Statement of the Research Agenda
International election observation has become a relatively regular feature of international relations in the post-Cold War era. As Bjornlund declares, “international observation is now an international norm”. 1 This assertion is supported by the fact that it is highly unlikely that any upcoming election will not have at least one team of international observers. This has especially been the case for developing countries, and most recently, Caribbean countries. In the contemporary global environment the decision to invite international observers may superficially be taken as a country’s desire to be accepted into the club of “free” states. Implicit in the decision to have international observers, though, is the recognition that parties—host country and observers—are very likely to have other unstated political motives. Organizations dispatching observer teams may want to indicate renewed support of a particular regime or rectify previous foreign policy mistakes; while sometimes the government issuing the invitation may want to entrench its hold on political power.
This book examines the practice of international election observation in a Caribbean context. It presents a survey of the Commonwealth Caribbean perspective and a detailed case study of Guyana between 1964 and 2015. In doing so, the dependent Commonwealth territories are excluded as the UK handles their foreign affairs, and their elections have not been subject to international observation. This research traces the history of election observation and how this practice became integrated into the landscape of Caribbean electoral politics. More specifically, the study examines the process by which election observers have become key actors in elections in the Commonwealth Caribbean with a special focus on Guyana.
Up to three or even two decades ago, the observation of national elections by foreigners in an independent country would have been highly offensive to the political integrity of the people. To have outsiders oversee one’s electoral process would imply that a country’s leaders and political representatives were incompetent and incapable of administering a relatively straightforward procedure. In its original form, observation was used as a tool of self-determination rather than for its current purpose of providing international legitimacy. Prior to the 1980s observation was rare in sovereign states and used by some such as the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) governments, the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) primarily in trust and dependent territories. Up until recently, therefore, the presence of international observers represented a negative indicator of a country’s ability to manage its own affairs.
Since the 1990s there has been a steady development of the field of international election observation. In the early 1990s most international organizations observed, on average, no more than one election per year. Between 1990 and 1998 the Commonwealth conducted 27 election observation missions in member-states. 2 For the same period, the OAS observed 34 elections in member states. Likewise, between 1999 and 2007, these figures increased by approximately 50% to 43 and 54 observed elections respectively. Each organization moved from observing the typical one election per year to an average of five; and up to twelve as was the case for the OAS in 2006. Between 2008 and 2016 the OAS observed over 70 elections in its member-states. These figures reflect a steady growth in the practice of international election observation in the post-Cold War period. This begs the question of what has directed this change in the foreign policy behaviour of states that in their international relations, they place such great importance on the holding of internationally accepted elections at what many traditionally consider to be at the expense of individual state sovereignty? The answer might be found in an examination of the policies and declarations of the major inter-governmental organizations (IGOs).
In 1989, for example, the UN set the stage for the development of the trend of election observation with the first of a series of resolutions on “free and fair” elections. Essentially, these resolutions underscore the importance of elections as a cornerstone of individual freedoms and human rights. UN action in this and other spheres has advanced the notion of the centrality of elections within a liberal democratic model of governance. So although states have always highly regarded the principle of sovereignty, they have acknowledged that in absolute terms this is merely an ideal. Over time therefore, states have also readjusted the manifestation of sovereignty in their international relations and have changed how they indicate their acceptance of other values that might traditionally have been problematic.
Notwithstanding reconfigurations and reformulations of Westphalian sovereignty observer groups have not circumvented the principle of non-interference in the affairs of independent states in the pursuit of exposing their adherence (or lack of it) to liberal democratic principles. In this regard, observer delegations and states have developed guidelines that attempt to reconcile these two conflicting trends. Currently, organizations will not observe elections unless they receive written consent from the host government or legally empowered agent such as the electoral authority. As discussed later, the European Union (EU) represents an exception in as far as it does not insist on a formal letter before initiating its programme of activities. The country holding the election issues an invitation to the organization that it wishes to send observers, although as the discussion shows, this invitation is sometimes not initiated by the country holding elections but solicited by an observer group. In other words, organizations and some political administrations in developed countries pressure governments to facilitate international observer teams and in effect solicit a request for their presence, or invite themselves.
This study examines the question of how observers came to operate in the Caribbean. It contemplates the underlying issues of sovereignty within the context of the relations between developing states and international actors that predominantly represent the interests of states in the developed world. The discussion therefore acknowledges as a starting point, that within the dynamics of this asymmetric relation arguments of respecting sovereignty are likely to emerge, but are also likely to yield to other economic and political considerations. So while the axis of this research rests on a discussion of elections and democracy in general, this does not limit the research to the field of comparative politics.
This research creates an important interdisciplinary nexus between Comparative Politics and International Relations. Its roots in the former are more obvious because of the focus on the role of elections in the formation, consolidation, endurance and renewal of democracy. However, the discussion is also intricately connected to many aspects of International Relations. Beyond the evident links to sovereignty, the examination of the process of the involvement of observers in the Caribbean requires an analysis of key International Relations concepts and issues such as foreign policy formulation, the role of international actors in domestic policy and the dynamics of power politics. The activities and role of various actors in spreading democracy and the philosophical neoliberal motives behind this trend are also clearly rooted in the field. Further, the underlying assertion that election observation is now accepted as an almost routine process suggests that states have set and accepted rules and guidelines among themselves. This notion of the existence and acceptance of norms of international relations is a central element within the constructivist theoretical debates in International Relations.
Many studies have been conducted on the activities of international observers. The effect of observation and a fairly extensive critique of the practice have been carried out. So, for example, there are articles on the merits and weaknesses of the practice; analysis on observation in several countries has been conducted and the performance of various regional, international and local observer groups has been evaluated. Amidst this explosion of material in the field since the late 1990s, however, is the striking gap of a substantial body of work that is relevant to the Caribbean reality.
Caribbean Overview
One of the issues this research contemplates is why Caribbean countries accept the imposition of observation within the context of sovereignty. As the case of Guyana shows the costs of not having observers have been multidimensional and have eclipsed concerns of respecting state sovereignty. In first instance, the opposition People’s Progressive Party (PPP) had become extremely frustrated with the inattention of the international community to the blatant electoral fraud conducted by the People’s National Congress (PNC). Considerations of sovereignty were therefore redundant in the context of the strong determination of the PPP and other local actors such as the Guyana Human Rights Group to bring international attention to the extensive problems in the country’s elections.
Beyond the initial cases of requesting observers, Guyana in particular, and other countries such as Jamaica and Antigua and Barbuda to a lesser extent have acquiesced to having observers as part of their foreign policy strategy to maintain the flow of aid and assistance to their countries. In that vein, some Caribbean countries have been eager to show the various stakeholders that even if their elections had not reached desirable standards, they were committed to ensuring that elements of fraud and violence would not be supported by political parties. In effect, Caribbean leaders invite observers as a signal of their commitment to improving elections processes of governance as these are increasingly used as preconditions for receiving aid, technical assistance and other types of support. Where there is likely to be no link between the decision to invite observers and the need for or receipt of support, countries have clearly preferred not to have observers. 3
Observation in Guyana and other Caribbean countries has typically been accompanied by various packages of technical assistance. At the same time, the reforms that have been proposed to implement changes and improvements in the electoral system have usually involved equipment, projects, and personnel requiring funding beyond what could be reasonably afforded by the political administration. Extensive financial assistance has therefore been a major component of the bundle of activities associated with observing elections in the country. In some cases, both technical and financial assistance have been conditionally provided upon the guarantee that the country will have observers.
Why Guyana?
There are several grounds which justify the selection of Guyana as a case study for Caribbean election observation. These include the phases of involvement of observers in the country, the range and number of actors involved in observing elections, and the degree of involvement of these actors in various related electoral activities. The process through which observers became involved in Guyana and the outcomes of their involvement on the country’s political processes also present similar patterns in how observers became involved in other Caribbean countries.
Specifically, Guyana has had international observers, in 1964 and 1980, long before the practice gathered momentum as a regular feature of international relations. These instances of observation were entangled with the dynamics of Cold War politics. Grenada also had international observers in 1984 for reasons similarly hinged on tensions of East-West relations. The 1990s marked the dissolution of Cold War tensions and international election observation persisted despite the shift in polarity of power. Observation started to be packaged as support for and consolidation of democracy but maintained hegemonic motives. Along with Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, Belize, Jamaica, Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda are among the countries that had their elections observed. These countries continued to have observers in the 2000s when others such as St Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago where having them for the first time.
The range of actors that has been involved in Guyana is generally representative of the various groups that have observed in other Commonwealth Caribbean states. Guyana has had international observers from inter-governmental organizations such as the Commonwealth; regional inter-governmental organizations including the OAS, EU and CARICOM; foreign observers such as the Carter Center and a local group, the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB). A similar range international, foreign and local observer groups has been involved in the other states under review.
States have frequently ha...