Kant on Love

Pärttyli Rinne

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9783110543896
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Modern Philosophy

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren damit den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

1Self-Love

According to Kant, it is a basic fact of human nature that we all love ourselves. Human beings are imperfect rational creatures who want things to go well for themselves, and there is really no way around this fundamental trait of our species. We want to be happy. Indeed, Kant tends to describe self-love [Selbstliebe, Eigenliebe]6 as the basic principle of subjective happiness. Self-love is the natural motivational ground of action, to which the moral incentive (respect for the moral law) is opposed. Self-love is active within us, and it is only hindered by morality to the extent that it gives rise to contra-moral inclinations. There are duties in Kantian ethics, of course (e. g. the duties to perfect oneself and to promote the happiness of others), and in light of our duties we should keep self-love in check and diminish its influence. Self-love can often appear as selfishness, and as such it is prone to impede our striving for virtue. It may threaten the freedom and happiness of others.

But what does the above actually mean, and can something like this be said to be the whole picture of self-love in Kant? While the basics are relatively simple from the perspective of moral theory, self-love poses problems for Kant’s ethics. It is a significant concept in his moral philosophy and has received attention from scholars. Treatments of self-love in the previous literature, however, can be quite varied. Some view self-love as ‘an objective principle of practical reason’ (Paton 1947, p. 91) or even as ‘furthering morality’ (Šimfa 2013, p. 107), whereas others hold that ‘love is not an attitude that clear-sighted and rational people could ever take toward themselves.’ (Wood 1996, p. 144) Often, scholars touch upon self-love in discussing other issues, such as beneficence (Hill 1993), benevolence (Edwards 2000), or respect for the moral law (e. g. Reath 2006; Engstrom 2010)7. Yet none of the previous readings aim to provide a systematic, exegetical interpretation of the notion of self-love.

My fundamental goal is to understand the intricate structure of self-love and the role it plays in Kant’s thought. What, for instance, does Kant mean when he says that self-love is a predisposition to the good (R, 6:26)? Or when he argues that it is the source of evil (R, 6:45)? What does he mean when he holds that all material practical principles fall under self-love (C2, 5:22)? What is the status of rational self-love (C2, 5:73; cf. R, 6:45–46fn.), and how does self-love relate to the general division of love into love of benevolence and love of delight? Finally, what is the place of self-love in the infinite progress towards moral perfection – will it continue to exist or not?

In what follows, I shall present what I call a ‘three-level’ interpretation of Kantian self-love, according to which the concept of self-love is divisible into ascending levels of rationality. I begin by discussing self-love at a rudimentary, non-rational level of the cognitive structure of the human being, where it figures as the strongest impulses of human nature. These fundamental animal impulses include self-preservation (love of life), preservation of the species (sexuality and parenting), and sociality. Together, they may be identified as ‘animal mechanical self-love’, and according to Kant they constitute a predisposition to the good. The main point of the first section is to lay the ground for the three-level interpretation of self-love (and for the ascent model of love in Kant more generally) by showing that Kant discusses the strongest impulses of human nature in terms of love. I will strive to understand why Kant calls these non-rational animal impulses ‘love’ in the first place, and why he thinks that they constitute a predisposition to the good. To this end, I will also problematise the relationship between animal self-love and the ‘self-love of humanity’ (the latter of which implies what I call the ‘middle level’ of self-love) by looking at notions of sociality and love of honour in this context.

Second, I analyse the middle level of self-love in more detail, from the perspective of Kant’s moral philosophy. I argue that this level of self-love is best approached by acknowledging the operation of the general division of love as love of benevolence and love of delight. This level implies the actuality of reason, and here self-love can be considered to inform all non-moral ends the agent may have and the instrumental reasoning related to them. The middle level brings with it the notion of self-conceit, which Kant incorporates into the framework of self-love through very complicated discussions. Love of benevolence for oneself is willing one’s own happiness (or love from others), and this is a permanent and acceptable part of humanity; self-conceit, by contrast, is a morally reprehensible, delusional delight [Wohlgefallen] taken in a sense of special self-worth in comparison with others. Self-conceit arises when one makes the self-love of benevolence an unconditional law. Rational self-love, on the other hand, refers to the middle level of self-love under moral conditions: it is prudence limited by morality (love of benevolence) or moral self-contentment (love of delight).

Third, I consider what would happen to self-love in the ideally rational state of moral existence, where the highest good as moral happiness is realised as closely as possible. Here, I argue that because the end of morality will necessarily involve happiness, it follows that self-benevolence and moral self-contentment will be present in the infinite approximation towards the highest good. I don’t see a way to conceive of morally deserved happiness without including some kind of self-benevolence or moral self-contentment, both of which can arguably be cashed out in terms of self-love. Hence, the three levels of self-love in my interpretation consist of: 1) animal mechanical self-love; 2) the middle level or general division of self-love; and 3) self-love and the highest good.

I thus argue that while there is an important sense in which self-love is in tension with morality and constitutes an obstacle to moral progress, it is an irreplaceable component of human existence. In Kant’s moral thought, there is no prescription (or even possibility) of a type of agency that is completely stripped of self-love (even though unselfish acts may very well be commanded). Self-love cuts through the ascending levels of the cognitive structure of the moral agent and can also be used to illuminate the notion of moral progress from a broader species perspective. Although the third and highest level of self-love is of course idealised, it functions in my argument to illustrate the persistence of self-love in the infinite approximation to the highest good. No matter how closely the moral happiness of all rational creatures is realised, the Kantian agent will still retain some minimum of an attitude of love towards herself.

Overall, then, the three-level interpretation of self-love has two exegetical functions: 1) it outlines the first relatively comprehensive analysis of the conceptual structure of self-love in Kant, and 2) it serves as a preliminary for the ascent view of Kant’s conception of love as a whole.

1.1Animal Mechanical Self-Love

We cry for food and flee from fire. We crave sex, even without seeing or thinking of anyone in particular to have sex with. We will do almost anything to keep our children alive. We are drawn to others of our kind for warmth, shelter, and acceptance. These notions clearly express fundamental human desires – desires that members of our species tend to share. But are these desires expressions of love? And if so, how?

Kant does think that crude self-preservation, sexuality and care for offspring, and our instinctive attraction to other human beings can be discussed in terms of love. But these loves, at their natural core, are not Kant’s usual concern when he talks about love. They are not his concern when he writes in the Religion: ‘Like love in general, self-love too can be divided into love of benevolence and love of delight (BENEVOLENTIAE ET COMPLACENTIAE), and both (as is self-evident) must be rational.’ (R, 6:45.22–25)8 As such, the crude natural loves, as fundamental impulses of desire, operate completely irrespective of reason. They are non-rational, and they are neither benevolence nor delight. Given that the first major claim of my book is that the general division of love into love of benevolence and love of delight is a key to understanding love in Kant, it may seem peculiar that I begin the overall argument by pointing to a love (or a set of loves) that is not grasped by the general division of love. I seem to begin with a counterexample to what I wish to argue for. But while the general division of love is indeed a key to understanding love in Kant, it does not follow that the concept of love in Kant is completely reducible to the general division. This leaves us with the problem of how to understand those loves that Kant discusses as love but that do not fall into the general division of love. It is this task that I will now undertake with respect to the ‘lowest’ possible level of human existence.

The main point of the first section is to show that Kant thinks of the strongest impulses of human nature in terms of love. Together, these non-rational drives may be identified as animal mechanical self-love. But to say just that is not very conducive to understanding Kant’s view. While the main point is necessary for the argument of this chapter (and for the ascent model of love in Kant as a whole), it is equally important to ask what Kant means when he speaks of love as he does. In particular, there are two questions I find pressing in the context of animal mechanical self-love. Why does Kant call these non-rational drives ‘love’ in the first place? And what does he mean when he says that animal mechanical self-love is a ‘predisposition to the good’? In this section I provide some answers to these questions.

In the first part of Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason, Kant asserts that there is an ‘original predisposition to good in human nature’ (R, 6:26.2–39; see also 6:43.18–21). The original predisposition to the good consists of three aspects of the human being (or the whole species)10 in an ascending order: 1) animality (life); 2) humanity (rational life); and 3) personality (rational responsible life). The third predisposition is about morality, which is not my concern at this particular point, but the first two are explicitly articulated in terms of self-love. The first is about non-rational animal self-love, and the second is about a self-love for which reason is required. Because the latter is relevant to understanding the former, I will return to it later on in the section. With regard to the first predisposition, Kant writes:

1. The predisposition to ANIMALITY in the human being may be brought under the general title of physical and merely mechanical self-love, i. e. a love for which reason is not required. It is three-fold: first, for self-preservation; second, for the propagation of the species, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the offspring thereby begotten through breeding; third, for community with other human beings, i.e. the social drive. (R, 6:26.12–18)11

As this passage clearly shows, Kant thinks that certain non-rational animal drives – self-preservation, sexuality and parenting, and sociality – are species of ‘self-love’. But why does Kant use the word ‘love’ at all in this context?12 He speaks elsewhere of ‘love of life’ [Liebe zum Leben] and ‘sexual love’ [Liebe zum Geschlecht] in the context of depicting ‘the strongest impulses of nature’ [die stärksten Antriebe der Natur], linking love of life to self-preservation and sexual love to the preservation of the species (AP, 7:276.28–33). In one sense it is obvious why Kant might use the word ‘love’ in the context of sexuality: there has been a close association between love and sexuality ever since the ancients, as Eros, which is traditionally used to depict sexual desire, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Acknowledgments
• Contents
• Introduction
• 1 Self-Love
• 2 Sexual Love
• 3 Love of God
• 4 Love of Neighbour
• 5 Love in Friendship
• Conclusion
• Appendix: Explanatory Note on Fig. 8
• Bibliography
• Index of Persons
• Subject Index