BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: ORGANIZATIONAL SECRECY, STIGMA, AND SEX ABUSE WITHIN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
James A. Vela-McConnell
ABSTRACT
This chapter presents an investigation of the sex abuse scandal within the Catholic Church through the lens of stigmatization for the purpose of elaborating the theory, making it more widely applicable across multiples levels of analysis. Much like individuals, organizations must engage in information management in order to conceal discrediting information that would blemish their reputation. Given the number of people who comprise an organization, such secrecy relies on teamwork in order to contain damaging information. Based on an analysis of investigative journalist accounts of the scandal between 1985 and 2014, I present a typology representing the system of organizational secrecy developed by the Catholic Church. While organizations like the church have more structural resources at their disposal to ensure information control is maintained, their size and the varying levels of commitment to secrecy on the part of individual members of the team ultimately work against them.
Keywords: Stigmatization; secrecy; information management; social control; scandal; organizations
The sex abuse among a minority of Catholic priests and the subsequent cover-up by bishops and other members of the church hierarchy highlight what all scandals, by nature, reveal and that is the “dramaturgical dimension of the public sphere” (Adut, 2008, p. 6). It is the highly publicized dimension of such moral transgressions that creates a scandal (Adut, 2005, 2008), bringing the offense to the attention of a widespread audience. Priests were sexually abusing minors over the course of many years and many people knew about it: victims, their immediate families, church officials, and even legal representatives. However, because of concerted efforts to conceal compromising information on the part of church officials, it did not achieve the level of scandal until that secrecy was broken and there was widespread publicity. Some publicity was achieved in 1985 in a story appearing in the National Catholic Reporter (Jenkins, 1995, 1998), though its scope was limited. It was in January of 2002 that the story made national headlines and, until the election of Pope Francis I, it remained a top story in local, national, and international news.
While individual priests were stigmatized for their transgressions, so were many church officials for the cover-up; but because scandals provoke public outrage (Jiang et al., 2011), the stigma goes well beyond the offending individuals and applies to the Catholic Church itself. As such, stigmatized organizations interact with their audiences in ways that are parallel to the performances of stigmatized individuals. However, organizations and individuals are quite different in terms of such characteristics as their access to structural resources, and this has implications for their ability to hide discrediting information in both the short and long terms. For this reason, it is important to examine the dynamics of stigmatization, information management, and secrecy as they apply at the organizational level of analysis in order to elaborate upon on Goffman’s (1963) model of stigma. Understanding organizational structure as both the patterning and continuity of interaction among social actors (Giddens, 1979), the following analysis will emphasize the structural elements of the Catholic Church, specifically represented by the clergy, the church leadership, and church policies – all of which conspired to exploit the most vulnerable members of the Catholic laity. As such, a culture of clericalism and the Catholic Church’s role as a moral authority – coupled with a strong organizational hierarchy – allowed it to exert social control over its members and those who served on its behalf through enforced, organizational secrecy; however, the sheer size of the organization and the number of those privy to the secret ultimately worked against the church’s ability to hide discrediting information in the long term despite the immense structural resources available to it.
JUST A FEW “BAD APPLES?”
The sex abuse of minors by priests within the Catholic Church dominated news coverage of the church for over a decade beginning in 2002 and is now considered a social problem. While sexual abuse by clergy is not limited to the United States (Doyle, Sipe, & Wall, 2006; Krebs, 1998; Sipe, 1998) nor to Catholic priests (Kane, 2006; Shupe, 1995; Zucker, 2005), much of the recent news coverage focuses on this scandal within the context of the Catholic Church alone. As of 2008, 4% of Catholic priests nationwide (a total of 4,392) faced allegations of abuse and 10,667 victims made allegations against a Catholic priest, though an additional 3,000 potential victims did not raise formal complaints with the church. Eighty-one percent of the victims were male and 51% of the victims were between 11 and 14 years of age at the time of the abuse. Of the accused priests, 55.7% had one formal allegation raised against them, while 3.5% had 10 or more formal allegations. Only 3% of accused priests received convictions and 2% were sentenced to prison. This is due in large part to the statute of limitations on accusations of sex abuse. For example, only 10% of victims reported the abuse within one year and 25% reported the abuse within 10 years; the majority of victims reporting sexual abuse came forward 10 or more years later. Instances of sexual abuse by Catholic priests peaked during the 1970s. However, the reporting of abuse peaked between 2000 and 2002 (Terry, 2008; see also Smith, Rengifo, & Vollman, 2008).1
At the same time that clerical sex abuse extends well beyond the Catholic Church, it is also a problem that is not confined to recent decades (Dale & Alpert, 2007; Sipe, 1998). Doyle et al. (2006) review the paper trail of clerical sex abuse within the Catholic Church and identify canonical (church) laws governing the sexual behavior of priests, including the regulation of sexual activity between adult men and young boys, dating as far back as the Council of Elvira held in Spain in 309 CE. Overall, “history shows that in practically every century since the church began, the problem of clerical abuse of minors was not just lurking in the shadows but so open at times that extraordinary means had to be taken to quell it. If there is anything new about the sexual abuse of minors by members of the clergy, it is that over the past fifty years a conspiracy of silence has covered it” (2006, p. ix).
The first case of clerical sex abuse to produce a scandal since the “conspiracy of silence” was imposed occurred in the Lafayette Diocese in Louisiana in the 1980s and involved a priest by the name of Gilbert Gauthe, who was implicated in acts of sexual abuse with over 100 young boys in four parishes (Dale & Alpert, 2007; Jenkins, 1995; Shupe, 1995). Reporter Jason Berry detailed the story for the National Catholic Reporter in 1985 and revealed that church superiors knew about the sexual abuse for over a decade and had simply moved Gauthe from parish to parish. This story marked the beginning of media coverage on clergy sexual abuse; but it was not until January 2002 that the story achieved the level of international scandal and institutional crisis that continued for over a decade. The investigative staff of The Boston Globe (2002) – trying to learn what the Archdiocese of Boston knew about another abusive priest – supplied the spark when it successfully gained access to previously sealed personnel records from the Archdiocese.2 It was then revealed that the priest they were investigating – Father Geoghan – had raped and/or fondled 130 children since the 1980s. As in Louisiana, the Archdiocese of Boston knew about the abuse and covered it up, shuttling Geoghan from parish to parish without informing parishioners of his history (2002). It is for this reason that the stigma associated with clerical sexual abuse of minors extends well beyond the individual priests and includes bishops, archbishops, cardinals, and ultimately the Pope and the church itself.
Critics argue that the structure of the Catholic Church makes deviant behavior within its ranks possible. Elaborating on this argument (and writing prior to 2002 when secrecy was far more entrenched), Krebs highlights how, “the Church’s international nature, its organizational hierarchy, and its internal polity allow pedophiles to remain anonymous to all but a few within the Church hierarchy and secular society” (1998, p. 16). The complexity of the organizational structure – in terms of the network of parishes, dioceses/archdiocese, and provinces – also plays a key role. Krebs then builds on the work of sociologist Anson Shupe (1995) and analyzes the sexual abuse by priests within the church as an example of “clergy malfeasance.” Such malfeasance is a version of elite deviance and is understood as “the exploitation and abuse of a religious group’s believers by trusted elites and leaders of that religion” (Shupe, 1998, p. 1). Clergy malfeasance is possible because religious institutions are characterized as (1) hierarchies of unequal power in which (2) those in elite positions (such as priests and bishops) have moral authority over church members who (3) believe in the benevolence and good intentions of the church (which thus has the unique status of a “trusted hierarchy”). These characteristics of religious institutions enhance the opportunity structures available for exploitation and abuse (Shupe, 1995, pp. 27–29). Shupe concludes, saying, “instances of abuse … should not simply be regarded as the occasional outcomes of a few ‘bad apples’ … Rather, the nature of trusted hierarchies systematically provides opportunities and rationales for such deviance and, indeed, makes deviance likely to occur” (1995, p. 30).
Shupe goes on to make a number of propositions that emerge from his analysis of religious hierarchical institutions like the Catholic Church. For example, long-term recidivism of abusive behavior is more likely within such an institution though, compared to congregational church structures (in which local congregations are largely autonomous), hierarchical institutions do better at discouraging the normalization of such malfeasance (1995, p. 49). Hierarchical religious structures also facilitate the ability to neutralize or contain the scandal posed by clerical malfeasance. On the other hand, these same institutional structures ultimately allow the church to more effectively address such malfeasance in its internal policies (1995, p. 81).
Overall, the extent of the abuse and number of victims clearly point to the fact that this problem of clergy malfeasance was not just about a few “bad apples” but represented the end result of opportunity and organizational structures within the institution of the Catholic Church. In trying to explain this scandal, journalists and social researchers alike recognized that the organizational structure of the Catholic Church bore a significant portion of the responsibility. Individual priests and even individual bishops, acting alone, could not possibly create such a widespread problem. For this reason, the stigma extends well beyond the offending individuals, damaging the reputation of the church. As such, this scandal represents an ideal case study for examining the dynamics of organizational secrecy employed to avoid discrediting publicity, the failure of this approach to information management, and the ultimate stigmatization of the church.
STIGMA AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Individuals – including the stigmatized – endeavor to present their selves in the best possible light and to create the most advantageous image possible. The “self-as-performer,” in seeking to present a positive image, also takes “precautions against embarrassment” (Branaman, 1997, pp. xlvii–xlix). For this reason, performance involves, among other techniques, both idealization and misrepresentation. Idealization implies not only presenting one’s self as “living up to ideal standards,” but also “entails a certain amount of concealment of inconsistencies” (1997, p. lii). This is where misrepresentation enters into the performance. For those whose stigma is readily apparent to others, what Goffman (1963) terms the “discredited,” it is very difficult to pass as a “normal.” However, for the discreditable – those whose stigma is not obvious and is unknown to others – misrepresentation and idealization offer a chance to pass as a non-stigmatized person. The challenge for these individuals is in managing information about themselves – information that is discrediting and therefore threatening to their ideal image.
Because of the emphasis on secrecy and concealment, the discreditable engage in strategic interaction (Goffman, 1969) with those around them. Misrepresentation and idealization necessarily involve concealing compromising information about one’s self. If the discrediting information comes to light, validation of one’s performance as “normal” and the attendant deference shown is withheld. One will no longer pass as a normal and is stigmatized as a result. Such management of information is central to Goffman’s conceptualization of “expression games.”
To sustain a positive self through one’s performances, one must not only possess traits deemed desirable but also have access to structural resources. When an individual loses access to structural resources (Goffman, 1961), it is no longer possible to sustain a positive image and the self changes dramatically as a result. Goffman (1971) discusses such resources in the context of “territories of self,” such as control over one’s personal space and possessional territory. However, in more general terms, structural resources also imply a certain amount of status and power. As described by Branaman, structural resources are determined by one’s position within society: “[O]ne’s place in various stratification orders determines where, when, and to what degree one can claim the territorial preserves necessary for sustaining self” (1997, p. lvi). In other words, those with higher social rank have more resources at their disposal – resources they may employ to manage and hide discrediting information. Ultimately, failure in concealing discrediting information and the resulting stigmatization “is entirely contingent on access to social, economic, and political power” (Link & Phelan, 2001, p. 367). In the event that discrediting information comes to light, individuals may engage these resources to help challenge or minimize the resulting stigma. In this way, the individual utilizes structural resources to frame the situation in the best possible light (Goffman, 1974). Those with power are better able to frame events in a way that is supportive of their own interests or “combat [negative] interpretive frameworks applied to them” (Branaman, 1997, p. lxxvi). Thus, the stigmatization that arises when discreditable information is revealed may be averted and more easily overcome.
Finally, and of most relevance in the case of the organizational secrecy, individuals will often coordinate their performances with others in a team effort. If an entire team is discreditable due to the behavior of one or more group members, ...