The Structure of Scientific Inference

Mary Hesse

• Publisher: University of California Press
• Year: 2023
• Print ISBN: 9780520359871
• eBook ISBN: 9780520313316
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Science General
• Index: Biological Sciences

Mary Hesse’s The Structure of Scientific Inference offers a rigorous, accessible reorientation of how science actually advances—beyond verificationism and simple falsification—to a dynamic, network-based account of theory, observation, and meaning. Engaging Duhem, Quine, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, Hesse dismantles the myth of a neutral observation language and shows how concepts are inevitably “theory-laden.” In its place, she develops a nuanced model in which scientific language grows by metaphor and analogy, observational reports are assessed for coherence within evolving theoretical webs, and truth retains both correspondence and coherence dimensions. The result is a powerful via media between logical formalism and historical relativism—one that preserves empirical content while explaining why paradigm shifts alter not just beliefs but the very meanings of our terms.

Moving from philosophical diagnosis to positive methodology, Hesse builds a Bayesian, probabilistic logic of science that generalizes beyond the deductive “covering-law” ideal. She explicates confirmation, induction, and analogy (including detailed treatment of models and simplicity) and advances a bold thesis about the finitude of scientific laws’ domains. Case studies—most notably Maxwell’s electrodynamics—demonstrate how analogical reasoning productively guides theory construction without sacrificing realism. For philosophers, historians, and practicing scientists seeking a disciplined account of inference that matches the texture of real inquiry, this book is both a corrective to positivist orthodoxy and a toolkit for analyzing how science earns its claims to knowledge.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1974.

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents 1
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction THE TASK OF A LOGIC OF SCIENCE
• CHAPTER ONE Theory and Observation 1. Is there an independent observation language?
• II. Entrenchment
• III. The network model
• IV. Theoretical predicates
• V. Theories
• VI. Conclusion
• CHAPTER TWO A Network Model of Universals 1. The problem of universals
• II. The correspondence postulate
• III. Coherence conditions
• IV. Some epistemological consequences
• V. Meaning-change
• VI. Goodman’s strictures on similarity
• VII. Absolute universals again
• CHAPTER THREE The Grue Paradox I. Principles of solution
• II. Objective tests of ‘grue'
• III. Meaning variance and entrenchment
• CHAPTER FOUR The Logic of Induction as Explication I. Hume s legacy
• II. A more modest programme
• III. Probabilistic confirmation
• CHAPTER FIVE Personalist Probability I. Axioms and interpretation
• II. Bayesian methods
• III. Convergence of opinion
• IV. Non-Bayesian transformations
• V. Uncertain evidence
• CHAPTER SIX Bayesian Confirmation Theory I. The positive relevance criterion
• II. The transitivity paradox
• III. Suggested resolutions
• CHAPTER SEVEN Universal Generalizations I. Exchangeability and clustering
• II. The raven paradoxes
• III. Clustering in Carnap’s confirmation theory
• IV. Extension to analogical argument
• V. Causal laws and eliminative induction
• CHAPTER EIGHT Finiteness, Laws and Causality 1. The distribution of initial probabilities
• II. The probability of laws
• III. The necessity of laws
• CHAPTER NINE Theory as Analogy I. Some false moves: ‘acceptance’ and ‘explanation’
• II. Deduction from phenomena
• III. Whewell’s consilience of inductions
• IV. The analogical character of theories
• V. The function of models
• VI. Identification of theoretical predicates
• CHAPTER TEN Simplicity I. Subjective and notational simplicity
• II. Content
• III. Economy and clustering
• IV. The principle of relativity and classical electrodynamics
• V. Einstein’s logic of theory structure
• VI. Summary
• CHAPTER ELEVEN Maxwell’s Logic of Analogy I. Hypothetical, mathematical and analogical methods
• II. Experimental identifications
• III. The electrodynamic theory
• IV. Meaning variance and experimental identifications
• CHAPTER TWELVE A Realist Interpretation of Science I. The aims of science
• II. From naive realism to pluralism
• III. Realism and relativity
• IV. The cumulative character of science
• Index of Names
• Index of Subjects