Seneca Philosophus

Jula Wildberger, Marcia L. Colish

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9783110373554
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ancient & Classical Philosophy

Addressing classicists, philosophers, students, and general readers alike, this volume emphasizes the unity of Seneca's work and his originality as a translator of Stoic ideas in the literary forms of imperial Rome. It features a vitalizing diversity of contributors from different generations, disciplines, and research cultures. Several prominent Seneca scholars publishing in other languages are for the first time made accessible to anglophone readers.

dp n="349" folio="343" ?

Having the Right to Philosophize: A New Reading of Seneca, De Vita Beata 1.1–6.2

Matheus De Pietro
Universidade Estadual de Campinas

The repetitive character of Senecan style was criticized not only by modern scholars.⁸⁹⁴ Most notably, Marcus Cornelius Fronto highlights this feature as a one of the many stylistic flaws he finds in Seneca’s works.⁸⁹⁵ Seneca himself, however, held a different opinion. In several passages throughout his prose writings he expresses the belief that presenting the same idea repeatedly and in different ways is desirable from a didactic point of view. Others have shown that such repetition may in fact be one of Seneca’s tools of psychagogy.⁸⁹⁶ The thesis I wish to develop in the present paper concerns an apparent paradox. Although Seneca’s stylistic “flaws” were often seen as a sign of his shortcomings as a philosopher — or at least as an inappropriate mode of presentation for serious philosophy⁸⁹⁷ — his ostentatious use of such variation in De vita beata has a function which contradicts that assumption: It showcases his skill in treating important philosophical topics.

I will argue that the repeated unfolding and condensing of the concept of happiness in De vita beata 3.2–6.2 may be considered as Seneca’s deliberate demonstration of his mastery of Stoic doctrine and thus of his standing as a philosopher. This hypothesis is supported by several different features exhibited by the text, the first of which is the structural disposition of the work as a whole. Second, one can point to the context in which it was written, which may have required some form of discourse justifying the author’s self-characterization as a Stoic philosopher. Third, the initial part of the work draws attention to Seneca in contrast to everyone else. Fourth, there is his insistence on the inadequacy of all other definitions and the consequent need that the author himself provide one of his own as a solid basis for the subsequent debate on the topic of happiness. The fifth and most relevant evidence in support of my thesis is the multifaceted definition extending from sections 3.2 to 6.2 itself. It displays to striking properties: On the one hand, it contains several methodological remarks which draw attention to the act of composition. Seneca ensures that the reader cannot help but be aware of what he is doing and, at the same time, emphatically clarifies that the passage, however repetitive, was deliberately written in this manner.⁸⁹⁸ On the other hand, the multiple definitions provided are not a mere accumulation of doxographic notices. Rather, they develop different aspects of the Stoic doctrine concerning happiness. By offering the same definition over and over, in different formulations, vocabulary, and images, and by making the reader conscious of that process, Seneca effectively demonstrates that he fully understands the concept being discussed and does not just parrot what was said by former Stoics.

I.

Before arguing that the passage serves as a demonstration of Seneca’s expertise, we must clarify why he may have felt the need to supply such a proof of his skills in the first place. In other words, why must the author produce evidence that he is a competent philosopher? Seneca was often criticized for his lack of philosophical authority. He did not exhibit the frugal and detached lifestyle usually expected of a philosopher, as it was manifested by Socrates, unquestionably the most significant role model for someone whose profession was the quest for wisdom. Instead, Seneca was one of the wealthiest and most powerful men of his time — while professing a doctrine which regarded political power and material goods as morally indifferent. This fact led to the charge of hypocrisy, and his status as a proper philosopher (i.e. a philosopher who is consistent and has expert knowledge of the doctrines he professes) was called into question. It is probable that De vita beata was written as a response to accusations of this nature.⁸⁹⁹ This may be inferred from information in the text itself. Beginning from section 17.1, the work becomes a defense of the entire class of philosophers against generic accusations of inconsistency. Even though De vita beata’s genre remains uncertain,⁹⁰⁰ one may at least, acknowledge that it has a strong apologetic tone.

Attested ancient accusations directed specifically at his lack of philosophical authority are rare and, for the most part, posthumous.⁹⁰¹ What we do find in plenty, however, are criticisms that draw attention to Seneca’s apparent inconsistency.⁹⁰² The best documented accusation we have today, coming from the former consul suffectus Suillius Rufus, was leveled in public and certainly a blow to Seneca’s reputation. Furthermore, as Griffin argues, Suillius’ charge may have been a reflection of a general opinion about Seneca’s life held by many of his peers.⁹⁰³ Both kinds of criticism, however, are ultimately grounded on the same premise: Hypocrisy (e.g. not practicing what one preaches) or inconsistency (e.g. upholding different values at different times) are severe flaws that no serious philosopher can exhibit and therefore incompatible with that status.

Indeed, if coherence was regarded as sign of a correct understanding and practice of the tenets of one’s school,⁹⁰⁴ it was even more relevant for a Stoic, whose very goal as a philosopher was to live harmoniously and lead a thoroughly consistent life.⁹⁰⁵ Thus we understand how deeply a charge of incoherence or hypocrisy affected Seneca: It carried the implicit message not only that he did not practice what he was preaching but also that he did not understand what he was preaching. Had he done so, he would certainly have known that Stoics regarded wealth as indifferent for a happy life and not taken the trouble to acquire so much of it. For someone in Seneca’s position, a simple explanation of why he was not hypocritical would therefore not have been sufficient. In this case, it was necessary to provide not only a clarification of the misunderstandings concerning his lifestyle but also some evidence that he actually knew the doctrine he was teaching so eagerly.

II.

That Seneca presents himself in his writings as an expert in Stoic philosophy is nothing new, and at any rate nothing exceptional or unexpected. This paper aims to highlight the fact that references to his authority either as a Stoic or as a philosopher, which are more or less implicit in other texts, have a specific rhetorical function and take on an apologetic force in De vita beata. I will point out various features of the text that invite us to read De vita beata 1.1–6.2 as a statement of philosophical proficiency and indicate possible effects Seneca may have intended to achieve with them. The evidence can be divided into two broad categories: textual structure and philosophical content. Naturally, there are instances in which these categories overlap, but they must be analyzed separately for a clearer exposition of the effects achieved by these different means. I begin with a structural feature.

De vita beata’s initial sections exhibit a referential structure that starts from a broader range of social groups or categories of individuals and reaches its final point in only one person, Seneca. The author opens the work with a reference to all human beings: Even though all want to live happily, they have muddled ideas about how such a condition can be achieved. The author then proceeds to outline the content of his work in form of a partitio, the division and preview of the content that is to follow (Vit. beat. 1.1), and immediately introduces the first of his explanatory aims, namely to dismiss false conceptions of happiness and produce a definition of correct one for the reader.

In a narrowing sequence, Seneca limits the range of persons whose judgment can trusted until the only one that remains is he himself:

omnes (1.1)
populus (1.4, 1.5)
maior pars (2.1)
pluris (2.1)
turba (2.1)
vulgus (2.2)
chlamydati et coronati (2.2)
alii [philosophi] (3.2)
Stoici proceris (3.2)
Seneca (3.2, 3.3)

It is certainly not insignificant that the passage dealing with the dismissal of false conceptions of happiness has a centripetal directionality with humankind forming the widest circle and Seneca at the midpoint. The rejection of sources for knowledge about the conception of happiness begins with “all” (omnes), then trust is denied first to the people (populus), then to the majority (maior pars), the many (pluris), and the masses (turba and vulgus). He further refuses to attribute correct conceptual knowledge to two specific subsets of the elite, to those who are powerful (chlamydati)⁹⁰⁶ and acclaimed (coronati).⁹⁰⁷ This suggests that even those commonly regarded as “happy” have in fact no idea of what happiness is. The circle tightens even more when Seneca mentions only the philosophers, who, unlike the previous groups, are professionally bound to attempt a reasonable and well-grounded definition of happiness. Even their conceptions are incorrect and can easily be refuted by the author, which leaves the reader with the impression that only the Stoics can provide the right interpretation of the debated concept. But even this is not exactly what Seneca intends to offer. Instead of giving a complete account of the Stoic position, the author declares that he will adduce or omit certain aspects in conformity with his personal judgment. At this point the reader can already infer that he will not receive the Stoic opinion, but rather the Stoic opinion through Seneca’s lens.

It is important that this “narrowing” of the circle of competent judges occurs not only at a purely numerical level, but also concerns the value of the opinions of the mentioned groups, so that, at the end, Seneca draws attention not only to himself but also to his opinion about the matter. He appears as the one whose interpretation the reader should hear. It is a Stoic account, but through Seneca’s voice and according to his design. The textual structure thus focuses attention on the author as a source of philosophical expertise.

Another effect produced by the features described above is the creation of a very particular situation at De vita beata 3.2. The reader’s attention has been drawn to the presence of the author Seneca himself, and now he expects that this author will define the concept of happiness at last. The most striking feature of the following sections (3.2 to 6.2) is their repetitive character. Seneca does not merely condense, expand, and transfigure his definition of the concept, but he is also explici...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright page
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• Getting to Goodness: Reflections on Chapter 10 of Brad Inwood, Reading Seneca
• Seneca on Prolepsis: Greek Sources and Cicero’s Influence
• Did Seneca Understand Medea? A Contribution to the Stoic Account of Akrasia
• Seneca on Acting against Conscience
• Seneca on the Analysis and Therapy of Occurrent Emotions
• Double Vision and Cross-Reading in Seneca’s Epistulae Morales and Naturales Quaestiones
• Freedom in Seneca: Some Reflections on the Relationship between Philosophy and Politics, Public and Private Life
• Torture in Seneca’s Philosophical Works: Between Justification and Condemnation
• Gender-Based Differential Morbidity and Moral Teaching in Seneca’s Epistulae morales
• My Family Tree Goes Back to the Romans: Seneca’s Approach to the Family in the Epistulae Morales
• Honeybee Reading and Self-Scripting: Epistulae Morales 84
• The Philosopher as Craftsman: A Topos between Moral Teaching and Literary Production
• Sententiae in Seneca
• Having the Right to Philosophize: A New Reading of Seneca, De Vita Beata 1.1–6.2
• In Praise of Tubero’s Pottery: A Note on Seneca, Ep. 95.72–73 and 98.133
• Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius: Hypocrisy as a Way of Life
• The Epicurus Trope and the Construction of a “Letter Writer” in Seneca’s Epistulae Morales
• Abbreviations
• Index of Passages Cited
• Index of Modern Authors
• General Index