Liberal Perfectionism

Alexandra Couto

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9783110372984
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Much of the recent literature on political perfectionism has focused on dealing with objections to this view. This book adopts a different approach: It attempts to highlight the intuitive appeal of liberal perfectionism by presenting a positive prima facie argument in its favour. The book starts by clarifying the relation between political perfectionism — a conception of politics — and prudential perfectionism and ethical perfectionism — a conception of the good life, and a type of ethical theory. It is crucial to start by selecting a plausible form of ethical perfectionism, as it makes an important difference to the plausibility of the political conception based upon it. Once appropriate distinctions are drawn and a plausible form of liberal perfectionism is endorsed, many of the standard objections to perfectionism are shown to fail to reach their target. Different arguments in favour of liberal perfectionism are then proposed and critically examined, but the resilience of some pragmatic arguments against liberal perfectionism is conceded. The book ends by showing that perfectionism can be surprisingly relevant for discussions of social justice and proceeds to draw a sketch of the perfectionist implications for questions of distributive justice.

1 Perfectionism: Some Basic Distinctions

A serious flaw of the current literature on perfectionism, I believe, is that Prudential , Ethical and Political Perfectionism aren’t always properly distinguished. This chapter will be devoted to clarifying the relation between Political Perfectionism – a conception of politics – and Prudential Perfectionism and Ethical Perfectionism – a conception of the good life, and a type of ethical theory. I will start by defining Ethical and Prudential Perfectionism and discuss their main features. I will suggest that Ethical Perfectionism is best seen as grounded in Prudential Perfectionism, which I take to be equivalent to an Objective List conception of the good life. However, I will argue that it’s possible to endorse Prudential Perfectionism without being committed to Ethical Perfectionism, as one might believe in a perfectionist conception of the good life, while also holding that this conception of the good life should not ground one’s ethical theory (and further that this conception of the good life does not ground one’s political theory). As it is uncommon for a political perfectionist to begin with a discussion of Ethical Perfectionism, it might be worth briefly explaining why I think that this is an important, and indeed necessary, starting point. I believe that we need to start with an account of Ethical Perfectionism for three reasons: First, political theories are almost invariably committed to at least some ethical beliefs and it is better to be explicit about these commitments. Second, Political Perfectionism lacks a concrete content if its ethical underpinnings are not specified. Third, I believe that it is easier to motivate a Political Perfectionism that is associated with some explicit moral claims, given that moral commitments have priority over other kinds of commitments.

After setting out these basic distinctions, I will turn to clarify the nature of Prudential Perfectionism. I will examine the relationship between well-being and intrinsically and objectively valuable goods. Prudential Perfectionism is distinctive in that its conception of the good life is based on identifying a variety of goods that are intrinsically and objectively valuable and constitutive of well-being. I will then argue in favour of prudential perfectionism. For that purpose, I will present some negative arguments against hedonist and desire-based conceptions of well-being. I will then point to some intuitions in favour of Prudential Perfectionism. Finally, I will argue that the steps from Prudential to Ethical Perfectionism and from Ethical Perfectionism to Political Perfectionism are easy enough to make.

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1.1 Defining Ethical Perfectionism, Prudential Perfectionism and Political Perfectionism

If one has the intention of identifying a set of features that group together all the different texts that have been labelled as perfectionist in the history of Western culture, I would have to agree with Stanley Cavell that no such definition can be given.³⁹ However, I am presenting here not a historical account of perfectionist theories, but a theoretical account of what I take to be the most plausible version of what I will call Ethical Perfectionism. For that purpose, a more precise definition is both feasible and advisable. For now let us provisionally define Ethical Perfectionism (EP) as an ethical theory that combines the following three claims:

• (a) certain goods and activities are objectively and intrinsically valuable;
• (b) an engagement with these goods constitutes an agent’s well-being;
• (c) these goods play a foundational role in determining what is morally right.

The two first features (a) and (b) are critical because they distinguish perfectionism from, on one hand, hedonist and desire-satisfaction theories of well-being and, on the other hand, at the political level, a neutralist conception of the good, such as Rawls’s, which recognises only some goods as all-purpose goods (goods that could be instrumental to diverse conceptions of the good). It is important to distinguish Ethical Perfectionism (henceforth, EP) from Prudential Perfectionism.⁴⁰ On my view, Prudential Perfectionism endorses only (a) and (b) (i.e. an objective list conception of well-being (henceforth OL)), while EP endorses (a), (b) and (c). The distinction between Prudential Perfectionism and EP is useful because some authors that are taken to be perfectionists in fact seem committed only to an Objective List conception of well-being (that is, only to Prudential Perfectionism). These include, on my reading, Brad Hooker, Richard Arneson,⁴¹ and George Sher⁴². I will refer to these authors as Prudential Perfectionists.

Let us start then by clarifying Prudential Perfectionism. On this view, there is a list of objective⁴³ goods (perfections or excellences)⁴⁴ that are constitutive of well-being and that we should strive for our own good. EP makes a further ethical claim. In its strongest and simplest form, it claims that to strive for objective goods is what is morally right: right action is constituted by the promotion of these goods. But to be perfectionist, it’s enough if a theory accepts an OL conception of well-being and gives a foundational moral role to the promotion of objective goods; perfectionists can thus recognise other moral considerations apart from the promotion of excellences. Now this foundational role given to the promotion of the good in defining the right is of course not distinctive of perfectionism, since consequentialism and virtue ethics hold roughly the same view on the relation between the right and the good.⁴⁵ In chapter 3, I will clarify the relation between EP and these distinct views.

As I have defined it, EP presupposes Prudential Perfectionism. However, the endorsement of Prudential Perfectionism does not commit us to EP. A Prudential Perfectionism approach takes certain objective goods to be prudentially valuable, but this needn’t imply a particular stand on moral rightness.⁴⁶

Now, you might ask: What is the relationship between Prudential Perfectionism and Ethical Perfectionism, on one hand, and Political Perfectionism, on the other hand? I define Political Perfectionism as the claim that the state is permitted and justified to protect and promote the opportunities for citizens to engage with intrinsically valuable goods. The short reply to the question of what is the relationship between these three notions is that Ethical Perfectionism (and thus also Prudential Perfectionism) is necessary for a plausible conception of Political Perfectionism. EP offers a substantive account of the good (Prudential Perfectionism) and argues that we are ethically required to promote these goods. I will argue below that it is necessary to endorse these two claims in order to defend Political Perfectionism. But beware as the reverse is not true; Ethical Perfectionism does not entail the endorsement of Political Perfectionism. The endorsement of Ethical Perfectionism gives us a reason to protect and promote the well-being of individuals, but there might be other considerations that would bar the extension of EP into Political Perfectionism. An example of such considerations would be to claim that it is not the proper role of the state to enforce ethical values on its citizens; i.e. a commitment to neutrality (according to which the state should refrain from justifying a particular policy by referring to a particular moral theory or conception of the good). The endorsement of Ethical Perfectionism can thus be compatible with the endorsement of political neutrality. Although EP is compatible with political neutrality, it is fundamentally incompatible with philosophical neutrality. Philosophical neutrality is neutrality applied to philosophical theories, that is, the absence of commitment to any specific philosophical conception. In ethics, philosophical neutrality would require no commitment to any ethical or meta-ethical view. One can thus combine a commitment to a conception of the good at the ethical level with non-perfectionist politics, as Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. den Uyl’s have done in their book Norms of Liberty.⁴⁷ I will discuss different arguments in favour of Political Perfectionism in chapter 4 and chapter 5 and reject the claim that the liberal state could be neutral.

Earlier, I distinguished the OL view from hedonic and desire-satisfaction conceptions of well-being. Now I will distinguish the OL list of goods from a neutralist list of goods. A neutralist list of goods is not a competing conception of well-being. It is used in a political context, to compare the well-being of individuals. Both perfectionists and neutralists may endorse a list of goods that are crucial for an agent’s well-being. They nevertheless have a different understanding of the relation between these goods and well-being. On the neutralist conception of well-being, the goods are merely instrumentally valuable to promoting well-being. The goods on the index of primary goods are not excellences, because they do not have intrinsic value; they are taken to be only means to the realisation of individuals’ different conceptions of the good: ‘… primary goods are things that men generally want in order to achieve their ends whatever they are….But of course accepting them for the purpose of an index does not establish a standard of excellence.’⁴⁸ However, on a perfectionist view, the goods are intrinsically valuable and constitutive of well-being. Even a partial liberal account of the good might be said to be perfectionist as long as it affirms certain goods to be objectively and intrinsically valuable and does not ground the list of goods on an overlapping consensus. William Galston, for instance, suggests also a liberal account of the good, which is ‘deliberately thin’.⁴⁹ Galston claims that this liberal account of the good constitutes a kind of ‘minimal perfectionism’ in that it defines a range of normal human functioning.

1.2 Why Political Perfectionism Requires an Account of Ethical Perfectionism

Political perfectionism is often considered independently from its ethical foundations. The first question that needs to be answered is thus: Why should we start with EP and not proceed directly to the examination of Political Perfectionism (henceforth PP)? After all, some authors have defended PP without explicitly committing themselves to EP. Even Raz who argues for an Objective List conception would prefer, somewhat inconsistently, his PP to remain indifferent with respect to desire-based conceptions of the good and objective list conceptions of the good.⁵⁰ Steven Wall takes a similar position but he ultimately admits that PP would benefit from endorsing a conception of the good.⁵¹ I think that there are three main reasons for providing an account of EP before examining PP.

First, I reject the plausibility of a political philosophy that is ‘epistemically abstinent’, to use Raz’s phrase, where epistemic abstinence refers to the refusal by Rawls and his followers to endorse truth-claims.⁵² Rawls held that political theories should be neutral between competing conceptions of the good.⁵³ This decision (of epistemic abstinence) may be interpreted as scepticism, as Brian Barry does. But Rawls is very clear on this: he chooses epistemic abstinence because it allows him to satisfy the aim of political philosophy, the achievement of a consensus. Raz argues, however, that endorsing epistemic abstinence while defending a political theory is paradoxical: ‘To recommend one [political theory] as a theory of justice for our societies is to recommend it as a just theory of justice, that is, as a true, or reasonable, or valid theory of justice.’ A political theorist cannot refrain from making judgements about the true and the right as the promotion of a political theory requires the conviction that it is a justified or valid theory. Furthermore, Raz argues that claiming the truth of a limited number of moral values delimits the range of comprehensive views that can be adopted.⁵⁴ Although Raz does not develop this point further, I suggest the following: to claim a foundational value as true commits the claim-holder to a meta-ethical view about the status of moral values.

That would lead to the forfeiture of philosophical neutrality and a commitment to cognitivist meta-ethical views. Onora O’Neill similarly argues that any political theory that takes rights and equality seriously ought to refrain from metaphysical agnosticism. This has for implication that liberal neutralist could be charged not only of epistemic abstinence but also of metaphysical abstinence, as Vinit Haksar has argued in Equality, Liberty and Perfectionism.⁵⁵

In light of the above, I reject an epistemically abstinent approach such as Rawls’s and Nussbaum’s, where a political perfectionism centred around the promotion of good and valuable lives nevertheless refuses to explicitly endorse some conception of the good as objectively true.

Second, EP has more normative force than Prudential Perfectionism and as such can give more legitimacy to Political Perfectionism. PP is contentious enough and many would be suspicious of the thought that it would be legitimate to promote through political means a particular conception of the good. If we skip the crucial stage of examining EP, it would be even harder to make the legitimacy of this goal persuasive. In other words, given that PP recommends that state actions should be given more scope, it is important to provide a convincing philosophical and moral grounding for that increase in state power.

Third, Political Perfectionism would be underdetermined without a specification of the Ethical Perfectionism on which it is grounded. Political Perfectionism requires some account of the good and the morally valuable to have gen...

Table of contents

• Practical Philosophy
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Acknowledgements
• Table of Contents
• 0 Introduction
• 1 Perfectionism: Some Basic Distinctions
• 2 Perfectionist Goods
• 3 Ethical Perfectionism: Distinctions and Objections
• 4 The Reasons that Goodness Gives
• 5 The Consistency Argument
• 6 The Location of Unfairness
• 7 Conclusion
• Bibliography