- English
- PDF
- Available on iOS & Android
About This Book
Many people have claimed that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may. Greg Scherkoske challenges this claim, arguing that it creates problems in distinguishing integrity from fanaticism, close-mindedness or mere inertia. Rather, integrity requires sticking to one's convictions to the extent that they are justifiable and likely to be correct. In contrast to traditional views of integrity, Scherkoske contends that it is an epistemic virtue intimately connected to what we know and have reason to believe, rather than an essentially moral virtue connected to our values. He situates integrity in the context of shared cognitive and practical agency and shows that the relationship between integrity and impartial morality is not as antagonistic as many have thought - which has important implications for the 'integrity objection' to impartial moral theories. This original and provocative study will be of great interest to advanced students and scholars of ethics.
Frequently asked questions
Information
Table of contents
- Cover
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter One Two cheers for integrity?
- Chapter Two Integrity and moral danger
- Chapter Three Could integrity be an epistemic virtue?
- Chapter Four Leading a convincing life I: integrity and self-trust
- Chapter Five Leading a convincing life II: integrity, assurance and responsibility
- Chapter Six Integrity and impartial morality I
- Chapter seven Integrity and impartial morality II
- Postscript: the moral importance of leading a convincing life
- Bibliography
- Index