The Battle of Moscow 1941–1942

Soviet General Staff, Richard W. Harrison

• Publisher: Helion & Company
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781912174614
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World War II
• Index: History

"The Battle of Moscow, 1941–1942: The Red Army's Defensive Operations and Counteroffensive Along the Moscow Strategic Direction" is a detailed examination of one of the major turning points of World War II, as seen from the Soviet side. The Battle of Moscow marked the climax of Hitler's "Operation Barbarossa, " which sought to destroy the Soviet Union in a single campaign and ensure German hegemony in Europe. The failure to do so condemned Germany to a prolonged war it could not win. This work originally appeared in 1943, under the title "Razgrom Nemetskikh Voisk pod Moskvoi" (The Rout of the German Forces Around Moscow). The work was produced by the Red Army General Staff's military-historical section, which was charged with collecting and analyzing the war's experience and disseminating it to the army's higher echelons. This was a collective effort, featuring many different contributors, with Marshal Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, former chief of the Red Army General Staff and then head of the General Staff Academy, serving as general editor. The book is divided into three parts, each dealing with a specific phase of the battle. The first traces the Western Front's defensive operations along the Moscow direction during Army Group Center's final push toward the capital in November–December, 1941. The study pays particular attention to the Red Army's resistance to the Germans' attempts to outflank Moscow from the north. Equally important were the defensive operations to the south of Moscow, where the Germans sought to push forward their other encircling flank. The second part deals with the first phase of the Red Army's counteroffensive, which was aimed at pushing back the German pincers and removing the immediate threat to Moscow. Here the Soviets were able to throw the Germans back and flatten both salients, particularly in the south, where they were able to make deep inroads into the enemy front to the west and northwest. The final section examines the further development of the counteroffensive until the end of January 1942. This section highlights the Soviet advance all along the front and their determined but unsuccessful attempts to cut off the Germans' Rzhev–Vyaz'ma salient. It is from this point that the front essentially stabilized, after which events shifted to the south. This new translation into English makes available to a wider readership this valuable study.

Part I

A short description of the theater of military activities

 

The Moscow operation played out across an enormous expanse, the boundaries of which are the following:

north—the Volga River from Kalyazin to Rzhev;

west—the lateral railroad Rzhev-Vyaz’ma- Bryansk (as far as Dyat’kovo);

south—the line Ryazhsk-Gorbachevo station-Dyat’kovo;

east—Kalyazin-Ryazan’-Ryazhsk.

The straight-line distance from Kalinin to Moscow is 160 km; from Moscow to Tula, 170 km; from Vyaz’ma to Ryazan’, 350 km.

The surface of the theater represents a broad plain, covered by a series of small, flat heights and ridges of small hills. The northern part of the Central-Russian Uplands intrudes into the theater. The uplands have a low relief and do not impede large troop movements; only in the area of Tula and Kaluga does one encounter significant gullies with steep banks, and rivers flowing through deep valleys, which can make troop movements difficult.

The Smolensk-Moscow ridge stretches through the northwestern part of the theater in the general direction from Smolensk through Vyaz’ma and Gzhatsk toward Klin. The average height of this ridge is 200-250 m.; the highest point—height 286—is located near Volokolamsk. The Klin-Dmitrov ridge is a continuation of the Smolensk-Moscow ridge, and runs from Klin through Dmitrov to Yur’ev-Pol’skii as far as Vladimir.

Lowlands are encountered along the entire expanse of the theater and usually stretch along the rivers. More significant lowlands, of a forest-marsh type, are in the north in the area of Taldom and the Moscow Sea, and to the southeast of Moscow (the Meshchorsk depression) in a band between the Klyaz’ma, Moscow and Oka rivers, and along the northern bank of the Oka River in the area of Serpukhov and Kolomna. During the operation the lowlands to the west of Moscow along the course of small rivers (Lama, Ruza, Nara and others) had a material effect.

Forests cover about 25% of the surface and are located predominantly in the northeastern and central parts of the theater. The largest forest tracts are located mainly in the lowlands, along river valleys, as well as lake and swampy areas, which make entry into these sectors more difficult. There are fewer forests in the southern part of the theater and the terrain is more open.

Of the large rivers one must note: in the northern part of the theater—the Volga River (its width at Rzhev is 100 m. and at Kalinin 150-200 m., although there are fords; further to the east the river widens) in the southern part—the Oka River (the width as far as Belev is 70-90 m., at Kaluga 150 m., and at Serpukhov 300 m.). The Volga, which flows in a generally northeastern direction, divides along with the water system of the Moscow Sea and the Volga Reservoir, forces operating from the west to the east. It also covers the Moscow area from the north. The Oka River flows from south to north as far as Kaluga, forming a defensive line in a north-south direction. Farther along it turns to the northeast and thus divides forces in a latitudinal direction. It also covers the Moscow area from the south.

Between these two large water lines (the Volga and Oka) there lies a broad zone of terrain (220 km. along the line Rzhev-Kaluga), representing the shortest and most convenient route to Moscow, along which, running from the “Smolensk Gates,” enemies have more than once have invaded the Russian state from the west at various times in history. Here, in the central part of the zone, west of the city of Mozhaisk, lies the famous Borodino battlefield, where in 1812 Napoleon’s glory was first dimmed.

The Moscow River to the west of Moscow is narrow (about 50 m. in width); from the Moscow-Volga Canal its width increases and reaches 100-300 m. The Moscow-Volga Canal, at 80-90 m. in width (and wider in some places), with a depth of 5-6 m., along with its steep banks, presents a serious operational obstacle. It was along this line that the Germans’ offensive misfired to the north of Moscow.

In accordance with the operational situation, the small rivers west of Moscow (Lama, Ruza, Nara), which flow approximately in a north-south direction, played an important role as defensive lines. Information on these rivers is presented in the description of the corresponding operations.

Lakes and artificial reservoirs are located predominantly in the northern part of the theater. Heavy fighting took place in the area of the Moscow Sea and the Istra Resevoir.

The average temperature for the Moscow area is as follows: November—minus 3 degrees celsius, December—minus 8 degrees, and January—minus 11 degrees. However, the winter of 1941-42 was very severe, with a deep snow cover. The average temperature for the winter of 1941-42 was as follows: November—minus 5 degrees celsius, in December—minus 12 degrees, and in January— minus 19 degrees. At certain times in January the frosts reached minus 35-40 degrees. The thickness of the snow cover reached 50-65 cm.

Communications routes were highly developed. The thickest network of railroad, paved and dirt roads, as well as a large amount of waterways, is located in the central part of the theater, in the Moscow area. Moscow is the central junction of the railroad network not only for the Western Front, but of the entire European part of the USSR, and is fed from various directions by 11 railroad lines, having an overall peacetime capacity of 500 pairs of trains per day. The pavedroad network is primarily radial (much like the railroad network) with its center in Moscow. From Moscow radiate the most important highways to Leningrad, Warsaw, Khar’kov, Voronezh, Gor’kii, and other cities. The most important road is the Moscow-Smolensk highway; its peacetime carrying capacity is estimated at 10-15 pairs of trains. However, the radial direction of the railroads and paved roads and the absence of lateral roads, forced us to carry out troop and freight transfers mainly through the Moscow junction. This caused difficulties in carrying out shipments from east to west and back.

In the Western Front’s immediate rear lay Moscow—the capital of the Soviet Union—the political, economic and cultural center of a great country. Moscow is one of the great cities of the world, with a patriotically-inclined population and a numerous and heroic working class, with the latest powerful modern technology. Moscow is a very important junction for railroads, paved and dirt roads, waterways, and air routes for the USSR. Moscow’s great political and military significance to a significant degree determined the type of operations conducted by the Western Front.

In the operational-strategic sense, the retention of the Moscow area afforded a number of advantages to the Red Army over the enemy’s opposing forces. Moscow actively aided the front with people, equipment, and its entire mighty organization. Moscow increased our defensive and offensive capabilities and strengthened our situation at the front and in the rear. The retention of the Moscow area created favorable conditions for carrying out rapid maneuver by the Red Army in almost any direction. A series of defensive lines and fortified areas were constructed for the defense of the Moscow area during the course of the war.

Thus the location of Moscow in the immediate rear of the Western Front had a salutary effect on the activities of its forces, aiding their resolve, and guaranteeing an uninterrupted flow of forces, as well as their maneuver. The abandonment of Moscow (even temporarily) would have been not only a fact of great political significance, but would have sharply worsened the operational and strategic position of the Western Front, would have been reflected on other fronts, and would have complicated their communication and coordination. It was necessary at any cost to halt and defeat the enemy before Moscow.

The theater of military activities under consideration embraced a single vital strategic direction—the Moscow direction. This strategic direction included three main operational directions (running north to south).

1 Kalinin—connecting the western with the northwestern theater and with Leningrad. During the operation the Kalinin direction became an independent operational-strategic direction, embracing a large number of forces and its own front command.

2 Moscow—the central and most important one, covering the immediate approaches to the capital. It will be examined more thoroughly in describing Moscow and its environs.

3 Tula—covering the important Tula industrial and communications junction and connecting the Western Front with the Southwestern Front. The Tula direction acquired an important significance in November in connection with the unfavorable situation along the junction with the Southwestern Front as the result of the withdrawal of the front’s right-flank army and the resulting 40-60 km gap between the fronts. The armies of the Western Front’s left wing later successfully attacked along the Tula operational direction.

Within the confines of the Moscow area (during the fighting of November-December 1941), the following local operational axes were noted (from north to south).

1 Klin—located near the junction of two fronts and flanking Moscow from the north toward Dmitrov and Zagorsk and leading into the rear of the Western Front. The presence of two paved roads to the southwest toward Moscow also eased the advanced of mobile formations immediately against the capital from the area of Klin and Rogachevo.

2 Volokolamsk—including the Volokolamsk-Moscow road, enabling the enemy to turn the capital’s flank from the northwest. A well-developed communications network to the north and northwest of Moscow, within the confines of these two operational axes, and their favorable flanking position in relation to the capital, contributed to the fact that in the beginning the German-Fascists’ northern flanking group, followed by the counteroffensive by our armies along the Western Front’s right wing unfolded primarily along these axes. Here the decisive events transpired.

3 Zvenigorod—allowing movement from the town of Ruza to Zvenigorod to the north of the Moscow River. The Germans took advantage of this axis in November in order to outflank the Mozhaisk axis, which was securely sealed along the front.

4 Mozhaisk—including the shortest route to Moscow from the west and from Moscow to the west, had a well-developed road network (a highway, the Mozhaisk road). However, its central position between the other possible axes meant that the two sides’ actions here were essentially head-on offensives, frontal collisions and breakthroughs of the enemy defense.

5 Maloyaroslavets—leading to Moscow from the southwest through Naro-Fominsk and Podol’sk. It includes the important Moscow-Brest-Warsaw highway. Within the confines of these two axes, cut by a series of defensive lines (for example, the Nara and Protva rivers), stubborn frontal battles by both sides transpired and events developed here more slowly than along both wings. Here the central German-Fascist group unsuccessfully attempted to break through to Moscow and split our front, encountering the stubborn resistance of the Western Front’s center armies. Later offensive operations were carried out here by our center armies.

6 Serpukhov—including the shortest approaches to Moscow from the south and outflanking Moscow from the southeast through Kolomna and Bronnitsy. Two paved roads lead from the area of Serpukhov and Kashira to the capital.

After overcoming the crisis caused by the offensive of the German-Fascist troops in the Tula area, in December and January successful maneuver operations by the armies of the Western Front’s left wing unfolded along the Serpukhov and Tula-Ryazan’ axes.

The Red Army air force’s network of airfields included 85 airfields by the middle of November; about half of these were free; part of the frontline area’s airfield net was created while preparing for the operation. The airfield network fully met the basing needs of the available forces and had a significant reserve of unoccupied airfields. The network was inferior to that of the enemy as to the quality of equipment, which restricted the maneuver of our planes in poor weather.

The Germans’ airfield network consisted of airfields located on our territory temporarily under enemy occupation. For the most part, these airfields were operational and suitable for flying. The main airfields had landing strips, which enabled planes to land and take off regardless of the wetness of the soil on the airfields. The main basing airfields were located in the area of Vitebsk, Orsha, Roslavl’, and Smolensk. Airfields in the forward zone were located within 30-50 km from the front line.

Thus according to the topography and development of the communications routes, the theater of military activities allowed for large-scale maneuver operations by both sides, using all kinds of modern military equipment. The men and matériel of the Moscow area, located in the immediate rear of the Western Front, improved its situation and mitigated the conduct of defensive and offensive operations by the troops of that front. Here, on the approaches to Moscow, unfolded the vivid and important events of this period of the Patriotic War.

Part II

The failure of the first offensive of the German-Fascist troops on Moscow. The general situation on the Western Front at the beginning of November 1941

In the first half of October broad maneuver operations unfolded along the Moscow strategic direction. They were the result of a new and large offensive, begun by the Germans on October 2 on the Soviet-German front. The German-Fascist leadership placed great hopes on the forthcoming operations. On October 2, at the beginning of the new offensive, Hitler declared in an order for the Eastern front:

In a few weeks the three main industrial areas will be completely in our hands. At last the prerequisites have been created for delivering the final huge blow, which must bring about the destruction of the enemy before the onset of winter. All the preparations, insofar as is humanly possible, have been completed. This time the preparations were carried out systematically, step by step, in order to place the enemy in such a position in which we can now inflict a fatal blow to him. Today begins the final great and decisive battle of this year.

The three main industrial areas mentioned in the order were evidently: 1) Leningrad, 2) Moscow and, 3) the Donbas and Rostov-on-Don. Thus the Germans’ October offensive pursued decisive political and strategic goals: the defeat of the Red Army, the seizure of the main industrial areas, and the rapid completion of the campaign and the war.

Army Group Center under von Bock, including the Ninth and Fourth armies, the Third and Fourth panzer groups, and the Second Panzer Army, was to attack along the Moscow strategic direction. The chief objective was the defeat of the opposing forces of the Red Army and the seizure of Moscow.

The shortest and most convenient routes to Moscow lie in the topographical zone between the Moscow Sea and the Oka River at Serpukhov. However, the experience of the preceding battles evidently had an influence on the German command. It took into account the presence of fortified lines and areas on the approaches to Moscow from the west as well as the possibility of flank attacks by the Red Army from the north and south against German troops during the fighting for Moscow. ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• About the Author
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Maps
• List of Tables
• Preface to the English-language edition
• Introduction
• Part I: A short description of the theater of military activities
• Part II: The failure of the first offensive of the German-Fascist troops on Moscow. The general situation on the Western Front at the beginning of November 1941
• Part III: The second general offensive on Moscow by the German-Fascist troops and the defensive battle on the Western Front (November 16-December 1941)
• Part IV: The Red Army’s counteroffensive on the Western Front and the defeat of the German-Fascist troops around Moscow (December 6-December 24 1941)
• Part V: The offensive by the Western Front’s troops from the line of the Lama, Ruza, Nara, and Oka rivers (December 25 1941-January 31 1942)
• Part VI: Overall conclusions on the Moscow Operation
• Annexes