The Highest Good in Kant's Philosophy

Thomas Höwing

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9783110392746
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophie
• Subtopic: Éthique et philosophie morale

The idea of a final end of human conduct – the highest good – plays an important role in Kant's philosophy. Unlike his predecessors Kant defines the highest good as a combination of two heterogeneous elements, namely virtue and happiness. This conception lies at the centre of some of the most influential Kantian doctrines such as his famous "moral argument" for the rationality of faith, his conception of the unity of reason and his views concerning the final end of nature as well as the historical progress of mankind. To be sure, the different treatments of the highest good in Kant's work have led to a great deal of discussion among his readers. Besides Kant's arguments for moral faith, recent debate has focused on the place of the highest good within Kant's moral theory, on the antinomy of pure practical reason, and on the idea of the primacy of practical reason. This collection of new essays attempts to re-evaluate Kant's doctrine of the highest good and to determine its relevance for contemporary philosophy.

IThe Concept of the Highest Good and its Place in Kant’s Moral Theory

Federica Basaglia

The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason

In the second chapter of the Analytic in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant introduces the notion of the “good” as an “object of pure practical reason” (KpV 5:57 f.). In the Dialectic, he defines the “highest good” as the “unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason” (KpV 5:108.11 f.) and as “the whole object of pure practical reason” (KpV 5:109.21 f.). These two elements of Kant’s moral theory have traditionally, and rightly, been connected. In this paper, I intend to point out some fundamental differences between these two elements of Kant’s moral philosophy – differences which, in my opinion, can help us to better understand them.

In order to do so, it is first of all necessary to understand what an “object of pure practical reason” is. The first and second sections of the paper will serve this purpose: by taking a closer look at Kant’s response to Hermann Andreas Pistorius’s criticism of his conception of a “good will”, which occurs in the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason, I will try to clarify the topic of the second chapter of the Analytic and the definition of “objects of pure practical reason”. In the third part of the paper, and on the basis of the results of the first and second sections, I will compare the notion of an “object of pure practical reason” with that of the “highest good” in order to underline their essential differences. I will argue that, despite the similarities and systematic connections between these two notions – such as, for example, the fact that they both refer to objects of pure practical reason – there are also crucial differences between them. The notion of the good presented in the Analytic refers exclusively to what can be judged to be good in itself (and hence belongs exclusively to morality), whereas the highest good refers to the realization not only of morality, but also of (empirical) happiness, which, according to the premises of Kant’s moral philosophy, is not part of morality.

1Kant’s Reply to Pistorius in the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason1

In his Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant refers to an objection from a “truth-loving and acute” critic of his moral philosophy, who complains about the fact that the notion of the “good” is not the foundation of the practical law in Kantian theory (KpV 5:8.25–10.2; cf. Sala 2004: 63; Beck 1995: 27; Bittner/Cramer 1975: 16). The critic Kant is referring to is the German parish priest, theologian and philosopher, Hermann Andreas Pistorius.2 In his review of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Pistorius opposes the Kantian conception, according to which nothing can possibly be called “good” in an absolute and unconditional sense except the “good will”. As a matter of fact, what makes a will good is, according to Kant, not what it might bring about, or its “fitness to attain some proposed end”, but solely the way it wills: the good will is good in itself (GMS 4:393.5–394.31).

By contrast, Pistorius holds the view that a coherent and meaningful moral philosophy should instead start with the notion of what has to be considered good: only on the basis of this definition can we judge whether a will is good or not. Pistorius doesn’t mean that “good” is what is commonly accepted to be good: the moral philosopher, in his opinion, has to investigate the reasons on the basis of which something is considered good and must decide whether they are in fact good reasons. What Pistorius finds problematic in Kant’s view is the definition of “good will” as a will that is good independently of its objects:

“I wish that the author had chosen to discuss above all the general concept of that which is good, and to determine more closely what he means by this, for we obviously must come to an agreement on this before we make something of the absolute worth of a good will. […] I do not see here how one can accept something as being utterly and in an absolute sense good, or call something good, when in fact it is good for nothing, just as I do not see how one can accept the idea of an absolutely good will, considered merely in itself. The will should be considered as good only with respect to some sort of object, not with respect to its principle or to a law, for the sake of which it acts” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 27; third emphasis is mine, my translation).3

According to Pistorius, if, following Kant, the will were good exclusively in virtue of the principle or law guiding it, the question whether this principle or law is good or bad would remain open:

“[…] [T]o establish a will as the good, is it merely sufficient that it act according to some principle or another, or from respect for some law, be it good or evil? Impossible. It must therefore be a good principle, a good law, the following of which makes a will good. The question “what is good?” turns back around, and if we have pushed it back from the will to the law, then we must answer it in a sufficient way here; i.e. we must eventually come to some kind of object or to an ultimate end of the law, and we must avail ourselves of what is material, because for us neither a formal will nor a formal law will suffice” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 27; my emphasis, my translation).

An analysis of morality, according to Pistorius, should start with an analysis of the concept of “good” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 33). To do so, the moral philosopher must first consider the question whether anything exists that is universally, without exception, and in every circumstance good for feeling and thinking beings like humans. This something – and not the Kantian good will determined by a merely formal principle – should be called the “highest and absolute good” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 33). For Pistorius, such an absolute highest good is grounded in the collective nature of human beings and in their universal interest as rational beings, because something can be good for a human being only if it accords with both. Through this notion of the highest good, it is finally possible to develop the highest moral principle and to define a will which acts in accordance with it as good:

“If, through this examination, something is discovered that is universally, without exception and in every cirtumstance good for feeling and thinking beings, this somenthing must be called the highest and absolute good. If there is such a highest good, then a collective nature of all rational beings must also exist, in which is grounded a universal interest, for only in accordance with the former and in conformity with the latter can something be good for such a being at all” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 33, my translation).

Hence, for Pistorius, in order to define “good” – i.e. the concept of “good” – the moral philosopher must first investigate the highest object (or final aim) of human action. Moral investigation should start with an investigation into the highest good for human beings, i. e. that which human beings should realize, or at least try to realize, through their actions. Only after having defined the highest good are we able to establish – in accordance with its definition – whether other things are good as well. In other words, according to Pistorius, something is “good” – a good principle of action or a good will – only in virtue of its relation to the highest good.

In the Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason (KpV 5:8.25–10.2), Kant claims to answer this objection in the second chapter of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, to which he gives the title “On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason”. Accordingly, in the following section, I will present my analysis of this chapter, in which Kant defines “good” and “evil” as objects of pure practical reason.

2The Objects of Pure Practical Reason

Before I turn to the interpretation of the second chapter of the Analytic and attempt to understand what “good” and “evil” as objects of pure practical reason might be, it is necessary to clarify what an object of practical reason is for Kant.4 In fact, Kant does not deliver any precise definition of an “object of the will” or an “object of practical reason” (the various German expressions Kant uses here being the following: Gegenstand der Handlung, Gegenstand/Objekt des Wollens, Gegenstand/Objekt der praktischen Vernunft and Gegenstand des Willens). In fact, these expressions seem to be equivalent for Kant. They refer generally to a determination of the faculty of desire by empirical inclinations, or to the empirically determined will.

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, he explicitly defines an “object of the will” as the motivation of the will (Bewegursache, GMS 4:458.16–18) or its matter (Materie, GMS 4:461.29 f.). Kant explains that we have an interest in the object of an action when the will is determined to action by empirical inclinations. In the case of an empirically determined action, what moves us to act is what we want to accomplish through our action, i. e. our purpose; our interest is a pathological interest in the object of our action stemming from a certain inclination or desire. In this case, practical reason only provides the rule in accordance with which we should act in order to satisfy our need. In the case of moral action, the motive (Beweggrund) of practical reason is not what we want to achieve through the action, but the moral law itself; the interest is a practical interest in the action: we are interested in the action itself, not in its purpose (GMS 4:413.26–414.36). In both cases, I think, it can be held that the matter of the will, its object, is the purpose or end (Zweck) of the action.5

In the second Critique, an “object of the will” indicates the “matter” of a practical principle, which can become the ground of determination (Bestimmungsgrund) of the will. Where this occurs, the determination of the will is non-moral and heteronomous. In cases where the will is not determined by the object, the determination is a moral, autonomous one.

“If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he can think of them only as principles that contain the determining ground of the will not by their matter but only by their form. The matter of a practical principle is the object of the will. This is either the determining ground of the will or it is not. If it is the determining ground of the will, then the rule of the will is subject to an empirical condition (to the relation of the determining representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure), and so is not a practical law. Now, all that remains of the law if one separates from it everything material, that is, every object of the will (as its determining ground), is the mere form of giving universal law” (KpV 5:27.3–14; first and third emphases are mine)

Other passages in the second Critique help us to understand what Kant means when, in the above-quoted passage, he claims that the will is subject to empirical conditions when its object is its ground of determination. At the beginning of the first Theorem, for instance, Kant affirms that all practical principles that presuppose an object (i.e. a matter) of the faculty of desire as a ground of the determination of the will are empirical practical principles and cannot function as practical moral laws (KpV 5:21.14–17).6 Moreover, he clarifies: “By ‘the matter of the faculty of desire’ I understand an object whose reality is desired” (KpV 5:21.17f.). Only a few pages prior to this, Kant defines a practical rule as “always a product of reason because it prescribes action as a means to an effect” (KpV 5:20.6–8).

These passages show clearly that for Kant the object of the will is what one intends to produce through the action, i.e. its end or purpose. Independently of the morality of the action, human beings need a practical principle, i. e. a rule given by reason. This rule prescribes the action, which is needed in order to reach what the will aims at (its object). Thus, the object of the will – the object of the faculty of desire – is also the object of the practical principle, since the latter is a rule that reason prescribes to the will in order for it to reach what it aims at. This object can be what moves us to act, that is, the ground of determination of the action, as in the case of non-moral (heteronomic) action. In the case of moral action, which is autonomous, i.e. only determined by pure reason, the ground of determination is not material, i.e. not the object of the will, but the moral law itself.

Kant, however, does not deny that moral actions also have objects, i. e. that they serve a material purp...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Acknowledgments
• Contents
• Introduction
• Abbreviations and Methods of Reference
• Notes on Contributors
• I The Concept of the Highest Good and its Place in Kant’s Moral Theory
• II Kant’s Moral Arguments and the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason
• III Epistemology, Science, and Metaphysics
• Index of Names
• Subject Index
• Fußnoten