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Debating Self-Knowledge
About This Book
Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In this book, Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs debate how to characterize this problem and develop opposing views of what it shows. Their discussion is the only sustained, in-depth debate about anti-individualism, scepticism and knowledge of one's own thoughts, and will interest both scholars and graduate students in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology.
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Table of contents
- Cover
- DEBATING SELF-KNOWLEDGE
- Title
- Copyright
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- CHAPTER 1: Brains in a vat
- CHAPTER 2: Skepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats
- CHAPTER 3: Ebbs on skepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats
- CHAPTER 4: The dialectical context of Putnamâs argument that we are not brains in vats
- CHAPTER 5: Trying to get outside your own skin
- CHAPTER 6: Can we take our words at face value?
- CHAPTER 7: Is skepticism about self-knowledge incoherent?
- CHAPTER 8: Is skepticism about self-knowledge coherent?
- CHAPTER 9: The coherence of skepticism about self-knowledge
- CHAPTER 10: Why skepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining
- CHAPTER 11: Skepticism about self-knowledge redux
- CHAPTER 12: Self-knowledge in doubt
- CHAPTER 13: Looking back
- Bibliography
- Index