Renaissance

The Rebirth of Liberty in the Heart of Europe

Vaclay Klaus

• Publisher: Cato Institute
• Year: 1997
• ISBN:
  9781937184391
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Public Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The inspiring story of how Václav Klaus brought the Czech Republic out of communism. Václav Klaus was appointed finance minister of the Czech Republic in 1990, shortly after the demise of that country's communist government. Two years later he was named prime minister, and in that capacity he has been one of the most effective spokesmen for classical liberal ideas in the world. With the publication of Renaissance: The Rebirth of Liberty in the Heart of Europe, the Cato Institute brings together 29 essays and speeches by Klaus, all of which were originally written or delivered in English.

PART I




THE PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION

1. Rebirth of a Region: Central Europe Five Years after the Fall

As you probably know, this evening is a very special one for this country. It was just five years ago that our students organized their famous demonstration not more than several hundred meters from this spot. The demonstration started the Velvet Revolution that brought about the collapse of communism in this country. I spent the last two hours with students of the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University in Prague, and the meeting was really very refreshing. It gave me a good chance to think about all that has happened, and I would like to continue in the same spirit now.

I must confess that I remember that evening five years ago quite clearly. I was coming from the railway station after a trip abroad, and in front of our house I met my elder son, who was coming back from the students’ demonstration. He was shocked, he was scared, he was trembling. He told me what had happened, describing the peaceful nature of the students’ demonstration and the unexpected and incredible police brutality. He terminated his story with the following statement: “We children did what we could; now it is the task of the parents to take over.”

I hope that by taking over the torch we have succeeded in changing the country from communism to a free society with a market economy—no more, no less. I am deeply convinced that the results are unexpectedly good. I am aware that the achievements are different in different countries of the region, and I hope that they are better in this country than anywhere else, but the whole region has changed, and I disagree with occasional high-brow, detached, categorical, and unfounded statements that our success is below expectations. I have to argue that those commentators were either wrong 10 years ago when they thought communism was the embodiment of evil, the most undemocratic and inefficient system, or they are wrong now when they argue that it should have been possible to overcome the legacy of communism in as short a period of time as they might have wished and in a way they would have liked to impose upon us.

The ongoing transformation process has two sides from the point of view of policy—one rather passive, the other active. Both of them are very radical and revolutionary; both are based on a clear and transparent vision of the future, on the ability to sell that vision to the citizens of the country, and on a pragmatic but rational (definitely not simple) transformation strategy. The distinction between those two sides is important to an understanding of the logic of the whole process.

The passive (nonconstructivist and noninterventionist) side is identified with deregulation and liberalization. The political transformation was fully based on liberalization, on creating preconditions for free entry into the political market. We understood very early on that liberalization was sufficient and that no direct measures were necessary (it was not necessary to prohibit anything). That is a nontrivial conclusion. The free space was very rapidly filled with new political entities and now, in this country at least, a standard political structure—based on ideologically well defined political parties—has already been developed.

The economic transformation was, of course, based on liberalization as well. It has been proved that deregulation of markets—that is, of prices, foreign trade, and private entrepreneurship—is necessary for a fundamental change of the system, but we realized that it was not sufficient. A passive transformation would last too long and would be too costly. It was, therefore, supplemented with active transformation measures. I do not intend to discuss them in detail here; I will only outline their basic structure. It is helpful to use standard economic terminology and divide the measures into microeconomic and macroeconomic.

The most important change at the microeconomic level was general privatization. In our country we managed to effect the fastest and most extensive transfer of property rights to individuals. As you know, it is much easier to nationalize than to privatize; it is more difficult to build than to destroy. It took a very special mix of standard and nonstandard privatization methods, and the innovative Czech privatization by voucher proved to be a catalyst for the whole process. Now, five years after the Velvet Revolution and four years after the beginning of privatization, massive privatization is practically over. We have to solve some residual problems, as does any Western country, but that is part of our post-transformation task and challenge.

At the macroeconomic level, the task was to end the paternalism of the state, eliminate all forms of subsidies, keep the state budget in balance, and pursue an independent monetary policy. All that has been done. Using my standard analogy and describing the three consecutive transformation stages as waiting in a hospital ward, undergoing surgery, and recovering in a rehabilitation center, I can assure you that we have made it to the rehabilitation center. And we are in pretty good shape now.

Nothing else is necessary. Some people, here and elsewhere, would like to take advantage of the end of communism to create something more than a free society. They protested against our visions and strategies five years ago; they continue to protest now. They would like to have, not only free men and women, but better men and women as well. And they believe they know how to do it, how to “better” us; they know what is wrong with all of us and why. We are too materialistic, too selfish, too short-sighted, too self-centered; we consume more dumplings and meat than books and CDs of classical music. They don’t consider liberalization sufficient. They want to transform not only institutions and rules but people as well.

I agree with attributing positive signs to such values, but I disagree with people who aspire to impose them upon us. Violation of human nature as a byproduct of collectivist ambitions resulted in an Orwellian totalitarian system, and we are happy it is over. Violation of human nature to fulfill moralist, elitist, and perfectionist ambitions would result in a Huxleyan Brave New World, which would lead us to new complications. We have to continue our struggle for a free society, and I am sure we will prevail.

Footnote

Speech delivered at the Atlantic CEO Institute Conference, Palais Wallenstein, Prague, November 1994.

2. The Interplay of Political and Economic Reform Measures in the Transformation of Postcommunist Countries

The worldwide breakdown of communism at the end of the 1980s gave us a unique, we may say an epochal, opportunity to get rid of the irrationalities and injustices of the old, discredited communist regime and to build on its ruins a standard system of political pluralism and democracy and an unconstrained market economy. The country I represent here tonight, the Czech Republic, is in that respect no exception. If there is anything special about my country, anything I should—with unhidden pride and satisfaction—stress here, it is its very fast progress in both the political and the economic components of the transformation process. I believe that the Czech Republic has already crossed the Rubicon dividing the old and the new regimes. That is an important achievement; we may become proof that the transformation from communism to a free society can be realized.

The topic of my lecture, and the object of my curiosity, is the reasons for the visible and irrefutable differences in the speed as well as the nature of the transformation process in various postcommunist countries. I will draw on my experience to outline some of the underlying principles of an optimal reform strategy for all countries that may find themselves facing a challenge similar to the one my country faced.

Even without a detailed and profound analysis, it is apparent that there are postcommunist countries that have had very modest success, countries that have fallen into what I call the reform trap—the vicious circle of incomplete and incorrect reform measures, of increasing inflation and unemployment, of public budget deficits and foreign indebtedness, of accelerating political troubles, of myopic policies that generate even worse outcomes, of chaos and anarchy. We know that such a circle usually ends in a deep politicoeconomic crisis and in the undermining of chances for future success.

There are, however, countries that have avoided falling into the reform trap, countries that have been able to initiate a virtuous circle based on a mixture of reasonable and therefore effective reform measures. Such a circle brings about positive economic results, political stability, and continuation of reforms.

The huge differences we witness are, in my opinion, the result of a specific interplay of political and economic factors in the transformation process. Those factors support and complement each other. To me, the central role of the interplay between economic policies and the political environment is self-evident, but it is often forgotten, or at least not fully appreciated.

Systemic transformation is not an exercise in applied economics or in applied political science. It is a process that involves human beings; that affects their day-to-day lives; that creates new groups of gainers and losers; that changes the relative political and economic strength and standing of different socioeconomic groups; and that thereby destroys the original political, social, and economic equilibrium. The communist system was characterized by its own peculiar, relatively stable equilibrium. Whether the new equilibrium—and especially the path from one equilibrium to another—is stable or unstable depends on the aforementioned interplay. I can draw the following lessons from our experience.

Vision

To be successful, political leaders must formulate and “sell” to the citizens of the country a positive vision of a future society.

The first task is formulation of the vision; it must be positive (not just negative); it must be straightforward (not fuzzy); it must motivate; it must speak to the hearts of men and women who have spent most of their lives under a spiritually empty communist regime. It requires clear words, biblical yeses and nos; it must be stated in an ideal form (which needs “extreme” terms, because compromises belong to reality, not to images or visions); it must explicitly reject all “third ways,” which are based on incompatible combinations of different worlds.

The communist regime demonstrated, and we have fully understood, that human nature does not want Brave New Worlds (to use Aldous Huxley’s apt term) and that to construct a free and functioning social system on dreams, on moral imperatives, or on somebody else’s preferences is absolutely impossible. We accept Adam Smith’s teaching—his vision of a free, democratic, and efficient society in which the citizen, not an enlightened monarch or an elitist intellectual, is king. Because of that, fulfilling the first task—formulating a vision—is not difficult. It just requires knowing and following proven, time-honored principles.

The second task, selling the vision, is much more complicated. It requires us to address the people, to argue, to explain, to defend; it requires permanent campaigning. It requires more than a good communications system, more than sophisticated information technology, more than free and independent mass media. It requires the formation of standard political parties because without them the politicians have no real power base and there is no mechanism for democratically creating policies, ideologies, and visions. Most postcommunist countries started the transformation without established political parties (and without positive visions) and were, therefore, unable to establish a basic, sufficiently strong pro-reform consensus and to start introducing necessary reform steps.

The political and social cohesion of a country cannot be cultivated without the permanent interaction of political parties. That is something to which the citizens (and politicians) in postcommunist countries were not accustomed. Overcoming distrust of political parties is not easy, but it must be done as soon as possible.

Changes

The necessary reform steps include both changes of institutions and changes of behavioral and regulatory rules—the rules of the game.

Without profound institutional changes, we cannot establish new agents in the game: citizens, political parties, parliaments, and small constitutionally constrained governments in the political sphere; consumers, suppliers of labor, firms, and independent central banks in the economic sphere (to name the most important ones). Those changes create a totally new institutional or organizational structure for the whole society.

Rules are changed by new, spontaneously created habits and customs as well as by new legislation and subsequent policies. The substance of legislation and policies is on the one hand to deregulate and liberalize and on the other to define principal constraints on and limits to the decisionmaking spaces for participating agents. That is the only way to unlock markets, to unleash private initiative, to eliminate excessive state interference, to let the new agents behave in a rational way.

Institutional changes take time. Changes of rules, however, can and must be made very fast. Much of the disagreement about the speed of transformation (shock therapy or gradualism) can be resolved if a proper distinction is made between the speed of those two conceptually different transformation tasks.

Blueprints for Reform

Such a fundamental change of an entire society cannot be dictated by a priori, preplanned, or prearranged procedures. Reform blueprints must be loose, unpretentious, and flexible. The dreams of social engineers of all ideological colors—dreams of organizing or masterminding the whole process of a systemic transformation in a rigid way—are false, misleading, and dangerous. It must be accepted as an important transformation theorem that it is impossible to centrally plan the origin and rise of a free society and a market economy.

The reformers must accept that the process involves not just them but millions of human beings with their own dreams, preferences, and priorities. The role of politicians in it must, therefore, be rather limited. They can guide and inspire, introduce necessary legislation, implement appropriate policies; they should not, however, try to dictate, command, or order. Democracy is indispensable, and attempts to ignore it in the name of easier and faster reform are futile and ineffective.

The Nature of Reform

Reform must be bold, courageous, determined, and, therefore, painful, because

• economic activities based on subsidized prices, on artificial demand (formerly created by fiat and now nonexistent), and on sheltered markets must cease to exist;
• a one-time price jump after price deregulation is unavoidable;
• drastic devaluation, which must occur before liberalization of foreign trade, shifts the exchange rate very far below purchasing power parity;
• disparities in income and property grow to an unprecedented level.

Those changes and their impacts must be announced and explained ahead of time, vigorously defended, and “survived.” The costs the people have to bear must be widely shared; otherwise their fragile political support is lost. Telling the truth, not promising things that cannot be realized, and guarding the credibility of reform programs and of the politicians who realize them are absolute imperatives.

One-time changes are necessary byproducts of any kind of systemic transformation; galloping inflation or hyperinflation, repeated devaluations, prolonged declines in gross domestic product, state budget deficits, and growing foreign indebtedness are, however, avoidable by a positive interplay of political and economic reforms and by the introduction and implementation of rational macroeconomic policies based on conservative foundations.

Monetarism, not Keynesianism; fixed rules, not fine-tuning; a balanced budget, not fiscal activism; self-reliance, not dependence on foreign mercenaries—those are inspiring words for all of us who want to accomplish a historic transformation, for all of us who want to create a free, democratic, and efficient society.

Footnote

Speech delivered at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., October 1993, and upon receipt of an honorary doctorate from the University of Francisco Marroquin, Guatemala, October 1993.

3. The Ends and the Beginnings: University Studies and Systemic Change

It is a great honor and a great pleasure to have the opportunity to share some of my views with you—the views of one coming from a small Central European country, a country that in the last decades lived through a very frustrating communist experiment, a country that in the last few years has been realizing a most radical transformation of the whole social system. I come here as the prime minister of a foreign, yet friendly, country whose people see your country as the most important and most reliable guarantor of freedom, democracy, international stability, and security in today’s world.

There is no doubt that this impressive and exciting commencement ceremony is for you the end of something, the end of several years of difficult studies, and at the same time the beginning of something, the beginning of an adult, mature, and in many respects more complicated or more responsible life. That simultaneity reminds me of another example of ends and beginnings. In my country, and in my part of the world, we have witnessed (and enjoyed) the end of communism and the beginning of a new era, the beginning of a free society.

Let me say a few words about that crucial turning point in the history of mankind and its implications for all of us in the postcommunist world as well as your country and elsewhere. When discussing the end of communism, I feel obliged to warn against simplistic approaches and interpretations and against unfounded expectations that, paradoxically, would lead us in the wrong direction.

Communism was an immense human tragedy, but it should be neither demonized nor underestimated. Demonization impli...

Table of contents

• FOREWORD
• PREFACE
• PART I: THE PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION
• PART II: THE CZECH EXPERIENCE
• PART III: THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN EUROPE
• PART IV: THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN THE WORLD
• SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS BY VÁCLAV KLAUS
• About the Author