1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
The IAEA works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy to peace and prosperity around the world while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. IAEA safeguards, an important part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, provide for independent verification by the IAEA of Statesā compliance with their legal obligations under safeguards agreements. This publication is part of an IAEA guidance series developed to assist facility designers and operators in considering at an early stage the safeguards activities relevant to particular nuclear fuel cycle facility types.
This publication complements the general considerations addressed in International Safeguards in Nuclear Facility Design and Construction [1] and is written primarily for designers and operators of the specific facility type described within. It is written at an introductory level for an audience unfamiliar with IAEA safeguards and has no legal status. A State may incorporate elements of this guidance into its regulatory framework, as it deems appropriate. For specific guidance on IAEA safeguards implementation, the reader can refer to Ref. [2].
Safeguards should be considered early in the design process to minimize the risk of impacts on scope, schedule or budget [3], and to facilitate better integration with other design considerations such as those relating to operations, safety and security [4, 5]. In the IAEA publication Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety [6], Requirement 12 (Interfaces of safety with nuclear security and with the State system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material) states that: āThe government shall ensure that, within the governmental and legal framework, adequate infrastructural arrangements are established for interfaces of safety with arrangements for nuclear security and with the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material.ā
Considerations of safety, security and safeguards are essential elements of the design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning stages of nuclear facilities, as discussed in publications issued by the IAEA Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. The trend is for new facilities to be built with inherent safety and security features as well as accommodations for safeguards. The publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design [7] establishes in Requirement 8, pertaining to interfaces of safety with security and safeguards, which applies to any type of facility, that: āSafety measures, nuclear security measures and arrangements for the State system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material for a nuclear power plant shall be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that they do not compromise one another.ā
Safeguards by design (SBD) is a voluntary process to facilitate the improved implementation of existing safeguards requirements,1 providing an opportunity for stakeholders to work together to reduce the potential of unforeseen impacts on nuclear facility operators during the construction, startup, operation and decommissioning of new facilities. SBD should not be confused with the effective design of a safeguards approach, but rather it enhances the design process through the early inclusion of safeguards considerations in the management of the facility design and construction project. As such, cooperation on safeguards implementation is improved when (1) the designer, vendor and operator understand the basics of safeguards and (2) the safeguards experts understand the basics of the facility design and operations.
The particular safeguards activities conducted by the IAEA vary from one facility to another. From a design perspective, there is value in understanding the full range of potential safeguards activities and their impact on the facility design before design choices are finalized. Early planning can incorporate flexibility into the facilityās infrastructure to support safeguards, accommodating technology innovations over time that may benefit the operator during the facilityās life cycle. The relative ease with which safeguards can be implemented in a facility is referred to as āsafeguardabilityā.
Involving the designābuildāoperation teams in the SBD process carries the potential benefits of:
ā Increasing awareness of safeguards for all stakeholders;
ā Reducing inefficiencies in the IAEAās safeguards activities;
ā Improving the effectiveness of safeguards implementation;
ā Facilitating the consideration of the joint use of equipment by the operator, the State (or regi...