The North of England has rarely featured in national debates in the UK as much as it has done since the 2008 financial crisis, and particularly the 2010â2016 period when George Osborneâa son of London but a parliamentary representative for Tatton in the Northern county of Cheshireâserved as Chancellor of the Exchequer. In exploring the pursuit of economic development in the North, this volume seeks to account for both the genealogy of the Northâs renewed (and possibly short-lived) significance to national politics, and how related political processes can be characterised. Essentially, this work is motivated by the need to understand how the Northern economy has become politicised, the implications of this, and the specific forms that politicisation has taken, after a long period of discursive neglect. In a nutshell: why the North, why now and what is new? By necessity, the political economy of the North must be studied in relation to the political economy of the UK as a whole, and indeed relationships between the UK economy, its constituent geographies and the rest of the world. The fact that the North is north of somewhere else is of course a key feature of its political economy. Yet this relationship with the South of England is merely one of an infinite number of ways in which the North is materialised as a politicalâeconomic space. The economy of the North of England is produced, and reproduced, by processes of formal and informal governance at a myriad of geographical scales, including overlapping (and often contradictory) internal structures and processes within the North. Encouraging greater cross-fertilisation among political economy and economic geography (and related disciplines) is therefore one of the main aims of this volume.
âBrexitââthe UKâs decision, in the referendum of 23 June 2016, to withdraw from the European Union (EU)âlooms large over the bookâs content. Like the UK in general, most parts of the North are highly integrated with, and as such dependent upon, at least in the short term, the wider European economy. More generally, the EUâs political and economic structures and processes are in an integral dimension of the (evolving) political economy of the North. Interestingly, the areas of the UK (including large parts of the North) where jobs and production are most dependent on European economic integration (and indeed EU investment) are those that voted most strongly to leave; it is a myth that the big cities, principally London (but also the Northern âcore citiesâ), have higher levels of economic interaction with the continent (Los et al. 2017; Hunt et al. 2016). This is a fact that should not be forgotten, uncomfortable as it is for some commentators: the population of the North chose Brexit, albeit against the advice of the regionâs leadersâjust as Northern elites are often complicit in the maintenance of national politicalâeconomic practices, even though (as many chapters of this book will argue) such practices help to keep the residents of the North poorer. Brexit will undoubtedly, over time, reorder the means by which economic life in the North is governed. Yet this is not a book about Brexit and the North. Above all, we do not know, at the time of writing, whether the UK will experience (or choose) a âsoftâ or âhardâ Brexit; in practice, there will be degrees of stiffness across the different spheres through which Brexit will be operationalised, and we may yet see the form and extent of Brexit differentiated by geography within the UK. More generally, there are, quite apart from Brexit, innumerable local, national and international processes which, as they progress, threaten to reorder economic governance within the North. Historically, the Northâs development and prosperity have been shaped far more by its status within the British political economy than by the UKâs relationship with the EU.
The bookâs empirical focus is therefore the multitude of post-crisis policy agendas which have newly exposed the (global) political economy of the North, chiefly Osborneâs Northern Powerhouse framing, but also the broader devolution agenda. Exploring the Northern Powerhouse and devolution may (or may not) help us begin to understand the many implications of Brexit for the North, but is also an urgent task in its own rightânot least because initiatives related to the Northern Powerhouse and devolution have been largely driven by Whitehall, and Brexit will in all likelihood increase the formal authority of Whitehall over Northern cities and regions (as well as perhaps also offering new opportunities, in the longer term, for more substantial forms of devolution). The fact that the Northern Powerhouse as a specific discursive ploy appears to have been marginalised within the Theresa May government is worth ponderingâas it is by several of the bookâs chaptersâbut should probably not be exaggerated. Moreover, we should not overstate the extent to which the Northern Powerhouse encompassed a distinctive and original set of tangible policy initiatives. Many of the policies that fell under this framework have links with very long-standing agendas, many of which are still being pursued, albeit with a little less fanfare. And crucially, there are as yet no reasons to conclude that the assumptions about the North (and its economic imperatives) which underpinned discourse and practice related to the Northern Powerhouse have been expunged from the architecture of central governmentânot least because the Northern Powerhouse agenda appears to have merely reflected these pre-existing assumptions.
What is the North?
We recognise that what we mean by âthe Northâ is not entirely obvious from the term itself. At the same time, notwithstanding some debate over âborderlineâ areas, we would contend that most people in the UK have a general understanding of what is, and what is not, considered the North of England, and that this understanding is usually upheld in scholarship on the North. The book has not been compiled on the basis of an editorial line on how to define the North, although it is worth noting that all chapters implicitly share the view that the definition of the North that has at times been explicit in officialdomâbeing composed of the regions of the North West, North East and Yorkshire and Humbersideâis largely accurate.
It is of course not possible to tell the story of the North without referring to places unambiguously outside of these three regions. This is in part, first, because other parts of the UK resemble North in terms of socio-economic outcomes. Danny Dorling (2010, 2011), one of the leading scholars of the so-called âNorthâSouth divideâ, actually includes Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and a large chunk of the Midlands in his definition of the North, given similarities in outcomes such as household income and life expectancy. The Northern regions are disadvantaged, but not uniquely so within the UK. It is also because, second, the North is not a distinct economic space. Generally speaking, it obviously interacts with the domestic and international economies; moreover, we should not assume that the Northâs constituent parts interact with each other economically more than they do with âexogenousâ areas. We cannot understand how the Northern economy (or economies) functions without also understanding these wider relationships and processes. Yet none of this means that the North cannot be distinguished analytically. The North may not be uniquely disadvantaged but there may be (relatively) distinct explanations for its disadvantage. Similarly, while it may be necessary to locate the North in its wider politicalâeconomic contexts, the way in which these contexts shape specifically Northern economic life is a legitimate object of inquiry.
We would also offer a note of caution about a predominantly spatial understanding of the North. The bookâs central disciplinary perspective is that of political economy, and its analysis generally focuses therefore on how the exercise of power across multiple spheres shapes Northern economic life, or the way in which the North interacts with the rest. The relevant spheres may be local, national or international. The lack of any formal institutional framework through which the North as a whole is governed may make this exercise challenging empiricallyâbut arguably underlines the urgency of understanding the wider political processes which shape the North (Hayton et al. 2016). A political economy perspective also encourages us to focus on the social construction of the North, and the framing of its spatial identity by elite forces. Any simple understanding of the Northâs characteristics or boundaries is belied by an inherently complex social reality, but the delineation of the North is itself an act of power in need of interrogation (Paasi 2000; Jessop 2012, 2015). Indeed, it is not difficult to detect the power relations implicit in the notion that the North is different, unique or even âforeignâ from English or British normsâa notion that is reinforced even in narratives and policy initiatives that are designed ostensibly to ben...