Introduction
As I observe how my country, South Africa , faces tumultuous political times in the midst of several unfavourable political wrangling, especially in light of the replacement of a relatively good finance minister, I am once again raising the issue about the ramifications of political autocracy as a means to hinder the democratic aspirations of a citizenry that has become too aware of socio-economic and political instability in the country and on the continent as a whole. I cannot help to conclude that after almost 27 years of rule, the African National Congress āthe party of Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisuluāhas compromised its once credible status as a ruling party and seems to have regressed into one that supports the meandering of a president that has thus far embarrassed his own party and only seems to align himself with those politicians who can profit from his political caricature. Much of my previous work on democratic citizenship education on the African continent has revolved around the debilitating consequences of political autocracy as a concept. I now reconsider political autocracy not only conceptually. Rather, I bear witness to political autocracy as it collides with enactments of democratic engagement , against a landscape which has grown steadily disillusioned with political deceit, especially after decades of apartheid rule . This chapter addresses the issue of democratic citizenship education and its relevance as a theory to Africa ās postcolonial political and socio-economic aspirations .
On the Relevance of a Theory of Democratic Citizenship Education
Any theory ought to take into account the aspirations of those who advance particular views on or about a concept and then set out to proffer their articulations in a reasonable and persuasive fashion. So, to articulate a view of a democrat as someone who engages others on the basis of listening and judgement about this or that, is to make apparent a theory of such an actāthat is, the act of democracy . What follows from the aforementioned is that a theory of democracy , firstly, cannot avoid talking of humansā engagement , listening to one another and/or persuasive judgements in defence of some form of deliberative mode of human enactment . Hence, whether it is a Deweyan notion of communicative rationality , a Rortyan pronouncement of dialogical determinism or a Derridian tilting towards those engaging practices that are yet to be constituted, democratic action cannot do without people functioning in association with one another. In this way, talking about a theory of democratic engagement is relevant on the grounds that its relevance has some connection to the concept involving people enacting their individual and collective responsibilities .
Commensurate with the idea of acting democratically , secondly, is the understanding that humans would not violate one anotherās rights to freedom of articulation and being. In a way, acting in democratic association cannot be in violation of one anotherās rights and responsibilities as persons serving the interests of a democracy . In a way, people acting as citizens in a democratic arrangement co-belong without being coerced to do soāwhat Agamben refers as co-belonging without any condition of belonging. In other words, people co-belong in a democratic association without being coerced to do so. That is, their sense of belonging is constituted by their association to act together without having been obliged to do so.
Now that the notion of democratic citizenship has been elucidated in relation to humansā associational acts of doing things together without any form of coercion , it becomes more apparent as to why democratic citizenship , thirdly, cannot be disconnected from the very idea of education . To be educated , in the first place, implies being brought into a form of human living that recognises what the other does in relation to himself or herself and others. In a way, being educated means to make sense of events in the world and to justify to others and oneself as to why one has assumed a particular stance on a matter or notāespecially in parts of the African continent , where dystopias of conflict , hunger and displacement continue to pervade. In this way, education seems to be connected to two acts: being in association with others, and engaging and justifying oneās understandings in their presences. And, the act of engaging with people and co-belonging with them in an atmosphere of deliberative action is to become situated in othersā presence through education. For now, a theory of democratic citizenship education invokes a form of associational co-belonging and engagement whereby people come into one anotherās presence. In any form of human action that does not commensurate with engagement, co-belonging would be contemptuous towards a form of education. It is for the latter reason that a theory of democratic citizenship education, certainly for people living on the African continent , remains highly relevant. The latter is only possible if democratic citizenship education builds its forms of human engagement around what it means to engage deliberatively, co-belong associationally and being in one anotherās presence. This brings me to my next question: Is such a human encounter still relevant to Africa ?
The (Ir)relevance of Democratic Citizenship Education in Africa
I have specifically referred to democratic citizenship education in relation to an association, and not for that matter an aggregation. If one were to look at such an arrangement aggregatively, one would rely on numbers of people to justify the act of democratic citizenship education . However, enunciating the act in relation to the idea of an association takes care of not looking at the concept in relation to only quantification. That is, notions of association bring to mind images and practices of alliances , support, connections and even friendship. This brings me to my first argument: Political autocracies, certainly on the African continent , as conceptions of autocracy imply, come into power by disregarding a majority vote count, especially when that vote count acts against a particular political party or individual. In turn, even when majority vote counts are taken into consideration, this majority support is often interpreted as some sort of extensive right to power , even when that support might waiver and decide otherwise. In South Africa , the African National Congress (ANC) hegemony has been held in place by its superior franchise support its members have acquired. Similarly, many African political autocracies, like in Zimbabwe , Central African Republic , and Democratic Republic of Congo , have been kept in political power because of the superior vote count. And, because many of these African leaders do not wish to relinquish political power , they have remained in control, often at the expense of political inclusion and democracy . The very idea of a political autocracy undermines democratic citizenship education as the latter puts the autocracy at risk for obvious reasons of which the most poignant is that people engage collectively with one another. An autocracy undermines engagement as only those in power are considered as legitimate articulators of voice; it excludes others and hence, places co-belonging at risk; and it exercises power violently and by implication reduces the chances of people coming into one anotherās presence. The idea of people coming into one anotherās presence, as I shall argue later on, has some connection to them (people) making claims to understandings on the basis of their ways of situating themselves in relation to others in the world.
Considering that in several parts of Africa political autocracy still holds sway, the idea of democratic citizenship education becomes an immediate problem for many of the political rulers. Yet, this does not mean that democratic citizenship education for those adversely affected by autocracy becomes irrelevant...