The Puzzle
We are in a critical part of history when it comes to counterinsurgency warfare. One war, Iraq, is over for the United States and another, Afghanistan, is winding down. Some major goals were accomplished in each country. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein was overthrown, tried and executed and his brutal Baathist regime was dismantled. Furthermore, elections were held which led to the establishment of a government that represents a majority of the Iraqi people. Similarly, in Afghanistan the Taliban were overrun and removed from power and the current government was established by democratic means. Progress has been made on establishing and training Afghan security forces and police and some progress has been made in regard to economic development.
Neither of these conflicts, however, can be considered an untarnished victory for the United States. Violence has been on the rise in Iraq since the American withdrawal and sectarian tensions continue to prevent political reconciliation and stability. In Afghanistan the Taliban continue to threaten the stability and security of the country and al-Qaeda remains a threat. After more than a decade of effort, more than a trillion dollars spent, thousands of lives lost and tens of thousands of severe injuries, the costs of these conflicts have been great. In the wake of such costs many have come to the conclusion that succeeding at counterinsurgency is not possible, especially for democracies that must be responsive to the will of the people. Such conflicts are said to be too lengthy to maintain public approval and they are simply too costly in terms of financial investment and lives lost. Some have concluded from this that no such efforts should ever be attempted again and that democracies, especially the US, should focus their military efforts on conventional threats.
It is not at all clear, however, that this is the correct conclusion to draw. It is too hasty to claim that counterinsurgency is impossible without a close look at the totality of the theoretical and empirical evidence. Furthermore, democracies may not have the convenience of simply proclaiming a disdain for counterinsurgencies and pledging to avoid them. It is rare that such conflicts are desired. They are entered into because they are seen as vital to national security. Failing to prepare for counterinsurgency will only make victory less likely the next time one is unavoidable. It is therefore imperative to draw valid conclusions about the viability of success in counterinsurgency from the vantage point of democratic regimes. The analysis presented here is intended to further clarify the issues at stake and bring us to more firmly grounded considerations upon which democratic governments can base important defense and military decisions.
The fact that large powerful countries have frequently lost in counterinsurgency warfare against much weaker opponents during the past century is puzzling from the perspective of realist international relations theory. Since power is the predominant factor in realist theory, the larger power should almost always win. While other factors may be significant at the margins and result in an occasional upset, the vast majority of wars will, according to realism, be settled by power differentials. As Ivan Arreguin-Toft explains, âAs far back as Thucydidesâ description of the wars between Athens and Sparta, the link between power and conflict outcomes has been the root principle of realist international relations theory. More power means winning wars, and less power means losing them.â1 The facts suggest, however, that within the past 50 years strong states, even when vastly more powerful than their opponents, have been losing small wars at a much greater rate than previously. Calculations by Arreguin-Toft indicate that from 1950 to 1999 the more powerful actor won such wars only 48.8 percent of the time; less than half! The rate of success by powerful actors in earlier 50 year increments was much higher (1800â1849, 88.2 percent; 1850â1899, 79.5 percent; 1900â1949, 65.1 percent).2
Democratic states are considered especially ineffective at counterinsurgency warfare. Jason Lyall, for example, notes that âTo date, a near consensus exists among scholars, policymakers, and journalists around the belief that democracies are uniquely deficient when fighting counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns.â3 Several arguments have been advanced to explain the deficiencies demonstrated by democratic regimes in this regard. Efraim Inbar lists several of them in the introduction to his book, Democracies and Small Wars:
By their nature, democracies clearly have greater constraints than autocratic regimes on their freedom of action as they have to meet constitutional, legal and moral criteria in their use of force, and particularly so regarding the management of small wars. There are limits on the ruthlessness to which democracies can recur in subduing their enemies. The relatively slower decision-making processes, due to a less centralized system than in autocracies reduces the amount of flexibility required for waging small wars. Democratic political processes, including engaging in war, also require a certain amount of transparency, which is invariably at the expense of the military operational needs for secrecy. Unquestionably, democracies pay a certain price in combat effectiveness for maintaining their values.4
Despite the strong case that has been made by a variety of scholars using an array of arguments to demonstrate that democracies are particularly unsuited to counterinsurgency, there is an opposing literature which is consolidated around an effective counterinsurgency strategy applicable by democratic governments. It has long been a tenet of counterinsurgency doctrine that the local population is the key to winning such conflicts. In his 1964 masterpiece, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, for example, David Galula argued that the First Law of counterinsurgency is that: âThe Support of the Population is as Necessary for the Counterinsurgent as for the Insurgent.â5 In fact, he argues that support from the population is the key determinant of power in counterinsurgency conflicts. âIn conventional warfareâ, he argues,
strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare [insurgencies], strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embodied in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population.6
If this is true, power in counterinsurgency conflicts must be measured differently than it is in conventional warfare. A belligerent with more tanks but less support from the population may in fact be less âpowerfulâ than its ostensibly weaker opponent.
This population-centered notion of counterinsurgency has found support among other key theorists, including David Kilcullen,7 and has culminated in the US Army and Marine Corpsâ Counterinsurgency Field Manual, written under the direction of General David Petraeus.8 The strategy involves three primary components: providing security to the population, understanding the needs of the population through close interaction with them and a nuanced grasp of the culture, and developing legitimacy for the government through improved governance, institutions, and development projects. In Iraq and Afghanistan, a strategy called âclear, hold, buildâ was eventually implemented which essentially followed this approach and improved the situation on the ground in both countries.
There is a wide divergence in the literature pertaining to counterinsurgency. On the one hand, there is agreement among a group of experts (mostly academics) that democracies are uniquely incapable of carrying out counterinsurgency warfare while, on the other hand, another group, composed of both military practitioners and some academics, argues that democracies can be successful given that they follow the appropriate strategy. Determining which one of these competing camps in the literature is correct, or, whether or not they both contain elements of the truth, is extremely important to future force structure and national security issues for many democratic regimes, but particularly for the United States.
A demonstrated failure of democraciesâ efforts in counterinsurgency, along with a robust theoretical explanation detailing why they are inherently handicapped in such wars, has major policy implications. It may cause democratic governments, believing that it is impossible for them to win counterinsurgencies, to prematurely give in to insurgent demands or not to respond to them at all. It could lead democracies to focus military resources, spending and planning towards more conventional forms of warfare, despite the fact that counterinsurgency warfare is much more likely to occur. The belief that democracies canât win counterinsurgency may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby democratic regimes faced with an insurgency may be resigned to failure at the outset and therefore not devote the appropriate resources or implement the correct strategy necessary to prevail. If it is demonstrated, on the other hand, that democracies can win counterinsurgency efforts, and that there exists a fairly strong consensus around the necessary strategy for doing so, such regimes can prepare their militaries for probable contingencies and confidently resist insurgent elements when they present themselves. This is not to say, however, that winning such conflicts will be easy.
This book untangles this puzzle by examining the arguments on both sides of the divide in order to determine which group presents the more plausible case. This is achieved firstly by a conceptual analysis of the arguments and secondly by an examination of three case studies: Malaya (which is today Malaysia), Vietnam, and Iraq. Through these analyses I demonstrate that the argument against the ability of democracies to perform in counterinsurgencies is not as strong as many scholars currently believe. Thirdly, this research establishes that a population-based, culturally-informed, counterinsurgency strategy, the one advocated by most experts in the field, provides a plausible avenue of victory for democratic states faced with insurgencies. Though such a strategy cannot, of course, guarantee success, and all such conflicts are likely to be extremely difficult and costly, the more closely it is followed the greater the likelihood it will be achieved.
Organization
Chapter 2 grapples with and attempts to define a variety of relevant terms and concepts. Definitions of both insurgency and counterinsurgency are provided. What it means to âwinâ a war, which can be a highly complex and sometimes subjective determination, is also explored. Similarly, the concepts of âcultureâ and âlegitimacyâ are examined, along with an analysis of the arguments of those who believe that democracies are uniquely disadvantaged in counterinsurgencies. The reasons for this supposed weakness are presented and critically reviewed in terms of the strength of their logic and the weight of the supporting empirical evidence. Following this analysis, a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy is presented in the next chapter and its plausibility for democratic governments is considered.
The next three chapters consist of case studies. Since much of the rationale behind the idea that democracies are uniquely handicapped in counterinsurgencies comes from empirical evidence rather than solely through mere theoretical analysis, an empirical examination in the form of case studies is useful in demonstrating the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency strategy proposed here. A purely theoretical refutation of the idea that democracies are inept at counterinsurgencies would not carry the same weight as one confirmed by case study analysis. One of the studies (Malaya) is that of a democracy actually winning a counterinsurgency and describes how it was done. Two others (Vietnam and Iraq) show that the lack of success experienced was not due to the democratic nature of the counterinsurgent but rather to faulty strategy. While counterfactuals are most often impossible to prove, a strong case can be made demonstrating with a high degree of plausibility that these conflicts could have been prosecuted more successfully had they more closely followed the counterinsurgency strategy proposed here, or one similar to it.
These three case studies provide a broad analysis of relatively contemporary conflicts that offer highly relevant lessons for today and the future. The Malayan study serves as an example of a democracy (Great Britain) successfully countering an insurgency. It also illustrates a conflict in which the strategy followed was most closely aligned to that laid out in the counterinsurgency literature. Its final virtue is that it is a non-US case and will therefore distinguish it from the other two.
The second case study, that of Vietnam, is an example of a powerful democracy being defeated by a relatively weaker insurgency. Despite massive expenditure, a huge loss of life, and an effort that spanned over a decade, one of the most powerful countries on the planet could not defeat an insurgent movement in an undeveloped country. The study explores the reasons for the defeat. It reveals that the case of Vietnam doesnât really serve as evidence that democracies are inherently incapable of counterinsurgency, but instead demonstrates only that democratic countries are likely to fail if they diverge from the optimal strategy propounded by counterinsurgency experts. Since the strategy and tactics utilized in Vietnam were not entrenched, this case study draws out the significant differences between the two primary strategies utilized.
Under the leadership of General William Westmoreland, a conventional seek and destroy strategy was implemented with the intention of eliminating the enemy through force. While counterinsurgency was recognized as an aspect of the war, Westmoreland regarded it as secondary and left those tasks to the South Vietnamese government and military. In 1968, Westmoreland was replaced with General Creighton Abrams. Though Abrams continued to seek out the enemy and was by no means opposed to the use of force, he implemented a strategy that was much more in line with a population-centered counterinsurgency strategy. The results obtained under the two strategies were remarkably different and the use of such within-case comparison is instructive when judging success in counterinsurgency. It strongly supports the contention that a conventional military strategy is not likely to be successful against a committed insurgent. It also demonstrates, however, that such failure does not mean that democracies canât win against this type of foe. Rather, the success obtained following the implementation of a strategy more in line with counterinsurgency principles indicates that winning is possible.
Finally, the case of Iraq provides a more ambiguous case study in terms of victory or defeat. Some of the goals set out by the United States in its efforts to support the constituted government of Iraq against insurgent forces were certainly met; others, however, were not. In some cases, the level of success remains unclear, and what success was achieved is currently under severe threat by the Isis terrorist group. This case study provides a particularly good model for judging the success of the proposed counterinsurgency strategy versus a more traditional military approach, and whether or not the difference has any broad implications for democratic countries engaged in counterinsurgen...