Thank God They're on Our Side

The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965

David F. Schmitz

• Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press
• Year: 2009
• ISBN:
  9780807875964
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Despite its avowed commitment to liberalism and democracy internationally, the United States has frequently chosen to back repressive or authoritarian regimes in parts of the world. In this comprehensive examination of American support of right-wing dictatorships, David Schmitz challenges the contention that the democratic impulse has consistently motivated U.S. foreign policy.
Compelled by a persistent concern for order and influenced by a paternalistic racism that characterized non-Western peoples as vulnerable to radical ideas, U.S. policymakers viewed authoritarian regimes as the only vehicles for maintaining political stability and encouraging economic growth in nations such as Nicaragua and Iran, Schmitz argues. Expediency overcame ideology, he says, and the United States gained useful--albeit brutal and corrupt--allies who supported American policies and provided a favorable atmosphere for U.S. trade.
But such policy was not without its critics and did not remain static, Schmitz notes. Instead, its influence waxed and waned over the course of five decades, until the U.S. interventions in Vietnam marked its culmination.

1 PEACE MUST FIRST BE RIVETED

The Republican Response to Revolution and Dictatorship

The Republicans came to power in 1921 at a time of great apprehension concerning American relations with the rest of the world. Economic and political readjustment from the Great War was their primary concern, and these problems were compounded by the postwar depression and unrest in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Casting two large shadows over these problems were the unsure relationship with former allies and enemies caused by the rejection of the Versailles Treaty and the new challenge posed by Bolshevism in Russia. Wilson had placed his faith in the League of Nations as the mechanism that would allow peaceful, nonrevolutionary change to occur in Europe and provide collective security to prevent another war and concomitant revolutions.

Wilson’s political program for peace was, however, rejected by Republican leaders. While they shared with Wilson a concern for American interests in Europe, particularly economic, and an abhorrence and fear of Bolshevism, Republican officials such as Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes had little faith in the League. He did not believe that it could deter a great power from aggression and held steadfastly to the position that the only means to peace was through stability and economic prosperity. This would allow the powers to cooperate with each other and recognize their common goals. For Hughes, this would mean the codification of shared principles into international law to serve as a guide for the conduct of nations.¹ Of primary importance was the economic stabilization of Europe. This, in turn, placed a premium on the return of political order.²

But without the active involvement of the United States in the League of Nations and considering the political problems of Europe, how could there be a guarantee of political stability and, therefore, gradual change? The policy rested on the equation that economic recovery would end social unrest, bring American trade and credits, and halt the threat of revolution. Seeking a way out of this dilemma led Hughes to reverse the Wilsonian commitment to supporting self-determination and democracy internationally. Order and stability had to be the primary considerations. Republican policymakers backed those groups which they thought could ensure the necessary requirements for American support—political stability, anti-Bolshevism, and receptiveness to increased trade and friendly relations with the United States—and came to favor and actively support “stable” right-wing regimes over what they perceived to be unstable democratic or radically nationalist governments.

Economic stability was also considered to be vital for American prosperity as well as a means to avoid unrest and contain revolution. That the United States was now, for the first time, a creditor nation as well as the world’s leading industrial producer made the problems of Europe and the United States directly interrelated. As Hughes stated in 1921, “The prosperity of the United States largely depends upon the economic settlements which may be made in Europe.”³ He returned to the same point the next year in a major foreign policy address. Discussing European economic difficulties Hughes argued: “The economic conditions in Europe give us the greatest concern. . . . It is idle to say that we are not interested in these problems, for we are deeply interested from an economic standpoint, as our credits and markets are involved, and from a humanitarian standpoint. . . . We cannot dispose of these problems by calling them European, for they are world problems and we cannot escape the injurious consequences of a failure to settle them.”⁴

Economic recovery would, in theory, guarantee political stability and overcome the rivalries among nations. Political stability was, however, necessary for economic recovery to begin. As Hughes noted in 1922, he desired to aid “in the re-establishment of stable conditions and thus . . . contribute] to the welfare of other peoples, upon which our own prosperity must ultimately depend.”⁵ Republican efforts to escape this Catch-22 led them to favor right-wing dictatorships. While President Warren G. Harding set the tone for the New Era diplomacy through his views on reconstruction and radicalism, Hughes had the major responsibility for developing, formulating, defining, and, in conjunction with Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, implementing American policy during the 1920s.

American officials first articulated their emerging rationale for supporting right-wing dictatorships in response to the post-World War I events in Italy. American support of Benito Mussolini was based on a view of events in Italy that served American purposes and interests. Two ideas were central to this view: that there was a threat of Bolshevism in Italy and that Italy was not prepared for democratic government. This un-preparedness and inability at self-government created the instability that bred Bolshevism. These beliefs served to legitimize U.S. support of Mussolini in the name of defending liberalism. To justify this new perspective, State Department officials reclassified Italy and ignored Mussolini’s destruction of a liberal constitutional government. A nation that had been an ally during the war was now treated as if it were an ungovernable developing nation in need of a firm hand to guide it.

Thus American policymakers welcomed the coming to power of fascism in Italy. They saw the fascists as strong anti-Bolsheviks and ignored the antidemocratic nature of the regime. The fascists, officials believed, would bring the stability that would prevent Bolshevism and that was a precondition for economic recovery. This position led American policymakers to embrace Mussolini and actively support the fascist government in Rome. Italian fascism was perceived as meeting all the qualifications for U.S. support: promise of political stability, anti-Bolshevism, and increased trade with the United States.

Choosing Autocracy

Woodrow Wilson confronted the greatest revolutionary challenges liberalism had faced to date. Wilson had long distrusted radicalism and revolution. In 1904, for example, he had labeled the Populists as dangerous “radicals” who were “contemptuous alike of principle and experience.” The United States, he declared, “will tolerate no party of discontent or radical experiment.”⁶ When Wilson became president in 1913, there had grown, according to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, a “feeling in some countries that a Democratic victory would be hailed by those seeking to foment revolution as an encouragement.” A two-hour-long cabinet meeting was held on 11 March 1913 to discuss the “importance of making known this country’s attitude as encouraging stable government.” The next day Wilson issued a general message to all of Latin America which stressed the importance of order and the rule of law.⁷

In his message to America’s neighbors, Wilson wrote that “cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force.” Striking the same theme in a more ominous tone, Wilson stated that “there can be no freedom without order” and that the United States “can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests. . . . We shall prefer those who act in the interest of peace and honor, who protect private rights and respect the restraints of constitutional provisions.” The president concluded by noting that “from these principles may be read so much of the future policy of this Government.”⁸ The signs that Wilson saw revolutions as unnecessary and wasteful and that he would intervene in other nations in the hemisphere were unmistakable. Even with Wilson, who gave much thought to the problems in Mexico and Russia and demonstrated an understanding of change, a tendency to ignore local conditions that gave rise to revolutions became inherent in the American response.

In his efforts to “teach the South American Republics to elect good men,” Wilson dispatched American troops to Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Robert Lansing elaborated on the administration’s concern with revolution in a November 1915 memorandum to the president. Fearing the growing influence of Europeans in fomenting revolution, Lansing wrote that “stability and honesty in government depend upon sufficient force to resist revolution and on sufficient control over the revenues and over the development of the resources to prevent official graft.” Preventing the “small republics of America” from continuing to fall prey to revolutions “requires that the United States should intervene and aid in the establishment and maintenance of a stable and honest government.” Such intervention, which conflicted with ideals of equality among states, was necessary to protect the national interest. “The integrity of other American nations,” Lansing declared, “is an incident, not an end.”⁹

Justifying his intervention in Mexico, Wilson believed that he was protecting the Mexicans from outside interference and the special interests of imperial nations that had originally caused the Mexican Revolution. As Lloyd Gardner has noted, what Mexico needed, Wilson thought, “was an American revolution, if it was to break free from foreign economic dominion, avoid a violent lurching back and forth between reaction and anarchy, and, most important, not set the wrong precedent as the world moved out from under the shadow of the dying imperial order.”¹⁰ Mexico could not do this unaided, and Wilson was determined to guide it. Mexico would have to learn to “take help when help is needed.”¹¹ As Wilson explained in a 1918 address to Mexican newspaper editors, “When we sent troops into Mexico, our sincere desire was nothing else than to assist you to get rid of a man who was making the settlement of your affairs for the time being impossible.”¹² Wilson believed that though the European nations might be ready for self-government, the inequality of peoples did not make this a universal principle.

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia made Wilson “sweat blood” and provided the greatest challenge to his vision of liberalism.¹³ Wilson led the United States into World War I to destroy autocratic rule and militarism in Europe. He hoped that by promoting liberal, democratic forces in Europe, he could, in conjunction with the guarantees of the League of Nations for collective security, solve the dual problem of war and revolution. The Bolshevik Revolution shifted the president’s attention from his battle to eliminate autarky to the concern with revolution and containing Bolshevism.

The dilemma Wilson faced, of maintaining order to prevent revolution without relying on the old order in Europe, was one that he could not resolve. Still, Wilson resisted as best he could so that the Great War would not have been fought in vain and that the conditions that bred revolutionary upheaval would be eliminated. As Wilson said of World War I while in Europe in early 1919, “This has indeed been a people’s war. It has been waged against absolutism and militarism, and these enemies of liberty must from this time forth be shut out from the possibility of working their cruel will upon mankind.” During the war he told his advisers that “the conservatives do not realize what forces are loose in the world at the present time. Liberalism is the only thing that can save civilization from chaos—from a flood of ultra-radicalism that will swamp the world.”¹⁴

Initially, Wilson thought the Bolshevik regime would collapse on its own because it was the antithesis of civilization. When it survived its first weeks and took Russia out of the war, Wilson turned to nonrecognition and containment. If it could not expand, the president was sure that Bolshevism would burn itself out and a more moderate political force would emerge from the chaos of Russia. The Allies and Secretary of State Robert Lansing wanted to help accelerate that process and advocated a direct military intervention in Russia. Lansing wrote Wilson that “nothing is to be gained by inaction, that it is simply playing into the Bolsheviki’s hands.” He believed that for the immediate future the only “hope for a stable Russian Government lies . . . in a military dictatorship backed by loyal disciplined troops.”¹⁵

Debate continues concerning Wilson’s decision to send troops to Russia in July 1918. Wilson often stated his belief that intervention would only add to the turmoil in Russia “rather than cure it” and justified his action as assisting the war effort against Germany and aiding the Czech Legion. He also noted that such action would strengthen the opposition forces in Russia to fight the Bolsheviks and allow the Czechs to “consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government.” The intervention had both anti-German and anti-Bolshevik objectives. Indirect as it may have been, the United States had intervened in Russia to contain the Bolshevik fire and possibly extinguish it.¹⁶

The president did, however, reject any expansion of the Allied military efforts. He compared military interventions to check revolutions to using a broom to sweep back the tide. In March 1919, for example, he told the other Allied leaders that the West should “let the Russians stew in their own juice until circumstances have made them wiser, and let us confine our efforts to keeping Bolshevism out of the rest of Europe.” Wilson held steadfast to his belief that if left to themselves free of outside interference, moderate Russians would topple the Bolshevik regime. “I do not fear Bolshevism,” Wilson stated in 1920, “but it must be resisted. Bolshevism is a mistake and must be resisted as all mistakes must be resisted. If left alone, it will destroy itself. It cannot survive because it is wrong.”¹⁷

Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby made much the same point when he outlined the official policy of the United States toward the Bolshevik regime on 10 August 1920, a policy that would remain in place until 1933. Colby wrote that American policy was based on the premise that the “present rulers of Russia do not rule by the will or the consent of any considerable portion of the Russian people.” Moreover, the “existing regime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith, and every usage and convention, underlying the whole structure of international law.” Disclaiming that U.S. nonrecognition had anything “to do with any particular political or social structure which the Russian people themselves may see fit to embrace,” Colby asserted that the “United States maintains unimpaired its faith in the Russian people.... That they will overthrow the existing anarchy, suffering and destitution we do not entertain the slightest doubt.”¹⁸

Wilson, trying to balance peacemaking and encouraging liberalism in Europe while responding to V. I. Lenin, began to compare autocratic rule favorably to Bolshevism. Campaigning for the ratification of the Versailles Treaty, Wilson spoke of the danger of postwar disorder and of power passing from the old order, one group of “old and distinguished and skillful” autocrats to new “amateur and cruel” dictators as a result of continued unrest.¹⁹ Order was needed to halt the progress of Bolshevik influence.

The revolution in Russia led to the establishment of “a closer monopoly of power in Petrograd and Moscow than there ever was in Berlin, and the thing that is intolerable is not that the Russian people are having their way but that another group of men more cruel than the Czar himself is controlling the destinies of that great people.” The mere presence of this government, which rules by “terror,” and the “poison of disorder, the poison of revolt, the poison of chaos” it spreads, must be checked. Appealing to the rising domestic fears of radicalism, Wilson proclaimed that the Bolshevik Revolution meant “government by terror, government by force, not government by vote.” It was, therefore, the “negation of everything that is American.”²⁰ By making such a comparison, Wilson opened a wedge for criticism of his own policy.

Republican leaders eagerly stepped into this opening. The Red Scare, too long seen as merely a sad closing to World War I or a prelude to Mc-Carthyism, had an immediate impact on the politics of the 1920s as the fear of revolution and radical thought became a fixt...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Thank God They’re on Our Side
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Epigraph
• INTRODUCTION
• 1 PEACE MUST FIRST BE RIVETED
• 2 THE ORIGINS OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY
• 3 FROM ACCOMMODATION TO APPEASEMENT TO WAR
• 4 DISREPUTABLE GOVERNMENTS OR ALLIES?
• 5 THANK GOD THEY’RE ON OUR SIDE
• 6 NEW FRONTIERS?
• EPILOGUE
• CONCLUSION
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index