Preventive Measures for Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control

Implementing Guide

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• Publisher: International Atomic Energy Agency
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9789201079220
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Mechanical Engineering
• Index: Technology & Engineering

This publication elaborates upon the recommendations given in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 15, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, in relation to preventative measures. It serves as guidance for Member States interested in strengthening their nuclear security regime as it relates to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control and in improving their capabilities. The publication covers the following indicative elements: general considerations for preventive measures; deterrence measures, including deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial; information security; promotion of nuclear security culture; and measures for addressing the insider threat, including measures to promote the trustworthiness of personnel. The last section of the publication provides guidance on international cooperation and assistance to strengthen preventive measures.

1. INTRODUCTION

Background

1.1. A comprehensive national nuclear security regime includes effective nuclear security systems and measures for nuclear and other radioactive materials that are either under or out of regulatory control. Paragraph 2.1 of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20, Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime [1], states that “The objective of a State’s nuclear security regime is to protect persons, property, society, and the environment from harmful consequences of a nuclear security event.” This objective can be achieved by applying the principles set out in the Nuclear Security Fundamentals, Recommendations and Implementing Guides contained in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series [2–4].

1.2. A nuclear security event involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control (hereafter referred to as ‘material out of regulatory control’) may result in harmful health, economic, environmental and societal consequences. Therefore, a defence in depth approach for the design and implementation of nuclear security systems and measures is essential for prevention and detection of and response to nuclear security events.

1.3. Measures to prevent a nuclear security event are an integral part of a comprehensive nuclear security regime, and complement measures for detecting and responding to nuclear security events. Such preventive measures may be intended:

(a) To prevent nuclear material or radioactive material that is under regulatory control from becoming out of regulatory control by preventing its unauthorized removal from associated facilities or associated activities. Such measures are addressed within the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (see Refs [2] and [3]).

(b) To prevent nuclear material or radioactive material that is out of regulatory control from being used in a criminal or intentional unauthorized act. Such measures are addressed within the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (see Ref. [4]).

1.4. This publication provides guidance for implementing the preventive measures described in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 15, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control [4]. It is fully consistent with the Nuclear Security Fundamentals [1] and Nuclear Security Recommendations publications [2, 3], and is complementary to the Implementing Guides that address detection of and response to nuclear security events [5, 6].

Objective

1.5. The objective of this publication is to provide guidance on the development and establishment of technical and administrative measures to prevent criminal or intentional unauthorized acts with nuclear security implications involving material out of regulatory control. This guidance is intended for national legislators, policy makers, competent authorities, law enforcement agencies, organizations and individuals involved in the establishment, implementation, maintenance and sustainability of a State’s nuclear security regime.

Scope

1.6. This publication addresses measures (referred to as ‘preventive measures’ in this publication) that aim to prevent criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material that is already out of regulatory control. These measures include those aimed at preventing a potential adversary from attempting criminal or intentional unauthorized acts, for example, deterrence measures, and those aimed at preventing an adversary from successfully completing such an act, for example measures complementary to those for detection of material out of regulatory control and response to nuclear security events.

1.7. This publication complements guidance on the design and implementation of nuclear security systems and measures for the detection of and response to nuclear security events [5, 6]. It does not repeat or elaborate upon such guidance except to the extent that detection or response measures may also have a preventive effect, for example by deterring potential adversaries.

1.8. Guidance on nuclear security systems and measures for nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities that are under regulatory control is provided in other Nuclear Security Series publications. This publication does not address such systems and measures, but such measures also may contribute towards preventing criminal or intentional unauthorized acts with nuclear security implications involving material out of regulatory control by preventing material from leaving regulatory control.

Structure

1.9. Following this introduction, Section 2 covers general considerations for preventive measures. Section 3 covers deterrence measures, including deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Section 4 covers information security. Section 5 covers the promotion of nuclear security culture. Section 6 covers measures for addressing the insider threat, including measures to promote the trustworthiness of personnel. Section 7 provides guidance for international cooperation and assistance to strengthen preventive measures.

2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
PREVENTIVE MEASURES

General

2.1. This publication addresses a range of measures that may be used by a State ...

Table of contents

• 1. INTRODUCTION