Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology
- 416 pages
- English
- ePUB (mobile friendly)
- Available on iOS & Android
Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology
About This Book
This book collects original essays on the epistemology of modality and related issues in modal metaphysics and philosophical methodology.
The contributors utilize both the newer "metaphysics-first" and the more traditional "epistemology-first" approaches to these issues. The chapters on modal epistemology mostly focus on the problem of how we can gain knowledge of possibilities, which have never been actualized, or necessities which are not provable either by logico-mathematical reasoning or by linguistic competence alone. These issues are closely related to some of the central issues in philosophical methodology, notably: to what extent is the armchair methodology of philosophy a reliable guide for the formation of beliefs about what is possible and necessary. This question also relates to the nature of thought experiments that are extensively used in science and philosophy.
Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Methodology will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on the epistemology and metaphysics of modality, as well as those whose work is concerned with philosophical methodology more generally.
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Table of contents
- Cover
- Half Title Page
- Series Page
- Title Page
- Copyright Page
- Dedication
- Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Summary of Articles
- 1 Modality, Worlds, Essence, and Modal Knowledge
- 2 An Agency-Based Epistemology of Modality
- 3 The Price of Sensitivity
- 4 Modal Epistemology for Modalists
- 5 How (Meta-)Semantics Defuses Modal Pessimism
- 6 How Things Have to Be
- 7 In Search of a Structurally Complete Epistemology of Essence
- 8 Morals and Modals: Puzzling about the Dual Use of Modal Verbs
- 9 The Explanatory Power of Modal Rationalism
- 10 Conceivability: Still Not Enough: A Response to Prelević
- 11 Reviving the Modal Account of Essence
- 12 A Neo-Aristotelian Reply to A Modalist
- 13 Semantic Rules, Modal Knowledge, and Analyticity
- 14 Modal Knowledge and Modal Methodology
- 15 Gettier’s Thought Experiments
- 16 Horvath on Gettier’s Thought Experiments
- 17 Challenges for an Experimentalist’s Skepticism about Cases
- 18 In Defense of Modest Modal Skepticism
- Notes on Contributors
- Index