Copts in Context

Negotiating Identity, Tradition, and Modernity

Nelly van Doorn-Harder

• Publisher: University of South Carolina Press
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781611177855
• Topic: Theologie & Religion
• Subtopic: Christliche Konfessionen

A comprehensive examination of this deeply traditional Christian religion as it confronts modernity

Though the Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt is among the oldest Christian communities in the world, it remained relatively unknown outside of Egypt for most of its existence. In the wake of the Arab Spring, however, this community was caught up in regional violence, and its predicament became a cause for concern around the world. Copts in Context examines the situation of the Copts as a minority faith in a volatile region and as a community confronting modernity while steeped in tradition.

Nelly van Doorn-Harder opens Coptic identity and tradition to a broad range of perspectives: historical, political, sociological, anthropological, and ethnomusicological. Starting with contemporary issues such as recent conflicts in Egypt, the volume works back to topics—among them the Coptic language, the ideals and tradition of monasticism, and church historiography—that while rooted in the ancient past, nevertheless remain vital in Coptic memory and understanding of culture and tradition. Contributors examine developments in the Coptic diaspora, in religious education and the role of children, and in Coptic media, as well as considering the varied nature of Coptic participation in Egyptian society and politics over millennia.

With many Copts leaving the homeland, preservation of Coptic history, memory, and culture has become a vital concern to the Coptic Church. These essays by both Coptic and non-Coptic scholars offer insights into present-day issues confronting the community and their connections to relevant themes from the past, demonstrating reexamination of that past helps strengthen modern-day Coptic life and culture.

PART 1

IDENTITY IN TRANSITION

THE COPTS IN THE JANUARY REVOLUTION OF 2011

Sebastian Elsässer

Copts experienced the popular uprising against the regime of Hosni Mubarak and the following turbulent period in many different ways, much like their Muslim compatriots. The emotions of the Coptic community ranged from elation and hope to puzzlement, consternation, and anxiety. Some were actively engaged, while others looked away and focused on their daily lives. The most significant, innovative effect of the January revolution on the Coptic community was the rise of a revolutionary current specific to the Copts, a current whose focus was not on merely participating in the revolution, but also on appropriating it for the cause of Coptic emancipation. For a brief period it succeeded not only in breaking the long-standing pattern of political restraint among the Copts, but also in its strategy of direct public and popular action that articulated community-related concerns and grievances, such as legal and administrative discrimination and the lack of public recognition of Coptic identity and culture.

This current did not remain unchallenged from either side. The Muslim majority was still reluctant to recognize the legitimacy of Coptic grievances, while the influential clergy of the Coptic Orthodox Church continued to advocate and pursue different ways of political action. Together with increasing public attention to sectarian conflict, the Coptic question was high on the political agenda in the months after the fall of Mubarak, thereby revealing problems in Muslim-Christian coexistence with unprecedented clarity. While these problems remained continuously on a high level throughout 2012 and 2013, the postrevolutionary initiatives to address them were pushed to the sidelines by the political power struggles that saw the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout 2012, its subsequent fall, and the return of the army in 2013.

The Coptic Question in the Mubarak Era

Coptic attitudes toward the Mubarak regime had been deeply ambiguous. Many were convinced that the Mubarak regime was not ideal but still better than the alternative possibilities, the worst being Islamist rule. However, such pragmatic considerations seldom concealed the broad sense of disappointment, alienation, and marginalization that beset many Copts as they reflected on their situation and their status in Egyptian society and politics. This general disillusionment was the result not only of personal experiences of discrimination, but also of a discourse of withheld rights and unfulfilled promises (amounting to persecution, according to some) that left a deep impact on the Church and community and inescapably shaped people’s worldview and political consciousness, whether they were personally subject to difficulties or not. Coptic concerns and grievances were based on several related issues, which can be analytically separated into six main aspects: (1) the communal or sectarian character of Egyptian society; (2) struggles over national identity; (3) the problematic institutional relationship between the Egyptian state and the religious communities; (4) the vicissitudes of legal pluralism; (5) the political marginalization of the Copts; and (6) the negative effects of authoritarian rule.

First, the processes of nation-building and social modernization fundamentally changed Egyptian society in many ways over the twentieth century, but they did not diminish the social role of the religious communities. Even at times when religion was socially and politically receding, communal religious life remained important for large parts of the population. The low rate of intermarriage is an indication of the continuing importance of sectarian boundaries.¹ During the last two generations, the impact of religious revivalism, among Muslims as well as Copts, has increased social separation among the middle and lower strata of society. A substantial majority of the present Coptic population was socialized primarily by the Church and the religious community, which determines their view of society and the world.² The radicalization of a distinct religious and ethnic identity among Copts corresponds with the increasing Islamization of the social environment.

Second, even though Egyptian nationalist discourse and practice has consistently attempted to mend sectarian divisions, articulations of Egyptian identity have remained vague and shifting. Most of them have tended toward a more or less eclectic combination of Egyptian, Arab, and Islamic nationalism. Copts have historically found different ways of inscribing their own communal identity and tradition into nationalist discourses. With the gradual rise of an Islamic reading of national history and identity—its strongest impact has been since the 1970s—this had become increasingly difficult. Approaches that treat Egypt’s long Christian legacy as largely insignificant have consequently had a growing impact on education and the state-controlled media.³ Feeling alienated, a growing number of Copts have adopted radical counternarratives, which went as far as rejecting the Arabic and Islamic identity of Egypt altogether, thereby widening the chasm.⁴ Even the moderate majority of Christian voices have stressed the urgent need for toning down Islamic references in education, as well as restricting aggressive Islamic daʿwa (religious propaganda), and assuring an adequate presence of Christian religious content in the state media.

Third, there is a constitutional and institutional imbalance: Islam has been the Egyptian state religion since the first modern constitution of 1923, which means that it has been fostered, as well as intensively controlled. Although Egyptian constitutions have guaranteed the freedom of religion, they have remained conspicuously silent on the precise status of Christianity and the Christian churches. In practice they enjoyed freedom of worship and a great degree of internal autonomy. However, they were also mostly excluded from government funding and other forms of official support. While separation from the state was not necessarily a drawback for the churches—many Muslims, especially those with Islamist leanings, complained about intrusive and often high-handed government supervision of the Islamic sphere—it had the effect of excluding Christians from any role in government policies concerning religion.

Fourth, an essential aspect of legal, social, and political communalism in modern Egypt has been the preservation of a plurality of family law codes for the different religious communities.⁵ However, Islam stands above the other religions as Shari’a is considered the governing law in matters concerning family and personal status. This obviously implies discrimination against Christians and Christian religion: A Christian man cannot marry a Muslim woman, and the state authorities do not recognize conversion from Islam to Christianity. However, as the Coptic Orthodox clergy always made it a priority to defend the holy sacrament of marriage and its own central role in regulating family issues against secular intrusions, they have acquiesced with the existing legal system and rejected civil marriage. As Muslim religious authorities were equally disinclined to changing the system, it was preserved with all its contradictions and gray zones. While this may conform to the prevalence of communal orientation and conservative religious values in Egyptian society, it has deprived the Egyptian state of nonpartisan and mutually acceptable legal norms by which to arbitrate the increasingly frequent conflicts over conversion and interreligious relationships.⁶

Fifth, after a period of successful political integration under the leadership of lay notables in the 1920s, Coptic engagement in national politics declined, especially after the 1952 “revolution.” The post-1952 Republican regime was dominated by an almost exclusively Muslim military clique, even though, at least in its Nasserite phase, it displayed a strong public commitment to the equality of all citizens. The drift to a sectarian logic was gradual; it first became evident in the late 1970s, when the leadership of the Coptic Orthodox Church assumed the role of speaking for the Coptic population to the state in the face of the Islamizing policies of President Anwar Sadat. Rather than counterbalancing this trend by promoting Coptic participation, the regime of Hosni Mubarak surreptitiously strengthened political sectarianism. In practice this meant that negotiations of critical issues between the Church and the regime took place behind closed doors, coupled with polite exchange of formalities in public. This approach aimed at creating an appearance of national unity while keeping the vexing issues of discrimination, marginalization, and religious violence out of the public eye. In hindsight problems were concealed and solutions delayed, while social and religious tensions were boiling under the surface and erupting more frequently during the last decade of Mubarak’s rule. A large part of the Coptic population accepted the political role of the Church leadership and respected Patriarch Shenouda III (in office 1971–2012) for his struggle to defend Coptic rights and interests. However, neither were they satisfied with the concessions the Church was able to extract from the regime, nor had they given up on aspirations of genuine political participation.

And, finally, authoritarian rule under Mubarak and his predecessors had consequences for Muslims and Christians alike. Among its corollaries were the nontransparency of political decision making, widespread human-rights violations, administrative inefficiency, arbitrariness, and corruption. Bad governance exacerbated the existing legal, institutional, and social tensions. It created an environment in which religious discrimination based on individual prejudice could proceed virtually unchecked, often under the pretext of secretive “security” practices.⁷ In case of sensitive issues, for example, church building or religiously motivated violence, Copts often complained that state authorities, including the weak judiciary, were apparently more eager to appease Muslim extremists than to safeguard the legal rights of the victims. It is important to note that the lack of basic rights was not a unique experience to the Copts in a system in which legal claims against the state and others could only be enforced with the help of patronage and bribery.

Copts in the Uprising against the Mubarak Regime

Several of these aspects demonstrate that the Coptic question was not of recent making but was still in many ways symptomatic for the state of Egypt under the late Mubarak regime. In spite of the impact of the Internet and press liberalization since the mid-1990s, vital public debates made little difference to the stagnant political process. The regime’s typical approach was to deny the existence of problems or conceal them behind nationalist rhetoric. Political action was usually erratic and evidently served the ultimate purpose of stabilizing the regime. Frustration and indignation over this state of affairs were not confined to the Copts. In the shockwave caused by the Alexandria terrorist attack on January 1, 2011, even Muslim Egyptians who did not sympathize with Coptic demands became concerned about the impact of the government’s mismanagement of sectarian tensions on society and on Egypt’s reputation in the world.

Thus it was not surprising that Muslim-Christian coexistence and the challenge of sectarian strife became important themes in the uprising against the Mubarak regime and remained on the public agenda during the following months.⁸ The symbolism of national unity and religious tolerance that characterized the demonstrations was certainly magnified by the media coverage. It was nevertheless a faithful reflection of the general spirit of the Tahrir movement. There was a consensus that political, social, and religious contradictions had to be temporarily set apart in a united struggle against the regime, based on the common demands of freedom, dignity, and social justice. Regardless of actual Coptic participation, the movement embraced the theme of national unity and claimed to represent all Egyptians, Muslims as well as Christians. In fact, during the first week of the uprising, during its most violent days, from January 25 (“the Day of Rage”) until January 28 (“the Friday of Rage”), Coptic presence was limited. An indication of this fact was that, from these events to February 2 and 3 (the so-called Battle of the Camel) more than eight hundred people were killed in Cairo and other Egyptian cities, and only fourteen of them were Christians.⁹ Faithful to their quietist political stance, the Coptic Orthodox clergy had explicitly cautioned their flock against participating in the Day of Rage protests. Some reportedly organized special services and activities to keep the Coptic youth off the streets.¹⁰ It is interesting that skepticism also prevailed among Coptic activists, chiefly sparked by the fear that an uprising against the regime might lead to chaos and provide an opportunity for Islamists to seize power.¹¹ Most were convinced that a popular movement against Mubarak would be dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, and many changed their attitude toward the revolution when this was not the case.

However, when Christians did take to the streets to participate in sit-ins from the very beginning, they were uplifted by an overwhelming sense of solidarity. “When [we] were in the square, we were incredibly happy,” remembered a Christian protester. “We thought that there wouldn’t be any more discrimination against Copts, that life will finally be good and fair.”¹² Building human chains around praying Muslims was one way for Christians to participate in creating interreligious solidarity. Beyond Tahrir square, Muslims and Christians jointly formed popular committees and militias to protect their neighborhoods. Despite the security breakdown following January 28, there were no significant transgressions against churches in the period before March 2011.¹³

When things settled down in Tahrir square, during the second week of protests, Christians became visible in the public prayer rituals.¹⁴ It is interesting that Christian protesters—similar to the secular Muslims who led the movement—did not object to the widespread use of religious slogans and symbols as instruments of resistance:¹⁵ “Prayer is a basic element of Egyptian identity. We were all happy to see our Muslim compatriots lined up for prayer, in order to call on God and ask Him to grant our rights…. And when we were singing our Christian hymns (tarānīm), they stood next to us and listened to us. Often, I heard them join in with our ‘Amen’ so that God might protect our fatherland Egypt.”¹⁶

Roughly speaking, there were three different groups of Christian protesters: (1) members and supporters of leftist and liberal parties and youth movements, human-rights and civil-society activists; (2) Coptic activists, people who primarily and exclusively engaged in the defense of Coptic rights and interests; and (3) non-affiliated people, many of whom had never engaged in any sort of activism before.

Priests who came to Tahrir square came independent from their respective churches, but the largest part of the Coptic-Orthodox clergy refrained from visible revolutionary engagement. This was not just an expression of hesitation and political caution in uncertain times; it also signaled a deep-seated skepticism toward “street politics” in general, which did not go away after Mubarak had been forced out of office. If the church leadership had a consistent political stance in the transitional period, it was that order should be maintained at all costs. Frequent and pertinacious demonstrations and sit-ins were considered “outside the bounds of the freedom of expression” and “damaging to Egypt’s reputation.” ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Series Editor’s Preface
• Preface
• Note on Transliteration
• Introduction: Creating and Maintaining Tradition in Modernity
• Part 1: Identity in Transition
• Part 2: Challenges of the Diaspora
• Part 3: Tradition
• Notes
• Selected Bibliography
• Contributors
• Index