The history of the Kurdish question in the Middle East is a long and complex one. Divided among the states of Iraq, Iran , Syria and Turkey , the Kurds are one of the largest nations in the world without their own state. The lack of accurate census data on Kurdish population makes it impossible to provide an accurate figure about the exact number of the Kurds in the region and estimating Kurdish population is a contentious issue, with states tending to underestimate the size of their Kurdish population and Kurdish nationalists overestimate. Approximately, the Kurds constitute 20% of the population of Iraq and Turkey and 10% of Iran and Syria , and the Kurdish population across the region is estimated at 35 million (Gurses 2014, p. 253). According to this estimate, nearly half of the Kurds in the region live in Turkey and Kurdish population is estimated to be around 16 million. Kurdish population in Iraq is estimated at 7 million and that in Iran and Syria at 8 million and 2 million, respectively. There are large Kurdish communities in the Diaspora in Europe, Lebanon and the former republics of the Soviet Union , whose population is estimated at around 2 million.
In Iraq, the Kurds constitute the majority of the population of the Dohuk , Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates but large numbers of Kurds reside in Baghdad and in the governorates of Kirkuk , Ninaveh and Diyala. In Iran , Kurdish population is mainly concentrated in the northwest corner in the provinces of Kurdistan, Ilam, Kermanshah and West Azerbaijan along the Iran –Iraq and Iran –Turkey border. There are pockets of Kurdish population in Iran’s northeast in the historic region of Khorasan. In Syria , the Kurdish population is concentrated in the northeast and northwest regions and large Kurdish communities existed before the civil war in both Aleppo and Damascus . In Turkey , the Kurds’ historic homeland is in the south-eastern and eastern regions of the country and currently more than 80% of the population of the following provinces is Kurdish: Adıyaman, Ağrı, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari , Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Șırnak, Șanlıurfa, Tunceli and Van. A significant number of Kurds populate the adjacent area of provinces, such as Elazığ, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Malatya (Sirkeci 2000). There are pockets of Kurdish population in central Anatolia, in Sivas, Kayseri, Konya, Kırşehir and Ankara. Also, as a result of the adverse economic conditions in eastern and south-eastern regions, many Kurds have been migrating to western Turkey since the 1950s onward in search of work. From the late 1980s until the early 2000s, with the intensification of conflict in the Kurdish majority regions, many rural Kurds were forced out of their villages and hamlets by the army and security forces and settled in western and southern Turkey . It is estimated that as much as 4 million Kurds were forcefully displaced during the late 1980s and 1990s (Çelik 2005; Jongerden 2001). Consequently, large Kurdish populations reside in western Turkey , particularly in Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, Adana, Ankara, Bursa and Kocaeli. Kurds make as much as 20% of Istanbul’s population of 14 million (Sönmez 2015, p. 49).
The main Kurdish languages are Kurmanji and Sorani with Kurmanji spoken mainly in Turkey and Syria and parts of Iraq and Iran . Sorani is spoken in Iraq and Iran and is the language of education in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). In addition, a section of the Kurdish population in Turkey , perhaps as much as 2 million, speaks Zazaki or Dimilli. The majority of the Kurds are Sunni Muslim with a minority in Iraq and Iran following Shia Islam . Adherents to other minority religions, such as Alevis , Yazidis and Ah-li Haqq also exist.
On numerous occasions throughout the twentieth century, the Kurds have rebelled in defence of their national rights and against the repression of their identity and culture by the states of Iraq, Iran , Syria and Turkey . Kurdish grievances have become part of the Middle Eastern politics and Kurdish conflicts have been a significant source of instability in the region. Kurdish rebellions in Iraq between 1961 and 1975 and in Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s managed to mobilise a large number of Kurds and presented significant challenges to the authority of these states. The political developments taking place in the Middle East during the past three decades have been creating opportunities for Kurdish political movements. Following the consolidation of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq in 2005, the establishment of a Kurdish-led de facto autonomous region in Syria since 2012 and the electoral success of the pro-Kurdish movement in Turkey during the past decade, the Kurdish challenge to the existing states have taken on a new dimension.
Kurdish resurgence is taking place at a time Syria is experiencing conflict and civil war leading to a significant loss of power and control over its sovereign territory. With the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS ), the Syrian conflict spread to neighbouring Iraq and began to threaten the stability of the whole region (Gunes and Lowe 2015). As I discuss in Chapter 6 more fully, this situation has emboldened both Iran and Turkey to extend their spheres of influence in the region, which brought Kurdish actors and entities face-to-face with two regional powers that are determined to restrict the Kurdish gains and keep the existing state system in the region intact.
There were occasions in the past when Kurdish movements mobilised a large section of the Kurdish populations but it is for the first time in the history of the region that we are witnessing concurrent active conflicts in all parts of Kurdistan. Consequently, the Kurdish question has once again re-entered the regional political debate. It has not been easy for the Kurds to reach where they are but question marks persist on whether their resurgence in the region is sustainable. Bearing in mind that we are looking at political developments across four states and at a regional conflict with distinct yet interconnected and ongoing conflicts, a number of important questions arise:
- Will the Kurds be a new force in the region and what are the obstacles in front of their ambitions?
- What form Kurdish power in the Middle East is likely to take?
- What domestic and regional factors have shaped the recent dynamics of the Kurdish conflicts in Iraq, Iran , Turkey and Syria ?
- What are the impacts of the emergence of the Kurds as significant new actors in a region that is undergoing rapid change and how will it affect the existing power dynamics at the regional level?
These questions are explored via a discussion focusing on the political developments in each of the Kurdish conflicts, highlighting the impact of the regional level processes. In the reminder of this chapter, I explore the historical origins and development of this complex transnational conflict and situate its transformation within the wider regional developments.
1.1 A Brief History of the Kurdish Question
The Kurds have a long presence in the region they populate and their origin is often traced back to the ancient Medes who inhabited the mountainous area in north-western Iran and rose to prominence in the seventh century BC. Kurdish nationalists use the Festival of Newroz and the Legend of Kawa the Blacksmith to narrate the historical emergence of the Kurds and construct the Median Empire as the golden age of the Kurdish nation (Gunes 2012, p. 33; Aydın 2014; O’Shea 2004, p. 151). After the decline and fragmentation of the Abbasid Caliphate in the tenth century, a number of Kurdish emirates rose to prominence. From the eleventh century onwards, Kurdish emirates had to contend with the growing influence of the Seljuk Turks, who became the dominant power in the region after their defeat of the Byzantium Empire in the Battle of Malazgird in 1071.
The rise of the Ottoman Empire from the early sixteenth century onwards resulted in a military contest between the Ottoman and Safavid empires and a large part of Kurdish populated territory came under the rule of the Ottomans after the Battle of Chaldiran in August 1514. The Ottoman triumph marked a significant change in the way Kurdish emirates negotiated their existence. The Ottoman authorities adopted a policy of accommodation and a decentralised political system to win the support of Kurdish emirates and enlist them in dealing with the threat posed by the Safavid Empire (Kendal 1993, p. 14).
Kurdish emirates provided troops to the Ottoman army when needed and defended the borders of the empire and ‘developed ...