Existence, Fiction, Assumption

Mauro Antonelli, Marian David

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9783110451511
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Metafisica filosofica

Meinong-Studies, Vol. 6, contains papers focusing on the connections between intentionality and nonexistent objects, presenting historical analyses on the background of Meinong's philosophical position up to the Meinong-Russell-Debate. It also contains systematic studies of fictional characters, of Kripke's alternative theory of fiction, and of the relevance of fictions playing the role of assumptions in scientific contexts. The volume is completed by biographical sketches of Christian von Ehrenfels, founder of Gestalt-theory and Meinong's close friend, and of Ernst Mally, disciple of Meinong and successor to his chair.

Endnotes

1	The derelativization R* of a binary relation R is the property possessed by an individual x when there is at least one individual y to which x bears the relation R: ∀x (R*(x) ↔ ∃yR(x,y))
2	A (monadic) adverb can be abstractly conceived as an operator X that associates predicates to predicates (P ⇒ X(P); e.g., if X = ‘fast’, X(running) = the predicate ‘running fast’). In this context, we assume that for every name a there is an associated monadic adverb ‘a-ly’, in symbols [a], such that for every binary predicate R: ∀x (([a]R*)(x) ↔ R(x,a)).
3	In the literature it is customary to refer to inferences as those instantiated by (10) and (11) with the name of existential generalization. This terminology comes from Quine 1953, VIII. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to talk of existential introduction for (11).
4	For the following distinctions, see Künne 2007, 54.
5	[T]he expression ‘A has b’, is the general form of any proposition whatever, since all propositions can be represented by this concatenation of signs (WL I, 393).
6	WL II, 26–27: “The proposition ‘A has b’ has no other sense than that every object under A has one of the qualities that fall under b; and if there are several of the latter it remains undetermined, which of them belong to every A” (my emphasis). Also cf. BGA II A, 12/2, 61 & 105; Übersicht, 30–31.
7	As customary in the Bolzano literature, I use square brackets to designate the concept that is expressed by the filling of the brackets. Cf. e.g. Morscher 2007, 29. Künne 2008, 238. This use derives from Quine 1960, 165, 168–9, 194.
8	As to ‘exists’ as concept of concepts, see e.g. Frege 1884, § 53; 1892, 200; 1903, 373; 1910, 18.
9	Cf. WL II, 53f. As to Bolzano’s conception of the universal quantifier - that is at variance with Bolzano’s existential quantifier and with both quantifiers by Frege, it is not a second-order predicate - see WL I 246–251; II 216–218.
10	In this case the object that falls under the subject-concept is the collection of the Romans.
11	Incidentally, note that in (*) ‘Teams of scientists have searched for Vulcan’ we use ‘teams of scientists’ in exactly the sense considered by Bolzano at WL I, 248: “In my opinion, […] we […] use [the words ‘any’ and ‘every’] when it is our purpose to clear a word from additional concepts generally associated with the word ‘some’ […]. I take it that the expression ‘any man’ means no more that what we think by the expression ‘man’ alone, indeed what we must think by the word ‘man’ if we do not want to limit it arbitrarily to one or the other class of men; the only point of the addition ‘any’ is to prevent such a limitation.” What we are saying with (*) is: “the quality [of having searched for Vulcan] belongs to some, but not to all […] [teams of scientists]” (WL II, 216).
12	Meinong 1904, 489. Engl. transl. in Chisholm 1960, 82. Cp. Mally 1904, ch. 1, § 3. On the principle of independence of the being-so from the being see: Chisholm 1960, 6ff. & 1982, 39–40; 52; Lambert 1983 18–23; Casari 2009, 46–47.
13	Meinong 1904, 486ff. Engl. transl., 78ff. Cp. Lambert 1983, 13; Smith 1985, 307.
14	Meinong 1904, 490ff. Engl. transl., 83ff. Cp. Chisholm 1982, 39f.; 53f.; Lambert 1983, 14–15.
15	For the difference between content (Inhalt) and object (Gegenstand) see Meinong 1899, 381–387. For the semiotic relations see Meinong 1902, 21–41. Hereto cp. Simons 1988, 401. As to the psychologization of the Bolzanian Inhalt see Höfler 1890, § 6; Twardowski 1894, 11 fn.
16	Loc. cit. 491. Engl. transl. 84. Cp. Lambert 1983, 36ff.
17	On incomplete objects see Meinong 1907, 118–123; Meinong 1915, 168ff. Hereto cp. Chisholm 1982, 48–52 & 56–57.
18	Consider, for instance, the set of properties constituted of all my properties, except that the one of being black-haired is replaced by that of being blond-haired. According to the principle of independence of the being-so from the being, there is an object that has all these properties and no others. This object will be com plete but it will not be existent. Cf. Parsons 1980, 20–21; Reicher 2006, 17.
19	Russell 1905, 485 & Letter to Meinong of 1906 in: Meinong 1965, 151–152. Eng. trans. in: Smith 1985, 348–349.
20	This section of the paper partially originates from a talk I gave at the University of Hamburg at a seminar headed by Wolfgang Künne. I owe reconstruction of the below arguments I, II and II* to Wolfgang Künne.
21	As to the course of the controversy, see Simons 1988. Also cf. Ryle 1972, 256ff. (though less rich in details from an historical point of view).
22	In: Meinong 1965, 150–151. Eng. trans. in: Russell 1973, 15–16. Cf. Simons 1988, 410.
23	Cf. Russell 1944, 13: “The desire to avoid Meinong’s unduly populous realm of being led me to the theory of descriptions”. This “official view”, promoted by Russell himself, is a controversial issue in the literature. For arguments in favour of the view that Russell’s theory of definite descriptions was stated to solve problems which have little connection with Meinong, see Cartwright 1987; Hylton 1990; Griffin 1996, 57; Boukema 2007.
24	Russell 1905a, 482–483. Cf. Smith 1985, 309–310; 311.
25	Principle of Independence.
26	Meinong (1907), 222. Translation mine.
27	Cp. the tripartite structure of Husserl’s 1896 Logic Lectures (Husserl 2001), and what Husserl himself ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• STEFANIA CENTRONE Relational Theories of Intentionality and the Problem of Non-Existents
• PETER ANDRAS VARGA The Non-Existing Object Revisited: Meinong as the Link between Husserl and Russell?
• DALE JACQUETTE Anti-Meinongian Actualist Meaning of Fiction in Kripke’s 1973 John Locke Lectures
• MICHELE PAOLINI PAOLETTI Paradise on the Cheap. Ascriptivism about Ficta
• XAVIER DE DONATO-RODRÍGUEZ Meinong’s Theory of Assumptions and its Relevance for Scientific Contexts
• JUTTA VALENT Christian von Ehrenfels. Eine intellektuelle Biographie: Neue Forschungsergebnisse aus dem Nachlass
• MARKUS ROSCHITZ Zu Ernst Mallys Lebensgang, Umfeld und akademischer Laufbahn
• Endnotes