013). Tenants of this theory vary and include driving assumptions such as economic developments, gender equity, transparency, youth empowerment, efficient government, and electoral reforms.
Yet, the structural foundations of these states have remained intact through this “transitionalism” and the Arab states have continued to lack legitimacy and have seen declining popular support (Abdo et al. 2016). At the same time, militant opposition movements have gained unprecedented transnational momentum that have set in motion powerful forces, mostly Islamic and other sectarian groups, vowing to eradicate Arab regimes.
Post-“Arab Spring ” politics and contemporary political upheavals in the MENA region attest to the breakdown of the social contract amid widening communitarian rifts over the very nature of the state. A state’s survival, and legitimacy, is increasingly emerging as contingent upon the accommodation of diverse communities with affiliations and allegiance often transcending territoriality (Salamey 2017).
Between 2011 and 2017, 5 Arab presidents were overthrown, 7 constitutions were drafted or amended, and 20 new governments and prime ministers were inaugurated. Scholars and researchers remain inquisitive as of the drivers of political change in the region. The intriguing question is why have societies in the MENA region , who have for decades accommodated autocratic regimes, one party governments, and single leader-rule, suddenly emerged as defiant? Is the region indeed undergoing a democratic transformation?
However, this is only part of the question. The region has also experienced devastating waves of violence and turmoil. Six years after the eruption of the so-called Arab Spring , more than half a million people have lost their lives, several millions have been injured, close to 15 million have been forcibly displaced, while major towns and cities have been destroyed.
Unprecedented foreign military intervention and buildup in the region surged the role of non-state armed actors and brought more than 30 armies including those of the United States and Russia to battle for spheres of influence in separate attempts to preserve or undermine states.
Across the political map, post-independent states no longer appear the same: Sudan has split in two. Iraq , Syria , Yemen , and Libya have splintered apart. Drives toward Kurdish independence have gained momentum while the Islamic State (ISIS) has expanded, fought to maintain territorial control, and assumed state functions in part of Syria and Iraq. Samuel Huntington would have attributed intra as well as inter clash of civilizations to contemporary Middle East ern multi-layered conflicts (Huntington 1996).
Amid regional volatility, states are experiencing deep legitimacy crises, a situation that has driven many communities in the region to resort to their own means for self-help and preservation. And thus, perhaps, the comprehensive question to ask is whether the concept of “nation-state” in the twenty-first-century MENA remains viable? Or whether, and alternatively, it requires major scaffolding and fundamental reconstruction?
This volume is published while the structural transformation assessment of states in the MENA remains lacking. For fragmented states undergoing violent confrontations, such as Syria , a vision for a post-conflict political arrangement may help catalyze agreements for peaceful settlements and/or transition.
Thus, the urgency of this work stems from the fact that, since the eruption of the “Arab Spring ”, Syria along with the rest of the Middle East ern states have slipped toward a deeper socio-political and cultural identity crisis. The decline of post-“Arab Spring” nation-states has left many communities in duress. Once united under the banner of nationalism and protected by republics and monarchies, these communities have found themselves vulnerable to the contestation of multi-polar and multi-regional power struggles spilling onto their homelands. The future of the MENA region is placed in a limbo and, therefore, the reformulation of state structures that would gain the consent and approval of the multi-communitarian constituency are of primacy.
Since 2011, to the date of writing, political violence among ethnic and sectarian groups in Syria has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands and led to the displacement of millions. It is now unthinkable to seek an end to this conflict without forecasting a political roadmap that provides for a new “model” of inclusive governance for the Syrian state and includes solutions for the displaced populations, retribution to the victims, community-based reconciliation, and reconstruction—all within the perspective of building a viable peace.
Declining States and Rising Communitarianism
Among the challenges in the examination of post-Arab Spring political developments in the Middle East , however, are the shortcomings of liberal discourse as well as that of Realpolitik in diagnosing contemporary state failures. Liberalism as well as Realpolitik depart from the assumption that the “nation-state” represents the fundamental working model for international affairs, and that it forms an independent entity and presides over a confined geopolitical sovereignty consisting of law-abiding citizens.
Realpolitik leans toward justifying coercion for the sake of political stability and state preservation. Despite the assertion of human and political rights for citizens, liberal perspectives do not account for deep communitarian fragility and collective mobilization along sectarian, ethnic, regional, and tribal lines. Nor can they advocate international laws to preserve and protect rights for communities outside of the jurisdiction and approval of superpowers. The strengthening of the state along a unified rule of law and centralized national authority have persisted as prerequisites for political reforms and democratization.
However, post-“Arab Spring ” politics attest to the fact that globalization has dramatically transformed the essential function of protection of its citizens from the hands of the state into the hands of the community. It has liberated politics from the strict confinement posed by geography while helping expand communitarian mobilization and outreach across borders: a double movement that simultaneously stimulates globalization and communitarianization (Salamey 2017).
The repercussions for the model of the “nation-state”, in general, and for Syria are the following:
First, nation-states, and particularly centralized autocracies, appear to have lost the fundamental power leverage that had traditionally sustained their rules. The rise of non-state actors, open borders, global economy, trade and finance, transnational companies, global information systems, global advancements in transportation and technologies, and transnational military networks are among the globalization forces eroding and compounding nation-states (Heywood 2011). The implications have been devastating to the point where states have lost the ability to command national protection functions.
In Syria , for instance, liberalization policies that coincided with the commencement of President Bashar Al Assad’s presidency in 2000, contributed to a growing trade deficit that reached 3.7 billion dollars in 2008 compared to a surplus of 1.7 billion dollars in 2004 (UNSD 2014). Syria’s trade imbalance continued to increase throughout the decade. National economic sectors, particularly agriculture, were most badly damaged due to these uneven trade flows.
The exposure to world economic market forces and foreign investment has been responsible for the rise of new economic sectors. Selected globalization-driven industries linked to foreign domestic investments and connected to transnational companies have risen. Heavily centralized states have been confronted with unprecedented pressure by global lending and financial institutions to liberalize their economies (Heywood 2011, p. 116), but given the centralized authority, most liberalization activities have been driven by elites and close associates through nepotistic and political patronage networks.
For instance, a range of multi-national real estate enterprises, tourism, and hotel industries began to thrive in Damascus and other major cities, such as Aleppo . This is best demonstrated in the type of investments that came under the control of Al Assad ’s close confidant and cousin Rami Makhlouf.
According to a 2011 Financial Times report, Makhlouf is thought to have controlled as much as 60 % of the Syrian economy through his web of business interests (Peel 2011). These investments included the two-leading licensed mobile phone companies in Syria (Syriatel & MTN Syria), in addition to a majority share in Cham Holding: a holding company with a portfolio including luxury tourism companies (Al Mada’in), restaurants, real estate (Sourouh, Fajr, Al Batra, and Al Hada’iq), and Syrian Pearl Airlines—Syria’s second national carrier after Syrian Air. In the banking sector, Makhlouf invested in banks including the International Islamic Bank of Syria, Al Baraka Bank, the International Bank of Qatar, Cham Bank, the Bank of Jordan in Syria, and in the oil sector. He profited from deals with the British Oil company Gulf Sands Petroleum. Makhlouf’s further investments included a major share in media companies such as the daily newspaper Al Watan, radio/television station Ninar, and satellite station Dunya TV. He also held shares in the advertising companies Promedia, educational comp...