1 Introduction
The final vocation of the human race is moral
perfection,
so far as it is accomplished through human
freedom
Collins, 27: 470
âKant was enough of a child of the eighteenth century to be cosmopolitan, not nationalistic, in his feelingâ, John Dewey wrote in 1915 (Dewey 1970: 98). With this statement, Dewey reproduces the familiar clichĂ© of the allegedly âcosmopolitan Enlightenmentâ. Yet recent studies emphasize the diversity and complexity of the term âcosmopolitanâ in the eighteenth century, stress that many intellectuals just displayed a pro-European attitude, often equated cosmopolitanism with moderate patriotism, and were frequently challenged by critics (see among others Albrecht 2005, Cavallar 2011). Secondly, Dewey dogmatically assumes that Kantâs cosmopolitanism was ânothing butâ a reflex or mirror of widespread intellectual stances. Deweyâs assessment is dogmatic by standards of Kantâs critical epistemology (the causal relationship is never proven), and this study will try to show that Kantâs theory of cosmopolitanism is the outcome of his own systematically developed practical philosophy, not a mere repetition or copy of widely held Enlightenment beliefs. Third, Dewey does not even attempt to understand Kantâs systematic approach, which is not a matter of feeling, but of rational argumentation, not a matter of unthinking copy-and-paste, but of profound reflection, of an analysis of possible alternative positions, and a careful reworking of oneâs own thoughts over the years (for a full analysis see Kleingeld 2012). Finally, Deweyâs attempt to situate Kant historically (as a child of the Enlightenment) in turn invites historical contextualization. The context of Deweyâs assessment is the hysteria of the Great War, when oneâs enemies and their most formidable thinkers were usually perceived as illiberal, militaristic, nationalistic, and politically extremist. German authors in turn offered similar biased judgements of thinkers allegedly belonging to the allied camp; these Germans were apparently even more radical. And they sometimes believed that Kant should not belong to the camp of the âtrue Germansâ. It is interesting to note here that some German intellectuals before 1945 almost hated Kant for what they perceived as a cosmopolitan attitude or disposition, and believed he should have become an ardent German nationalist instead (cf. Cavallar 1992: 247â 52, 433 â 5, 445 â 50).
dp n="12" folio="2" ? Roughly one hundred years later, the intellectual climate has considerably changed. For most scholars in the U. S., Germany and elsewhere, the term cosmopolitanism is no longer an insult. Intellectuals outside Germany have started to appreciate Kantâs cosmopolitanism, among them politicians, political scientists like Garrett Brown, philosophers like Martha Nussbaum or Kant scholars like Pauline Kleingeld or Robert Louden. Scholars have started to investigate into the ramifications of the concept in Kantâs philosophy (see among others Bacin et al. 2013). Theories of cosmopolitanism, widely discussed in recent years, are the background of this new focus (see, among others, Fine 2009, Baker 2013, Brown and Held 2010, Halldenius 2010, Lutz-Bachmann, Niederberger and Schink 2010 and Cavallar 2011). Historical studies of the concept are rare, but Kant is usually seen as one of the founding fathers of contemporary cosmopolitanism (see for instance Cheneval 2002, Brown 2009 and Kleingeld 2012). At roughly the same time, cosmopolitan educational theories have been developed, and vigorously discussed (recent contributions include Hansen 2010, McCarty 2010, Nussbaum 2010, Todd 2009, Waks 2009 and 2010, Zembylas 2010). Finally, there has been a renewed interest in Kant and his educational theory (see Breun 2002, Kauder 1999, Koch 2003, Moran 2009, Surprenant 2010, and Roth and Surprenant 2012 among others). Kantâs omnipresence in contemporary cosmopolitan discourses contrasts with the fact that little is known about the historical origins of his cosmopolitan theory.
Kantâs Embedded Cosmopolitanism argues that many contemporary interpretations are potentially anachronistic and one-sided. It examines the historical context of Kantâs cosmopolitanism, and focuses on its neglected pedagogical and republican dimension. It argues that Kantâs cosmopolitanism should be understood as rooted in oneâs particular community and thus embedded. Inspired by Rousseau, Kant tried to develop a synthesis of republican patriotism and republican as well as thin moral cosmopolitanism. In contrast to static forms of cosmopolitanism prevalent in traditional conceptions, Kant belonged to a generation of Enlightenment reformers who conceived the tensions between embedded, local attachments and cosmopolitan obligations in dynamic terms. Kant in particular posited duties to promote the legal, moral and religious communities, to establish common laws or cosmopolitan institutions, and to develop a cosmopolitan disposition. This is the cornerstone of Kantâs cosmopolitanism, and the key concept is the vocation (Bestimmung) of the individual as well as of the human species. Since trying to realize or at least approach this vocation was a long-term, arduous and slow process, Kant turned to the pedagogical implications of this âprojectâ and spelled them out in his later writings. Embedding Kant in his proper late eighteenth century context, the book analyses possible influences, in particular the writings of Rousseau and educational reformer Basedow. In short, rather than jumping to the facile and Whiggish conclusion that Kantâs cosmopolitanism merely anticipated contemporary forms of cosmopolitanism, the book emphasizes possible differences and the uniqueness of Kantâs cosmopolitan theory, even by late eighteenth-century standards.
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the concept and theories of cosmopolitanism and of cosmopolitan educational theories. So far there has been only one comprehensive interpretation of Kantâs cosmopolitanism, Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship (Cambridge University Press 2012). The main theses of this excellent book are innovative, well argued, and plausible. Yet her book also has a few shortcomings: Rousseau is presented as a critic of cosmopolitanism and is ignored by and large; his possible influence on Kant is not discussed. While Kleingeldâs book is very strong in contrasting Kantâs views with those of his contemporaries, the author has little to say about the moral and educational dimensions of Kantâs cosmopolitan theory. Finally, I claim that Kantâs concept of an ethical commonwealth is deeply rooted in his understanding of Christianity and the role the Christian churches (clearly favoured over other religious traditions). In Kleingeldâs account, the ethical commonwealth, together with the concept of the highest good, are presented as fully secularized notions.
To my knowledge, only one monograph and one dissertation have so far been published on cosmopolitan education. Sharon Toddâs Toward an Imperfect Education. Facing Humanity, Rethinking Cosmopolitanism (Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers 2009) occasionally refers to Kant. Todd bypasses Kantâs theory of moral formation and its cosmopolitan dimension, and instead offers a brief interpretation of his cosmopolitan right. Matthew J. Haydenâs dissertation Cosmopolitan Education and Moral Education: Forging Moral Beings Under Conditions of Global Uncertainty (Dissertation Columbia University 2012) develops a contemporary theory of moral cosmopolitan education based on the âfundamental fact of shared humanityâ (p. 18). He is above all inspired by authors such as Arendt, Nagel, Habermas and Mouffe; Kant plays an insignificant role.
Felicitas Munzelâs excellent Kantâs Conception of Pedagogy. Toward Education for Freedom (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press 2012) sometimes overlaps with what I try to do in this study. Munzelâs key claim is that Kantâs doctrines of method (Methodenlehren) in the three critiques contain a âfourth critiqueâ (cf. XVf., XIX, 232). According to Munzel, critical philosophy is in fact a pedagogical project, âessentially a paideiaâ (XXI), which is the programme of cultivating the mind with the goal of wisdom and fulfilling oneâs vocation, namely autonomy and inner freedom. âFrom Kantâs perspective, the basic pedagogical task is not the inculcation of a principle (such as the prevalent effort in the eighteenth century to curb the detrimental effects of the workings of self-interest by instilling some variant of âlove thy neighborâ), but rather the task is the preparation of the mind to exercise its inherent principle of freedomâ (XX). Although Munzelâs monograph and my study sometimes overlap, there are different emphases: Munzelâs goal is to assign Kant a place âamong the great pedagogical thinkersâ (ibid., 83, cf. 181) and to explore his educational theory, whereas I try to investigate into Kantâs cosmopolitanism (and its educational ramifications). In the first part of her study, Munzel situates Kantâs pedagogy within the divergent educational theories of the 18th century (5 â 183); my own focus is almost exclusively on Rousseau, Basedow and Spalding. Munzel is interested in inner, moral freedom as the transcendental condition of the possibility of external, political freedom: true political freedom presupposes moral freedom (cf. XVI, 83, 171â 9, 233). My own approach looks at the issue from a different angle: external freedom helps humans to cultivate their dispositions and thus also their moral potentials as free moral agents (see chapters 6 and 7). Our respective studies definitely overlap when Munzel develops âArticles for a Cosmopolitan Educationâ (cf. 285â93).
1.1 Types of cosmopolitanisms
Cosmopolitanism is the belief or the theory that all humans, regardless of race, gender, religion or political affiliation belong to, or should belon...