Just Get Out of the Way

How Government Can Help Business in Poor Countries

Robert E. Anderson

• Publisher: Cato Institute
• Year: 2004
• ISBN:
  9781933995458
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Economic Policy
• Index: Economics

Economic growth is essential for reducing poverty, and a well-functioning private sector is the only way to increase economic growth. Yet international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund recommend sophisticated policies to improve the business environment that governments in poor countries cannot successfully implement. The result is often a worsening of private sector performance.

In this book, Robert E. Anderson, a development consultant and former World Bank economist, recommends a different approach. Instead of adopting policies that are common in rich countries, Anderson suggests that policymakers take into account the institutional weaknesses typical of developing countries — corruption, deficient rule of law, cronyism, and so on. Simpler, market-oriented policies are more suitable to poor countries' institutional environments and more likely to produce growth and keep the private and public sectors honest.

Anderson recommends sometimes counterintuitive policy solutions for a number of areas -- banking, privatization, corporate governance, bankruptcy, and competition. For instance, he argues that "rich countries were once poor countries" and that "examples from the past in rich countries may be more appropriate for poor countries today."

1. Government Failure versus Market
Failure

This book is based on two beliefs. First, economic growth is essential for reducing poverty in third world or developing countries. Second, an efficient, dynamic, and growing private sector is the only way to increase the rate of economic growth. This book then takes the next step and asks what governments can do to help develop the private sector.

The main conclusion is that the government often does too much. Many government programs and policies designed to help the private sector actually impede its development. The major reasons are the low level of ability or competence in most government institutions, the high level of corruption, and the influence of special-interest groups. Though private markets often fail to provide perfect outcomes, the ability of the government in poor countries to fix these failures is limited.

This conclusion reminds me of what my exasperated father told me many years ago when I was attempting to help him carry out a home improvement project: ‘‘Son, if you can’t help, at least get out of the way.’’ The best that governments can do in many poor countries is just get out of the way. The following chapters analyze which government policies intended to help the private sector are likely to succeed and how they can be designed to compensate for the government’s poor ability to implement them.

Government Corruption and Incompetence

I first became concerned about government corruption and incompetence in 1991 when I went to work for the agency that managed privatization in Russia (the State Property Committee). Previously, I had worked on the privatization program in New Zealand managed by the Treasury. Though I was a U.S. citizen, the New Zealand Treasury recruited me along with a number of other foreign citizens to be regular members of the New Zealand civil service. The Treasury felt it needed additional expertise to help with the Labour government’s ambitious economic reform program under the leadership of the minister of finance, Roger Douglas.

After having worked in the U.S. government, I was impressed with the quality of the New Zealand Treasury staff and the dedication of the Labour politicians to reform. Though the civil service in New Zealand is skilled and honest and the political system is generally free from corruption, the policy of the Labour government supported by the Treasury was that many of the activities carried out by the government should be transferred to the private sector. In addition, the government should eliminate burdensome regulation of the private sector as well as subsidies and incentives designed to promote its development. These reforms in New Zealand are discussed in more detail in Chapters 6 and 9.

Later, when I went to work in Russia in 1991, I had lengthy discussions with the bright young team (some Russian, some expatriate) recruited to devise and implement a privatization program. After I expounded at length on my ‘‘brilliant’’ proposals to privatize the thousands of state-owned enterprises in Russia, one of the Russians on the team told me that my proposals did not take into account a fundamental fact of life in Russia. They would have to be implemented by the Russian bureaucracy.

Though a relatively small number of new people could be brought in to help organize the program, the bulk of the work would have to be done by existing officials in various agencies and state-owned enterprises. The Russian team member then told me that most officials are incompetent, corrupt, or both. Russia needed to design a privatization program that could be implemented by such officials. This team devised a program for the larger enterprises that was a complex mixture of management-employee buyouts and voucher privatization unlike anything previously used in rich countries. However, the program accomplished its main goal of rapid privatization resulting in the transfer of roughly 70 percent of large and medium-sized enterprises to private owners between 1992 and 1994. Many of the remaining large enterprises were privatized later using other methods.

This accomplishment was illustrated in a presentation by an official of the Russian State Property Committee at a conference where representatives of the various privatization agencies in Central and Eastern Europe met to share their experiences. Some of the speakers from Poland and Hungary were critical of the Russian privatization method and implied that their countries were doing it better. The Russian representative countered by observing that Margaret Thatcher had privatized about 40 enterprises in the 11 years that she was prime minister of Great Britain. He then looked at his watch and said that in the 10 minutes since he began speaking, Russia had privatized at least that many.

Many have criticized Russian privatization for not achieving some theoretical ideal. However, the early program was probably the best that could have been implemented quickly given the limitation of the existing Russian bureaucracy and political system. More justified is the criticism of later programs, such as the loans-for-shares program, in which state-owned assets were awarded to financial supporters of the government at give-away prices.

Russia could have delayed privatization for years or even decades until government institutions and the civil service were improved and modernized. The choice for the government in the early 1990s was not between some inferior, second-best method of privatization and some theoretical, best method as determined by western experts. The choice was between a second-best method that could be implemented quickly by existing Russian officials versus delaying privatization for many years. This is a difficult choice about which reasonable people may disagree, but it is not obvious or clear-cut that the government made the wrong choice in spite of criticism from western experts. This argument about Russia reminds me of an old saying, ‘‘Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.’’

How to Develop the Private Sector

The private sector is a shorthand term for those economic, commercial, or business activities that are not carried out by the public sector and are instead carried out by privately owned businesses and individuals. I would also include nonprofit organizations and community-based organizations in the private sector. These are usually referred to as nongovernmental organizations or NGOs. In contrast, the public sector includes government ministries, agencies, and stateowned enterprises.

It is often easier to define the extent of the private sector by examining what the public sector does. Everything else is carried out by the private sector. In many poor countries, the public sector provides health care; education; utilities (electricity, telephone, natural gas, water and sewer); transportation (roads, rail, ports, airlines); banking; insurance; mutual funds; wholesale and retail trade (particularly in agriculture); energy (coal, petroleum); and finally manufactured products.

Developing the private sector has two main components. The first is to transfer more of these economic activities from the public to the private sector. The second is to create the complex structure of government policies, laws, and institutions, hereafter referred to as the business environment, which will encourage the private sector to function efficiently and to grow by creating more jobs and higher incomes. There is a growing acceptance that the public sector has done poorly in carrying out these economic activities, and that the private sector can do better in the right environment.

Considering the poor experience of the communist countries and other countries that relied on state-led economic development, greater reliance on the private sector seems self-evident to me. If you don’t already believe that the private sector will perform these activities better than the public sector or that developing the private sector is essential for economic growth, then an attempt by me to demonstrate this to be true will probably be unsuccessful. The purpose of this book is to analyze how best to develop the private sector and thus increase the rate of economic growth—not to prove that developing the private sector will increase the rate of economic growth and reduce poverty.

First, Do No Harm

Unfortunately, government policies intended to help the private sector are too often similar to the attempts of the medical profession of 200 hundred years ago to improve health. In those days, a visit to the doctor or hospital was likely to make you worse rather than better. Governments would be wise to follow the oath taken by physicians, which is ‘‘First, do no harm.’’¹

The outcome of a government policy will fall into one of three categories. First, the best outcome occurs when the policy actually improves the performance and functioning of the private sector, and the benefits of the policy outweigh the budgetary cost. The second outcome occurs when the government tries to help the private sector but actually accomplishes little or nothing. Though not a desirable outcome, at least the damage is restricted to the wasted government expenditures. The third, and worst, outcome occurs when the government policy actually harms the performance of the private sector. The government expenditure is not only wasted, but the private sector would also have been better off if the policy had never been implemented.

As an example, let me describe the outcome when the government created a Board of Investment in Bangladesh. Initially, everyone had high hopes that this policy would fall into the first category. The actual outcome today is in the second category, and there is a risk that it could fall into the third category.

The government created the Board of Investment to encourage foreign companies to invest in Bangladesh. The chairman told me that the Board would try to help foreign investors find their way through the thicket of government licenses, permits, and regulations. He hoped that it would become a one-stop shop for government permits.

I asked the chairman how successful they were. He admitted that it was difficult. Most of his staff were transferred from the now defunct Ministry of Industry. They had never worked in the private sector and had little understanding of the needs of businesspeople. Moreover, their whole careers had been spent regulating and controlling the private sector, which was the function of the old ministry. It was difficult for them to change their thinking.

I was disappointed but tentatively concluded that the outcome was not too bad. Admittedly, the Board was unlikely to be of much help to the private sector, in this case, foreign investors. However, if foreign investors did not find the Board helpful, they could just refuse its assistance.

Unfortunately, what the chairman next told me suggested that the outcome could become much worse. He was concerned about foreign investors who were dishonest or did not have a good plan for investing in the country. He proposed that the Board approve the qualifications of foreign investors and review the quality of their business plans before they would be allowed to invest. This action would keep out dishonest and incompetent investors. His objective was to protect consumers, suppliers, and banks that might be harmed by those investors.

He was not impressed by my argument that consumers, suppliers, and banks might be in a better position to protect themselves without help from the Board. I hoped to convince him that his plan was bad by taking it to its logical extreme. I suggested that if his plan was good for foreign investors, why not extend it to domestic investors as well? The Board should review the qualifications and business plans of all investors, both domestic and foreign. I suggested that domestic investors were even more likely to be unqualified or dishonest. To my horror, he seemed to think that I had a good idea. Thus, instead of helping foreign investors, the Board was likely to become just another obstacle.

The Importance of Competition

At this point, the reader might think that I am some naive ideologue who believes that the private sector can do no wrong. A private sector without government intervention, controls, or regulation is some ideal economic system that cannot be improved upon. I am like Pangloss, the hero of Voltaire’s Candide, and believe that an unregulated market economy is the ‘‘best of all possible worlds.’’ Actually, I view a private market economy in the same way as Winston Churchill viewed democracy. A private market economy is the worst economic system except for all others that have been tried.²

The impact of competition on the behavior of private companies is the main reason a market economy is a better economic system. This insight is one of the oldest ideas in economics dating back at least to 1776 when Adam Smith wrote the Wealth of Nations. Smith argued that, because of competition, private companies in pursuing their own self-interest (namely, higher profits) would actually help the entire society.

Private businesspeople are not inherently more honest or more capable than government officials and politicians. However, competition encourages them to be honest and capable or else they will be driven out of business. Competition pressures a private company to produce high-quality products and services at reasonable prices. Similarly, competition pressures the company to treat its customers, workers, and suppliers honestly and fairly. If not, they will vote with their feet and do business or seek employment with another company.

Although this theory explains why a competitive market economy should perform well, we all know that the practice never entirely lives up to this ideal. We can all give examples of companies that cheat their customers and suppliers, sell unsafe products, charge excessively high prices, underpay and mistreat their workers, pollute the environment, and so forth. However, I despair about the ability of governments in most poor countries to improve this economic system and fix its weaknesses.

In contrast to private companies, the only pressure on governments to perform better is that the politicians might be voted out of office at the next election. Unfortunately, democracy in many poor countries is weak, and poorly performing governments stay in power for decades.

Private-Sector Rent Seeking

Most of the current impediments to the growth of the private sector are the result of past government policies intended to help the sector. At a minimum, any government policies have to be designed to take into account the low level of competence in many government agencies and ministries, the high level of corruption, and the likelihood that special-interest groups will end up distorting the policy for their own benefit.

The worst of these special-interest groups is the private sector itself. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the private sector in any country is its persistent attempt to manipulate and control the power and resources of the government for its own benefit. Economists have come up with a term for this kind of behavior that is certainly not one of the best examples of technical jargon, but I will use it anyway. Economists call this rent-seeking behavior. Though not a widely used meaning of the word rent, economists use the word in this context to mean above-normal or excess profits. Thus rentseeking behavior by private businesspeople means that they are trying to use the government to earn excess profits.

Examples of such rent seeking in both rich and poor countries could fill many books. No country is immune. Every day when I pick up the newspaper in my own country (the United States), I become enraged when I see more examples of private firms, farmers, or labor unions using the power of government to enrich themselves at the expense of everyone else.

Governments can increase private profits in many ways. They can provide subsidies both for the products and services that private companies produce and for the inputs that they buy. Governments sell state-owned resources such as land or natural resources to private companies at below-market prices and buy goods and services from them at above-market prices. Governments provide low-interest loans from state-owned banks. Governments offer tax breaks for favored industries or companies. The general public pays for these higher profits through higher taxes or reduced government spending.

In addition, governments have a source of power not available to any other institution. Governments can pass laws or regulations that reduce competition and thus result in high profits for favored private firms and enforce those laws using the police and courts. For example, governments place high tariffs on imported products or limit imports in other ways so that domestic companies can charge high prices free from foreign competition. Governments refuse to allow foreign companies to set up operations in the country in competition with domestic companies. Governments use their power to license new companies so as to restrict their entry and thus limit competition even among domestic companies. The general public pays for these higher profits through higher prices or lower quality products and services. A recent book, Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists, argues that the biggest enemies of capitalism are business executives who use their influence to reduce competition.³

A better term than rent-seeking behavior grew out of the recent financial and economic crisis in East Asian countries— crony capitalism. This term succinctly describes how friends, associates, and relatives of the political leaders in some East Asian countries enjoyed a privileged economic position (the Philippines and Indonesia are often cited). These cronies received government subsidies, tax breaks, cheap loans, lucrative contracts to supply goods and services to the government, and protection from competition. Crony capitalism was blamed at least in part for the economic crisis in these countries.

Labor Unions

Labor unions often assist private companies in their rent seeking. If a company is protected from competition, it is more likely to grant wage increases to union workers in exchange for labor peace. The company knows that it can pass on the higher wages to consumers in the form of higher prices and not suffer reduced profits because it faces little competition. As a result, workers in these companies receive wages and benefits substantially above those of other workers. Labor unions know that increased competition will make it harder for them to demand higher wages. Not surprisingly, labor unions are the biggest opponents of globalization because globalization results in increased competition from foreign companies.

Labor unions are often more effective in rent seeking because they claim to be protecting poor, downtrodden workers even though only a minority of workers in most countries belong to unions. In both poor and rich countries, union members usually make up less than 35 percent of nonagricultural workers and often much less.⁴ For example, in India only about 5 percent of nonagricultural workers are union members. If one includes agricultural workers, the percentage is even smaller. Unions often argue that increased competition will force private companies to lower wages or fire workers. Politicians are reluctant to appear to be hurting ordinary workers even though unionized workers are not ordinary. In contrast, rich businesspeople in expensive suits driving around in chauffeured limousines have a harder time gaining the sympathy of politicians.

The higher wages of union workers are borne by the rest of the public in the form of higher prices for the products and services produced by t...

Table of contents

• Acknowledgments
• 1. Government Failure versus Market Failure
• 2. Economic Growth: The Only Way Out of Poverty
• 3. Large Companies: Heroes or Villains?
• 4. Privatization: Just Sell It
• 5. Banks: Better Off without Them
• 6. Bank Regulation: Depositors Beware
• 7. Bankruptcy: Swift and Certain Liquidation
• 8. Competition: Government Is the Problem, Not the Solution
• 9. Conclusions—The Example of New Zealand
• Notes