New History of the Peloponnesian War

Donald Kagan

• Publisher: Cornell University Press
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9780801467288
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Maps

1. Heraclea and Environs

2. The Northeastern Peloponnesus

3. Ionia and Caria

4. Miletus and Iasus

5. The Hellespont

6. Eëtioneia

7. Las to Euboea

8. The Battles of Cynossema and Abydos

9. The Bosporus and Propontis

10. The Battle of Cyzicus

11. Lesbos and Arginusae

12. The Battle of Arginusae

13. The Battle of Aegospotami

Abbreviations and Short Titles

AJP	American Journal of Philology
ATL	B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, The Athenian Tribute Lists
Beloch, AP	K. J. Beloch, Die Attische Politik seit Perikles
Beloch, GG	K. J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 2d ed.
Bloedow, Alcibiades	E. F. B1oedow, Alcibiades Reexamined
BSA	Proceedings of the British School at Athens
Busolt, GG	G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte
CAH	Cambridge Ancient History
CP	Classical Philology
CQ	Classical Quarterly
CR	Classical Review
Davies, APF	J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families
FGrH	F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker
Fornara, Generals	C. Fornara, The Athenian Board of Generals
GHI	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions
Glotz and Cohen, HG	G. Glotz and R. Cohen, Histoire grecque
Grote	George Grote, A History of Greece
Hatzfeld, Alcibiade	J. Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, Etude sur l’histoire d’Atbènes à la fin du Ve siècle
HCT	A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides
Henderson, Great War	B. W. Henderson, The Great War between Athens and Sparta
Hignett, HAC	C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution
IG	Inscriptiones Graecae
JHS	Journal of Hellenic Studies
Kagan, Archidamian War	D. Kagan, The Archidamian War
Kagan, Outbreak	D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War
Kagan, Peace of Nicias	D. Kagan, The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition
LAC	L’Antiquitè Classique
Lewis, Sparta and Persia	D. M. Lewis, Sparta and Persia
Meiggs, Athenian Empire	R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire
Meyer, Forsch.	E. Meyer, Forschungen zur alten Geschichte
Meyer, GdA	E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums
PCPS	Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society
PW	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W. Kroll, Realenzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft
REA	Revue des ètudes anciennes
REG	Revue des ètudes grecques
RH	Revue Historique
Rhodes, Commentary	P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia
Riv. fil.	Rivista di filologia e d’istruzione classica
SCI	Scripta Classica Israelica
Ste. Croix, Origins	G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War
TAPA	Transactions of the American Philological Association
YCS	Yale Classical Studies
ZPE	Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

1. After the Sicilian Disaster

The Athenian attack on Sicily, launched with such great expectations, ended in total failure. Nicias surrendered the pitiful remnants of his army to the Syracusans in mid-September of 413, so news of the defeat could not have reached Athens much before the end of the month.1 An ancient story says that the first report came from a foreigner who arrived at a barber shop in the Piraeus. Assuming that the Athenians had already heard of the disaster, he began talking about the details. The barber ran to Athens with the news, but no one would believe him. He was thought to be a fabricator and trouble-maker and was put to the rack before witnesses arrived to confirm the story.2 We need not believe such tales, but the picture they paint of general incredulity is surely right. Thucydides tells us that even when the very soldiers who had managed to escape from Sicily reported the extent of the disaster, they were for a long time disbelieved.3

When finally the truth could not be denied, the Athenians responded first in anger and then in fear. First, they lashed out at the politicians who had proposed and argued for the Sicilian expedition (Thucydides bitterly remarks, “as if they had not voted for it themselves”); they were furious with the seers who had predicted success. Next, they grieved over the men lost in Sicily. Finally, they feared for their own safety when they calculated their own losses and the enemy’s gains. They expected that the Peloponnesians, joined by their new allies in Sicily, would sail directly for the Piraeus and attack Athens by land and sea, joined by Athens’ allies, who would now surely rebel.4

In the panic of the moment, they exaggerated the enemy’s capacity to take effective action, but they had good reason for concern over the condition of Athens and its ability to carry on the war. The most obvious problem was manpower.5 At the start of the war, the Athenians had 13,000 citizen hoplites of fighting age and another 16,000 for garrison duty, of whom about 8,000 were citizens above and below the age for battle and 8,000 were metics. There were 1,200 cavalrymen and 1,600 bowmen; the number of thetes available for service as rowers and marines was between 20,000 and 25,000.6 The plague appears to have killed about a third of the population and to have crippled and disabled still others.7 These losses could have been only partially replaced by the time of the Sicilian disaster, which probably killed at least 3,000 hoplites and 9,000 thetes as well as thousands of metics.8 When account is taken of other casualties suffered between 431 and the autumn of 413, it is reasonable to believe that in 413 the Athenians may have been reduced to no more than 9,000 adult male citizens of the hoplite class of all ages; perhaps 11,000 thetes; and 3,000 metics,—a stunning reduction in the number of men available to fight the war.9

At least 216 triremes, of which 160 were Athenian, had been lost in Sicily, and no more than about 100, in different stages of disrepair, were still in the docks at Piraeus.10 They would be hard-pressed to find crews, even unskilled and inexperienced ones, from the available thetes. Perhaps as serious a problem was the lack of money to repair the ships, build new ones, and pay their crews. Thucydides’ statement that the Athenians “saw no money in the treasury” is probably rhetorical.11 But from the approximately 5,000 talents available in the public treasury in 431 (excluding the 1,000 talents set aside for extreme emergency “in case the enemy should attack the city with a fleet”12), surely fewer than 500 talents remained in 413.13 Nor could Athens hope to replenish its funds with increased income from the empire. The defeat in Sicily would likely cause rebellions that would reduce tribute payments and increase expenses by requiring expeditions to subdue the uprisings.

At the same time, the domestic economy of Athens was badly hurt. The Spartan fort at Decelea wore the Athenians down financially as well as physically and psychologically. They lost more than 20,000 slaves, they were prevented from working their silver mines, their capacity to use any of their farmland was reduced, and their houses in the country were stripped and stolen by the Boeotians along with any cattle and pack animals that could not be removed to Euboea for safekeeping. They had to import what they needed by a longer route, which increased its cost, and they had to support an armed force needed to guard the walls night and day.14 Deprived of their means of livelihood, more citizens were compelled to crowd into the city. The increased demand for and the higher cost of importing food and other necessities could not fail to drive up prices. This put a further strain on the public treasury, for the state somehow had to support the needy widows and orphans created by the war.15

The propertied classes also suffered from the misfortunes of war. They, too, were compelled to abandon the farms that provided their income, and their houses were vandalized by the marauding Boeotians. We have some clues to the strain they felt. The trierarchy, a public service that the wealthier Athenians performed in turn, required the men appointed trierarchs not only to command a warship but also to fit it out and even to supplement the pay of its rowers. Until the Sicilian expedition, one trierarch had always been appointed for each ship, but soon after the disaster the syntrierarchy was introduced, allowing two men to share the expense.16 By the end of the war, and perhaps as early as 413, a similar sharing was introduced for the liturgy that provided choruses for dramatic performances.17 Men of sufficient wealth to perform basic military and religious services for the state were clearly in short supply, so there was little help to be expected from the imposition of the direct war tax, the eisphora. We can be sure of only one such levy, in 428, which raised 200 talents, apparently as much as could be collected.18 The eisphora may have been levied a...

Table of contents

• The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War
• The Archidamian War
• The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition
• The Fall of the Athenian Empire